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                                CHAPTER ONE 
                              INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 GENERAL ISSUES IN THE AREA OF STUDY 
The financial system in any country is the framework within which capital formation takes 
place. This is made possible by the intermediation role of financial institutions like 
commercial banks and insurance companies. The Nigerian financial system consists of 
three levels of banking institutions such as: A-(i) Central Bank (ii) Nigerian Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (iii) Deposit Money Banks – DMB (iv) Microfinance Banks (v) 
Saving Institutions e.g. Federal Mortgage Bank (B) Development Banks (C) Money and 
Capital markets. The focus of this study is on the Deposit Money banks (Hitherto called 
Commercial banks by the apex bank), which had been the target of recapitalization. With 
the implementation of Universal banking by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) on 
January 2001 a level playing ground was created for all banks in Nigeria. Adequate capital 
is regarded as the bedrock of safe banking system. A sound bank capital base gives a 
competitive edge and enables it to provide better services and ultimately increase its 
earnings.  
Bank capitalization is the act of supplying long-term funds to a bank in order to place the 
bank in a good position to carry out the business of banking. Bank recapitalization is the 
act of beefing up the long-term capital of a bank to the level at least required by the 
monetary authorities and to ensure the security of shareholders fund (equity plus reserve). 
On the other side, capital cannot perform without good management from those at the top 
echelons of the organization. Capitalization in this study refers to a concept and not a 
variable for measurement per se. Rather; it refers to a number of variables of interest which 
are produced from the existence of funds for use in the process of intermediation. From 
these funds, obviously concepts such as rate of Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Capital 
(ROC) and Shareholders Fund (SHF) are derivatives from the use of funds. Management 
need to employ the assets and capital of the bank judiciously for positive results. Absence 
of corporate governance has been attributed to the distress experienced in the banking 
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industry in the past. The recapitalization policy is just one of about 13 issues announced in 
July 2004 by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in order to sanitize the banking industry. 
The CBN Governor noted that the vision or prospect of the CBN and the Federal 
Government of Nigeria is a banking system that is part of the global change, and which is 
strong and reliable. It is a banking system which must be efficient, depositors can trust and 
investors can rely upon. This is the Consolidation era (2004- till date). It is the era of ―13-
point Reform Agenda for Repositioning the CBN and the Financial System for the 21st 
Century‖. To achieve this prospect, the following framework (13 issues) was put in place. 
i.  Requirement that the minimum capitalization for banks should be N25 
billion with full compliance before the end of December 2005 (that is, 18 
months rather than 12 months normally given in many countries) for 
example, South Korea, Malayia, Indonesia, Japan. Only banks that met 
with the requirement above were licensed to undertake banking business. 
Others that failed to meet up either merged or were liquidated.  For the first 
time, the Nigerian banking industry witnessed merger between the small 
and big banks as shown in table 1 below. 
ii. Phased withdrawal of public sector funds from banks from July, 2004. 
iii. Consolidation of banking institutions through mergers and acquisitions. 
iv.  Adoption of zero tolerance in the regulatory framework; especially in the 
area of data/information rendition/reporting, where all returns by banks 
must be signed by the Managing Directors of the banks. Hiding of 
information under other assets/liabilities, off-balance sheets will henceforth 
attract serious sanctions. 
v. The automation process for rendition of returns by banks and other financial 
institutions through the electronic Financial Analysis and Surveillance 
System (e-FASS) will now be emphasized. 
vi.  Adoption of a risk-focused and rule-based regulatory framework. 
vii. Establishment of a Hotline, Confidential internet Address 
(governor@cebank.org) for all Nigerians wishing to share any confidential 
information with the Governor of the Central Bank on the operations of 
any bank or the financial system. 
 3 
TABLE  1 : THE EMERGING BANKS IN THE NIGERIAN BANKING INDUSTRY AS  AT DECEMBER, 2005 
N/S GROUP MEMBERS SHARE- 
HOLDERS 
FUNDS 
N 
TOTAL 
ASSETS 
N 
TOTAL 
DEPOSITS 
N 
1 Access Bank AB, Marina Int‘ Bank & Capital Bank 28.6BN 174bn 110bn 
2 Afribank Afribank Inter (Merchant Bankers) 27.1bn 129  bn 94bn 
3 Bank PHB Plc Platinum Bank & Habib Bank 28bn 156bn 109bn 
4 Diamond Bank Diamond Bank and Lion Bank 34.9bn 223bn 144bn 
5 ETB Equatorial Trust Bank & Devcom Bank 28.4bn 109.7bn 72.7bn 
6 Ecobank Ecobank alone 35.3bn 132.0bn 84.0bn 
7 FCMB FCMB,Coop. Bank, Nigeria-America 
Merchant Bank 
25.2bn 106bn 70.3bn 
8 Fidelity Bank Fidelity Bank, FSB International Bank 
&Manny Bank 
25.6bn 120bn 78bn 
9 First Bank First Bank Plc and MBC International Bank 
Plc 
58.9bn 538.1bn 391.2bn 
10 First Inland Bank FTB, Inland Bank, IMB,& NUB Bank 29.4bn 130bn 80bn 
11 Guaranty Trust GTB alone 36.4bn 305.1bn 212.8bn 
12 IBTC – Stanbic bank  Over 60bn  100bn Over 63bn 
13 Intercontinental Bank Intercontinental Bank, Equity Bank, Global 
Bank and Gate way Bank 
53bn  360bn 252.2bn 
14 NIB NIB alone 35.2bn 112.2bn 61bn 
15 Oceanic Bank Oceanic Bank, Stanbic & Int‘Trust Bank 37.1bn 371.6bn 310.3bn 
16 Skye Bank Prudent Bank, EIB Inter, Bond Bank, Reliance 
& Coop. Ban k 
37.7bn 176bn 70bn 
17 Spring  Bank Citizens Inter‘ bank, Guardian Express Bank, 
ACB Inter‘ bank, Omegabank,,  Fountain 
Trust Bank &Trans Inter‘  bank. 
Over  25b 131 bn N/A 
18 Standard Chartered Standard Chartered alone 26bn 34.72 23.5bn 
19 Sterling Bank Trust Bank of Africa, Magnum Trust Bank, 
NBM Bank, NAL Bank & Indo-Nigeria Bank 
35bn 111.2bn 75.0bn 
20 UBA UBA & STB 47bn 851.2bn 757.4bn 
21 Union Bank UBN, Universal Trust Bank, Hallmark Bank 95.6bn 517.5 bn 275.5bn 
22 Unity Bank   Intercity Bank, First Inter State Bank, Tropical 
Commercial Bank, Centre Point Bank, Bank 
of the North, Societte Bancaire,New Africa 
Bank & Pacific Bank,NNB Inter‘  
30bn 100bn N/A 
23 Wema  Lead bank, National Bank, Wema Bank 34.8 bn 127.7bn 78bn 
 24 Zenith Bank Zenith Bank Plc 93bn 608.5bn 392.8bn 
Source: Compiled from Annual Financial Statement of Banks and CBN Banking Supervision Annual Report  
             2006/2007 
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viii. Strict enforcement of the contingency planning framework for systemic 
banking distress. 
ix.  Establishment of an Asset Management Company as an important element 
of distress resolution. 
x.  Promotion of the enforcement of dormant laws, especially those relating to 
the issuance of dud cheques, and the law relating to vicarious liabilities of 
the Board members of banks in cases of failings by banks. 
xi.  Close collaboration with Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) in the establishment of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), and 
the enforcement of the anti-money laundering laws. 
xii.  Revision and updating of relevant laws, and drafting of new ones relating 
to the effective operations of the banking system. 
xiii. Single obligor limit of 10% of shareholders‘ funds as opposed to the present 
25%, with aggregate borrowing pegged at 800% of shareholders‘ funds. 
This was actually stated by the CBN director of banking supervision.               
 CBN conditions for banks for mergers/takeovers are contained in the CBN guidelines and 
incentives on Banking Sector Consolidation issued on 5th August 2004, and the Procedures 
Manual for Processing Applications for Bank Mergers/Takeover issued in December, but 
revised in March 30, 2005 among others (Soludo, 2004).  
 
According to Sanni (2007), “The numbers of distress banks rose from 9 in 1990 to 60 in 
1995 and later dropped to 9 in 2001.Those that could not be salvaged were allowed to 
go under. Between 1994 and 2002, a total of 33 banks were closed. The situation 
continued to worsen. As at end-December 2003, the asset quality of the banking sector 
further deteriorated as the total non-performing credit increased from N100 billion in 
2000 to N236 billion in 2003. Thus the ratio of non-performing credit to total credit 
also increased from 17.64 percent to 25.79 percent. This was below the trigger level of 
35 percent for setting on the Crisis Management Unit as stipulated in the Framework 
for contingency Planning for Systemic Distress and Crisis…”. The precarious scenario 
was further compounded by the structural weaknesses in the banking sector, 
particularly the high incidence of insider lending activities, dominance of inefficient 
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state-owned banks, political interference and the general economic environment arising 
from deteriorating macroeconomic conditions”. 
 
The issue of bank capitalization in most economies today has been how to resolve the 
problem of unsound bank, enhance efficient management of the banking system, provide 
better funding for banks lending activities, reduce non-performing loans and advances, 
increase profitability, reduce risk, to ensure quality asset management and to put banks in a 
strong liquid position to meet customers obligation at all times. For instance, the distress 
that was pervasive in the Nigerian banking system in the mid-1990s was due to amongst 
others, illiquidity in the banking system which led to the loss of customers‘ confidence in 
the banking industry. The move by the CBN to raise the minimum paid up capital of banks 
to N25 billion was aimed at strengthening the Nigerian banking industry. It is imperative 
for banks to meet up the required level of capital for sound and safe banking. Capital 
adequacy is important for banks to absorb risks till banks are able to generate profit. 
However, banks that are able to exceed the capital requirement stand a better chance of 
luring customers and instilling confidence in the system.  
In contemporary Nigerian banking system, bank capital has attracted more attention from 
the regulatory authorities because of the expected role they play within the domestic and 
external economy. Today, banks are still going to the capital market to solicit for funds 
irrespective of the fact that they have met the capital requirement because they want to be 
relevant globally.   In this study, bank capital is not considered in isolation to performance 
but other specific variables would be used to explain the relationship between bank capital, 
management and performance in Nigeria.  Performance is not also a matter of only profit. 
Investment, loan extension and efficient use of assets etc. are performance criteria. For 
example capital/deposit ratio would affect the capital investment and profitability of banks 
positively. Other bank capital variables are explained in chapter 3 of this study.  There is 
no doubt that a Nigerian bank that has N150 billion which is about N125 billion beyond 
the capital requirement will not keep such fund idle but need to generate income from it 
through capital investment. Several research studies revealed that the motive for 
consolidation/capitalization is to maximize shareholders‘ value, make financial institutions 
more efficient, profitable and lessen non-performing loan ratios, as well as enhance the 
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recapitalization efforts of the players in the industry. Many countries of the world are now 
involved in the consolidation drive in order to avert marginalization tendencies arising 
from financial re-engineering. The current financial  reforms in Nigerian banking industry  
has become imperative, owing to the need to resolve the problem of distress; reverse the 
declining trend in the domestic economy; reinvigorate the role of the banking sector; and 
possibly refocus the ownership structure of the sub sector. 
 
Some analysts are of the view that the main motivation behind bank 
capitalization/consolidation is to maximize shareholders value which is best achieved 
through Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) and that is the experience in Nigeria. Others are 
of the view that capitalization via consolidation will not only bring about increase 
shareholders‘ worth but will also contribute to the exploitation of economies of scale, 
investment and employment opportunities. Apart from the benefits, it has its costs (direct 
and indirect). Its consequences include not only the direct effects of increased market 
power or improved efficiency, but also indirect effects. One potential indirect consequence 
may be a reduction in the availability of financial services to small customers, though it is 
a contentious issue in most literature. The potential systemic consequences of 
capitalization include changes in the safety and soundness of the financial system. 
However, the changes in competitive conditions created by the M&A may evoke 
significant reactions by rival firms in terms of their own organizational focus or managerial 
behaviour that may either augment or offset the actions of the consolidating firms. For 
example, if consolidating institutions reduce their availability of credit to some small 
businesses, other institutions may pick up some of the reduced credits, if it is value 
maximizing for them to do so. Before 1986 which has been christened Pre Sap Era the 
Nigerian banking industry was highly regulated and was subjected to many forms of 
restrictions such as products and activities. Banks were made to play development role for 
which they were ill-equipped (due to insufficient capital).This led to mismatch in assets 
and liabilities. After 1986, the monetary authorities introduced some reforms to sanitize the 
operations of banks in a deregulated environment. One of such policies was the Prudential 
Guidelines of 1991 which standardized the reporting of loans and advances into 
performing and non-performing accounts. There was also the introduction of Statement of 
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Accounting Standard, the use of Stabilization securities by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) to mop up excess liquidity in the system as well the withdrawal of public sector 
deposits from deposit money banks to Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).  
All these measures affected banks profitability and their capital base. In some occasions 
they had to borrow money in the interbank at exorbitant rates. While the banking industry 
was growing at a geometric progression the real sector was growing at an arithmetic 
progression. The reason that can be adduced for this was the fact that the banks generated 
majority of their income from import finance. The impetus for the banks to support the real 
sectors of the economy was eroded since the import finance business has shorter turn-
around, and reduced risk with the potential to deliver the required profitability.  Added to 
this was the fact that the banking sector concentrated lending on state-owned institutions to 
finance fiscal deficit of the government and the losses of enterprises in which the state held 
majority shares coupled with unproductive public sector projects weakened their capital 
base. The precarious scenario was further compounded by the structural weaknesses in the 
banking sector, particularly the high incidence of insider lending activities, dominance of 
inefficient state-owned banks, political interference, and the general economic 
environment arising from deteriorating macroeconomic conditions.CBN (2006) stated that 
the objectives of the last recapitalization of Nigerian banks in 2005 were as follows: 
i.     To reduce the number of banks operating in the country from the current 89 to a 
minimum of about 12 and a maximum of 18 where resources can be fully 
maximized. At the close of 31st December 2005 twenty five (25) banks where 
registered by CBN (See Table 1 above p.3). The number of commercial banks 
in Nigeria has reduced to twenty-four (24) with the merger of IBTC and Stanbic 
Bank in 2008 (now IBTC-Stanbic bank). 
ii.      To make supervision less cumbersome, efficient and to bring about greater   
                  professionalism into the sector;   
iii.      To move the Nigerian economy forward, and to productively position the    
banking system to become a sound and reliable catalyst of development. 
According to Soludo (2004), most Nigerian banks pre-2005 recapitalization in 
Nigeria were not better than outposts for foreign exchange touting and many of 
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the Chief Executive Officers (CEO‘s) were indeed not better than some 
Nigerian in banking halls soliciting for foreign exchange;  
iv.       It will help to reduce the cost of maintaining bank directors and that will 
invariably drive down cost of funds to some extent. As more and more capital is 
being made available by the process of financial intermediation (labour being 
held constant) and has productivity increases, the capital/output ratio is 
expected to rise.  
The objective of bank capitalization is quite similar with the firm and its objectives which 
according to Baumol (1977) are to maximize sales, maximize profits, to minimize costs. 
The firm must settle for one of the three objectives or some compromise among them.  
Baumol (1977) also posited that other objectives of the firm include to stimulate the 
growth of the firm and to satisfy the interest of shareholders. The measure put in place by 
the CBN is meant to shore up output, maximize return on capital, and reduce waste by 
enthroning good governance. In the views of Samuel and Oduniyi (2004): 
 
―Prior to the N25 billion bank recapitalization, a systemic crisis had crept into banking 
industry where the capital of all the 89 banks put together happened to be less than that 
of one bank in South Africa; the most capitalized bank in Nigeria has less than 50% of 
the capital base of the least capitalized bank in Malaysia; where indeed none of our 
banks was big enough to finance a major project that may transform the economy”.  
 
The recent recapitalization in the Nigeria banking industry resulted in mergers and 
acquisition especially for banks that could not raise the N25 billion. The capital base of 
banks is reviewed by regulators from time to time to meet with international standard. The 
experience of recapitalization of banks varies from country to country because the 
economies are affected differently by macro economic variables. According to David 
(2004), banks are financial intermediaries and must ensure that deposits held with them are 
paid as at when due while also investing surplus funds in order to maximize their 
shareholders wealth. Pre -December 2005, which was the cut-off date of recapitalization, 
Soludo (2004) posited that: 
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―Nigeria with 89 banks has capital base of less than US$10 million and about 3300 
branches, compared to 8 banks in South Korea with about 4500 branches or one 
bank in South Africa with larger assets than all our 89 banks. He concluded that 
Nigerian banks need to be proactive and strategically positioned to be active players 
and not spectators in the emerging world.” 
 
In the wake of deregulation and financial liberalization of the financial sector in Nigeria, a 
number of financial institutions had emerged. For banks to play their proper role in 
financial services delivery locally and internationally, the regulators need to improve on 
the framework for the operation of bank and non-bank financial intermediaries. This 
implies that CBN needs to be given greater powers to ensure the soundness and financial 
health of the financial system while efficiently using their current power so as to sustain 
the confidence and loyalty of the public. Pre-2005 bank recapitalization, the small size of 
most of Nigerian banks, each with expensive headquarters, separate investment in software 
and hardware, heavy fixed costs and operating expenses, and with bunching of branches in 
few commercial centers led to an increase in the cost of funding the industry.  
The increasing wave of bank distress globally and especially Nigeria in the past has been a 
source of worry to regulators on how much banks should hold as capital. How much banks 
should actually hold has been one of the most controversial topics in the history of the 
banking industry. Stokes (2001) posited that bank should hold excess of reserve 
requirements to meet the standard set by the regulatory authority that is CBN, to meet 
customers‘ cash withdrawal on demand, to provide a buffer against future and unexpected 
losses. Such losses are brought about by credit, market, and operational risks inherent in 
the business of lending money. Capital is expensive for many banks and, therefore, they 
often seek to minimize the amount of capital they hold. On the other hand, regulators 
operating in the public interest are more concerned about the safety of depositors‘ funds 
hence they continually request for upward review of capital of the banks they supervise.  
 
The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of 1986 introduced in Nigeria, as an 
economic reform measure was designed to radically transform the structure of the Nigerian 
economy, which between 1982 and 1985 suffered a major structural imbalance especially 
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in its patterns of trade. The consequence of this resulted in an adverse balance of payments 
in the Nigeria‘s external trade and a grossly depleted foreign reserves position that was 
unable to cover one month‘s imports. Preceding SAP in 1986, the number of operating 
commercial and merchant banks in the country was less than sixty but trade liberalization 
and financial deregulation which were major policy issues of SAP, facilitated a 
phenomenal growth in the number of licensed banks, which peaked at 120 by 1990 while 
Community Banks (now renamed Microfinance Banks) rose to 158 as at May 1992. While 
the growth in the financial services sector was experiencing geometric progression and a 
boom, the other sectors of the economy, such as the productive sector were contracting and 
the whole economy continued to plunge deeper into recession. To gain a fair share of the 
market in a highly competitive environment, the financial services sector especially the 
banks need to be innovative. In the 1990s, the financial sector witnessed the development 
of some innovative products and services, massive investment in information technology 
and a continuously re-engineering of financial instruments to meet the needs of discerning 
customers by banks that wanted to maintain their leading position and competitive edge. 
 
On the other hand, the increase in the number of operators was not matched by a 
commensurate increase in the level of manpower and expertise needed to man and 
supervise the emergent banks as the industry human resource capability and expertise were 
overstretched. This led to increase in the number/volume of bad debts, fraud and other 
sharp malpractices in the banks. Added to this was a poor and inadequate monitoring 
control by the regulatory authorities and lack of continuity in government monetary and 
fiscal policies. The industry, by 1993, became seriously afflicted with a very severe crisis 
of confidence that led to terminal distress of 54 banks by 1994 which subsequently 
increased to 60 at the end of 1995. This abnormality in the financial services sector led to 
six upward reviews of capital post-SAP to adjust for inflationary impact of the SAP 
induced policies. The recent being the N25 billion recapitalization which took effect on 
31st December 2005 reduced the number of banks from eighty-nine(89) to twenty- four  
(24) as a result of merger. In the Nigerian Banking Industry, bank capital requirement has 
been reviewed several times between 1952 and 2006 – (See table 1-1 below). 
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TABLE 1-1:  TREND IN THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF NIGERIAN BANKS 
(1952 – 2006) 
YEAR FOREIGN 
(Commercial) 
INDIGENOUS 
(Commercial) 
MERCHANT 
1952 £200,000 £25,000 -- 
1958 £400,000 £25,000 -- 
1969 £1,500,000 £600,000 -- 
1979 N1,500,000 N600,000 N2,000,000 
FEB. 1988 -- N5,000,000 N3,000,000 
OCT.1988 -- N10,000,000 N6,000,000 
OCT.1989 -- N20,000,000 N12,000,000 
FEB.1991 -- N50,000,000 N40,000,000 
1998 -- N500,000,000 N500,000,000 
2001-Universal 
Banking 
-- N1 billion (old 
banks) N2 (new 
bank) 
N1 billion (old 
bank) N2 
billion (new 
bank) 
1st January, 2006 -- N25,000,000,000 -- 
SOURCE: CBN Annual Report (Various issues)                     
 
Capital constitutes an important part of any business. It serves as a measure of the degree 
of financial commitment of the owners in that business/project and also serves as a 
veritable loss absorber. Capital becomes imperative when reserves of the business are not 
sufficient to cushion or cover operational losses. The persistent devaluation of Naira 
against major foreign currencies (US Dollar, Pound Sterling, e.t.c) had informed the 
various reviews witnessed during the post SAP era. Another reason that informed these 
was the need to comply with the internationally accepted standard (Basel Accord of 1988 
and 1992 to which Nigeria subscribes). Capital adequacy measures capital vis-à-vis risk-
weighted assets of banks. The increase in the number of banks between 1987 and 1990 led 
to an unprecedented increase in the number of loans and advances of banks which 
subsequently resulted in delinquency in banks and deterioration in the quality of banks‘ 
risk assets.  CBN was compelled to introduce the Prudential Guidelines in 1990, which 
 12 
made it mandatory for banks to recognize early and to provide for non-performing assets. 
The effect of these was the erosion of the capital base of quite a sizeable number of 
operators as their accumulated reserves were not sufficient to absorb the huge losses. 
Consequently, the last upward review, which became effective on 31st December 2005 
fixed the statutory minimum capital deposit money banks to N25 billion from N2 billion 
with a view to strengthening the already eroded capital base of banks. This was occasioned 
by the devaluation of the naira from N127 against $1.00, which soon rendered the old 
minimum paid up capital of N2 billion inadequate.  
The inflationary impact also led to an astronomical jump in the Naira working capital 
requirements of industries (major users of bank loans) which depend on imported inputs, 
effectively reduced the real value of bank capital base. In nominal terms, it limited the 
financial support that the banks could give to their borrowing customers particularly 
against the background of statutory lending limits. In the wake of this, companies 
strengthen their relationships with multiplicity of banks to ensure that their working capital 
requirements are adequately met. The continuing deterioration in the quality of bank risk 
assets worsened the distress systems that started to manifest between 1989 to mid-1990 
and early 2000.  It is in this light that this research would attempt to study the relationship 
between bank capitalization, management and performance in the Nigerian banking 
industry with a view to filling gaps in the literature and proffering recommendations. 
 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The above have shown us precisely that the problem of this study can be attributed to 
inadequate capitalization, poor management and supervision and consequent poor 
performance in the banking industry, which has affected the growth of the economy.  
Existing literature on bank capitalization and performance are not settled. There are 
evidences that capital of Nigerian banks has been inadequate and this has affected the 
stakeholders, performance of banking firms and contribution to the economy. The 
stakeholders also consider the management, supervision and regulation of banks 
inadequate. Hence, the spate of bank distress witnessed in the recent past. 
While the loan interest rate structure has been rising, the deposit interest rate has been 
nose-diving. This disproportionate loan interest-deposit interest rate structure has affected 
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ability of banks to mobilize deposit, capital and has affected extension of loans. While 
interest rate on deposit is about 2%, lending rate ranges between 16-20%. Banks derive 
over 90% of its income from lending and when this is affected, outcomes of capitalization 
such as return on assets (ROA), return on capital (ROC) and shareholders fund (SHF) will 
be affected. Also bank internal determinants of performance such as bank loans and 
advances to deposit (LA/D),  ratio of liquid assets to deposits (LA/BD), ratio of operating 
expenses to total assets (OE/TA), ratio of shareholders funds to total assets (SHF/TA) and 
ratio of bank‘s loans to total assets (L/TA) will also be affected. Banking industry is the 
engine of any economy and it is expected to influence performance of other sectors. In 
Nigeria, the naira is noted for its depreciation than appreciation and this affects the interest 
rates, inflation, cost of doing business and the real sectors.  
 
Management can be viewed from two perspectives. As a process and another as a structure. 
Management as a process refers to the design and maintenance of an internal environment 
in which individuals working together in groups can effectively and efficiently contribute 
to the achievement of accomplishment of preselected group missions and objectives. We 
are concerned with the structure in this study. That is how bank management has directed 
the efforts and activities of other people (controlling function) towards achieving common 
objectives. According to Thakur and Burton (1995), efficiency involves doing things right 
that is using resources wisely and with minimum waste. The epileptic power supply has 
affected the cost of doing business in Nigeria and the banking industry is not an exception. 
Bank management has resorted to the use of diesel to carry banking operations. How has 
management control of operating expenses affected profits of the deposit money banks? 
Besides, Nigerian banking industry has been faced with a dearth of qualified bankers to 
implement the objectives of the organization. The few qualified bankers hardly stay long in 
one bank because they are in high demand. Hence, the managerial efficiency of banking 
operations has been a concern to bank management. The selection of bank management 
has not been taken seriously and the performance of the system is a function of the inputs. 
Management is  not  evaluated on the basis of objective criteria such as capital adequacy, 
liquidity, and profitability,  instead subjective criteria such as competence, compliance 
with regulations and leadership ability are employed (Adewunmi, 1992).  While capital 
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adequacy, liquidity, risk exposure, profitability and efficiency of banks have been affected 
by the quality of management, bank management failed in their responsibility to determine 
if the rate of growth of operating expenses exceeded revenue and this may have affected 
bank performance. The several boardroom squabbles, technical incompetence, poor 
leadership, administrative inability, increased level of risk, in-fighting, management 
divisions that sprouted in the new generation banks in the early 1990s contributed to the 
general malaise and pervasive distress in the system.  
The inability to manage the systemic distress in the past in the Nigerian banking industry 
had affected deposit mobilization, quality of assets and credit extension to customers. It 
can be mentioned here that correct capital base is necessary but not sufficient condition for 
a bank‘s continued state of good health. These challenges witnessed in the past in the 
banking industry could be traceable to inadequate capital, liquidity crisis, managerial 
inefficiency and inability of the regulators to monitor and perform their oversight function. 
The Nigerian banking industry has been affected by inconsistent monetary policies, 
unstable macroeconomic variables such as exchange rate, interest rate and general inflation 
some of which have led to increase in prices of capital and consumer goods thus, lowering 
effective purchasing power of people and reduced aggregate demand.  
Financial performance especially relating to deposit money banks is based on performance 
dimensions comprising: capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings and liquidity which are 
deeply rooted in the expectations of stakeholders which is in turn based on financial 
transparency.  In the past, the Nigerian banking industry had been plagued with small size 
banks with low capital and high cost of operations. This weakness inhibits bank 
management in the performance of its development roles in the economy, thus hindering the 
achievement of government objectives such as price stability, macroeconomic stability, 
provision of employment and increased output. It also affects the ability to compete 
effectively in the international market. Since the banking sector is the hub around which all 
other economic activities revolves, the health and prosperity of the bank is a major source of 
concern to Nigerians especially the regulators. According to the Governor of Central Bank 
of Nigeria cited in Egene (2009), of the ten (10) banks audited so far as at August 2009, the 
banks‘ balance sheets of five banks (Union bank, Finbank, Oceanic bank, Afrique bank and 
Intercontinental bank) had shrunken, shareholders‘ funds impaired and they now have 
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liquidity problems. Their huge exposure to non-performing loans (margin loans) has 
affected the banks. These banks had spent length of time at the expanded discount window 
(EDW) introduced in September, 2008 by the apex bank. These five banks accounted for 
90% of transactions at the EDW. The remaining banks accounted for 10%. According to the 
apex banks, these banks took money from the inter-bank to repay their exposure to the 
discount window. It is an indication that their balance sheets had shrunk. The management 
teams had acted in a manner that was detrimental to the interest of their depositors and 
creditors. According to the apex bank, the temporary capital injection of N420 billion into 
the banks in the form of Convertible Tier 11 Debt, is expected to be repaid to the CBN once 
the banks are recapitalized. Considering the fact that ownership of banks has moved from 
family to private, existing shareholders have not been informed how these funds would be 
converted when the bailout fund is fully repaid. The measure adopted by CBN to bail out the 
banks is adjudged as misuse of taxpayers‘ money and may eventually displace existing 
shareholders. Like other sectors, this sub-sector is also faced with poor infrastructural 
facilities which add to cost of doing business and poor performance of regulatory 
authorities. According to Ajekigbe (2009: 2-8), from the classical and historical perspective,  
―Several factors led to the failure of banks between 1977 and earlier 2000. Some of the 
reasons advanced are poor asset quality, under capitalization, inexperienced personnel, 
illiquidity, inconsistent regulatory policies and supervision‖.  
 
The evolving competition in the banking industry as a result of globalization has made it 
difficult for deposit money banks to play their major role of financing economic activities 
arising from inadequate capital. Inadequate bank capital has led to a crisis of confidence in 
the banks to the extent that the original functions which is to support the volume, type and 
character of a bank‘s business, to provide for the possibilities of losses that may arise there 
from and to enable the bank to meet a reasonable credit need of the community have been 
eroded. Losses suffered by banks as a result of non-performing accounts led to bank failure 
especially in the areas of lending. The soundness, safety and profitability of a bank affect 
the quality of its loan portfolio. The last few years have both been traumatic and 
revolutionary for the Nigerian banking system. According to Eke (1999:1-14):  
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“Since the introduction of structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1986 and the 
deregulation of the nation‟s financial system, banking business has raised a variety of 
performance questions. Although insured banks had recorded an appreciable increase in 
the volume of assets and deposits, their overall financial condition had deteriorated 
tremendously”…  
 
The entry of the new generation banks from 1989 witnessed competition amongst banks. 
New generation banks introduced aggressive marketing for deposits, new technology etc. 
Between 1977 when rural banking was introduced and 2006 the cut-off date of this study, 
the deposit money banks opened branches across the rural areas and cities of Nigeria. This 
was facilitated and enhanced by the liberalization of banking license  and changes in the 
capital structure of Nigerian banking by the regulatory authority (apex bank) between 1977 
and 2006 (See table 1-1, Chapter one, p.11 ). Before 1989, the Nigerian banking industry 
was dominated by the four big banks (United Bank for Africa, Union Bank of Nigeria, 
First Bank of Nigeria and Afrique bank) in terms of market share (deposits, loans and 
advances etc). Has this really changed? What is the present state of market concentration in 
the banking industry vis-à-vis bank capital (shareholders fund)? Are banks performance 
influenced by shareholders fund? This study will also examine the impact of bank capital 
on industry/market concentration. Based on the forgoing, this study sought to examine 
empirically/ investigate the relationship between bank capitalization, management and 
performance in the Nigerian banking industry.  
 
1.3   SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The period covered in this research is from (1986-2006). Cross-sectional and time series 
data will form the focus of our study. The study will cover the period from SAP in 1986 
using sample of fourteen deposit money banks and a cut-off date of 2006. The sample of 
fourteen out of the twenty four deposit money banks was employed in the study. The 
sample (the fourteen deposit money banks) was drawn from both the old and new 
generation banks which are quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange before the 
commencement of this study. The Stratified sampling technique and random sampling 
method is adopted.  
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I.4     OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The study will focus on the following main/broad objective:  
To determine the extent of relationship between bank capitalization, management and 
performance.  The specific objectives are: 
(i) To determine the effect of growth of bank deposit, bank loan and liquidity 
on bank capitalization; 
(ii) To examine  how  the determinants of bank capital; assets and liquidity 
ratios affect return on assets; 
(iii) To determine  to what extent   management control of operating expenses 
has impacted on the return on capital (profit); 
(iv)  To determine the extent to which macroeconomic variables such as 
interest, inflation and exchange rates have affected capitalization in the 
banks; 
(v) To determine the relationship between bank capitalization and market 
concentration (market share) in order to find out if it has enhanced 
competition; 
(vi) To test the relationship between profitability/return on capital and bank 
characteristic indicators.  
The measures of capitalization used in this research is the outcome from the use of fund 
such  as  return on assets (ROA), return on capital (ROC) and actual capital; that is 
Shareholders funds (SHF). Five bank‘s characteristics indicators are used as internal 
determinants of performance. They are ratio of bank loans and advances to total deposit (B 
DEPOSIT), ratio of liquid assets to total deposits (LAD), ratio of operating expenses to 
total assets (EOM), ratio of shareholders funds to total assets (CAP) and the ratio of bank‘s 
loans to total assets (B LOAN). Bank capitalization/consolidation, management and 
performance need to be established both theoretically and empirically in order to predict to 
a reasonable extent the determinants of the performance and behaviour of banks in Nigeria. 
Most of the studies on bank capitalization and performance were conducted in the United 
States of America and emerging markets of Asia, Africa, South America and Europe. Few 
studies exist in developing countries including Nigeria. This study is inspired by the  
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inadequacy of existing empirical studies on capital adequacy and performance for the less 
developed countries. Developing a model, using time-series, cross-sectional and panel data 
of Nigerian banks, would provide evidences to determine the factors of bank capitalization, 
management and performance as well as the behaviour of banks in relation to capital 
adequacy and the impact on the economy. 
 
1.5             RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 This research study was initiated by a series of questions. The research study will 
attempt to provide answer to the following research questions: 
      i.      How does growth of bank deposit, bank loan and liquidity influence bank  
               capital? 
ii      To what extent does capitalization lead to increase in market concentration so  
         that banks can control sizeable market share and compete effectively? 
     iii.     To what extent does the determinant of bank capital impact on Profitability/return  
               on capital? 
     iv.      To what extent do macroeconomic variables impact the financial performance of  
               Nigerian banks and the economy? 
  v.     What are the variable (s) involved in bank performance? 
vi.      How does capitalization of the banking industry help to boost bank     
          performance? 
      vii.     To what extent does bank management control operational expenses impacted  
                 return on capital? Are discrepancies in bank‘s profitability/return on capital due  
                 to variation in endogenous factors under the control of bank management? 
     viii.      Does increase capitalization reduce the operational risk and bank failure?    
 
1.6            STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
The study will be carried out in three consistent groups of models and are specified in 
Chapter five. 
A. Return on Assets (indicator of capital) and bank capital ratios (Efficiency of 
Management, Liquidity and Capital Adequacy). 
B. Return on Capital (indicator of capital), Management and Performance variables. 
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C. Shareholders fund and Performance variables. 
From the theoretical perspective and the research questions the following hypotheses are 
postulated for us to justify and validate our models:  
1.   H0:     Bank capital ratios (Capital adequacy, Liquidity and Efficiency/Quality of  
                  Management) have no significant impact on Return on Assets. 
       H1:     Bank capital ratios (Capital adequacy, Liquidity and Efficiency/Quality of   
                  Management) have significant impact on Return on Assets. 
 2.    H0:    Operating Expenses have no significant impact on return on capital.    
        H1:    Operating Expenses have significant impact on return on capital. 
 3.    H0:    Banks‘ liquidity, bank loans and growth of bank deposits have no significant  
                  impact on Shareholders fund. 
         H1:   Banks‘ liquidity, bank loans and growth of bank deposits have significant  
                  impact on Shareholders fund.      
4.    H0:     Shareholders‘ funds have no significant relationship to banks control of market  
                  share (total deposit: TD, loans and advances: LA, total assets: TA ) 
        H1:  Shareholders‘ funds have significant relationship to banks control of market  
                 share  (total deposit: TD, loans and advances: LA, total assets: TA)     
Answer to these questions will follow the footsteps of Abreu and Mendes (2002), 
Demerguc-Kunt and Huizingha (1999) and Ben Naceur Samy (2003) and Goaied (2001) 
stated in chapter 3. It will also extend the existing literature. The research will use 
regression analysis to find the underlying relationship between bank capitalization, 
management and performance.  A comprehensive set of internal characteristics is included 
as determinants of bank‘s capitalization. These internal factors include shareholders fund, 
operational expenses and interest bearing assets e.g. deposits, loans and advances, liquid 
assets etc. While studying the relationship between bank capital, management and 
performance, we shall include macroeconomic variables (inflation, interest and exchange 
rates) and financial structure indicators (concentration, bank and market size) not included 
in Ben Naceur Samy (2003) and Goaied, 2001). 
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1.7                  METHODOLOGY 
This research deals with the bank capitalization, management and performance in the 
Nigeria banking industry. This section tries to capture empirically how bank capitalization 
and management affect bank performance and to what extent. The method used consists of 
the data sources and the analysis. 
1.7.1   Data Sources 
Secondary data will be needed for the entire work. In order to carry out this study, data 
(1986-2006) were collected from various issues of the Statement of Accounts and Annual 
Reports of deposit money banks, Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin (various 
issues), CBN Banking Supervision Annual Report and the Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact 
book. The data include time series, cross section and panel data on variables adopted, (See 
table 4-2, chapter 4). 
 1.7.2   Analysis 
This study uses panel data to investigate the hypotheses composed in various single – 
equation econometric models. The e-view software package is then employed to obtain the 
various solutions. A sample of the deposit money banks population has been used and the 
sample method adopted is the probability sampling technique, particularly the simple 
random sampling in the context of stratified random sampling. The study cannot possibly 
cover the entire population hence, a sampling method is adopted. The probability sampling 
technique is used to select the sample size. The Stratified Random Sampling method is 
used to categorize the banks into groups. The study of bank capitalization, management 
and performance thus covers the period from the structural adjustment program of 1986 to 
2006. The period of 1986 was the beginning of bank deregulation and liberalization (more 
banks were licensed) while we projected from 2005 the commencement year of the study 
to a cut-off date of 2006 (one year after bank consolidation) when all financial statements 
of deposit money banks will be available. Audited bank financial statements most time fall 
in arrears. As stated earlier, this study employed the Stratified Sampling Technique (See 
detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.3). 
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1.8   SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Capital requirement has become an important tool in determining how much risk exposure 
a bank can accept. In the literature, empirical evidence suggests that capital plays a key 
role in rapid growth of bank mergers. Ross (2002) found that hundreds of smaller banks 
have disappeared via merger because of the burgeoning growth in large business loans, 
which can only be made by bigger banks with strong capital position. While there have 
been several studies on bank capitalization and performance, very few of them have 
focused on bank capitalization, management and performance of the Nigerian banking 
industry. Several studies about bank capitalization exist in United Kingdom (UK), United 
States (US) and Asia, Africa, South Africa and Tunisia. In the literature, scholars have 
written on determinants of capital adequacy, determinants of bank profitability, financial 
conditions of bank performance, determinants of bank capital ratios, effects of bank 
capitalization on financial performance, merger and acquisition, bank consolidation and 
performance. However, the extent to which such research findings can be applied to 
Nigerian banking industry should be studied.  
Given the fundamental nature of banking as the hub around which economic activities 
revolve, any study that will unearth and confirm the problems, issues on bank 
capitalization, management and performance in the Nigerian banking industry will be of 
immense benefit value to banks, regulatory bodies, government and society. The study will 
fill the gap in the existing literature especially as it relates to variables that affects bank 
performance. In summary, this study hopes to establish the relationship that exists between 
bank capitalization, management and performance in the Nigerian banking industry. 
Therefore, in this section, issues that will engender interest of stakeholders in the Nigerian 
banking industry are adequately addressed in this study. Therefore, this study is significant 
in the following areas: 
i.      The study is significant because it present adequately the problems of the 
Nigerian banking industry (deposit money banks) in proper perspective. 
ii.       The study will serve as a pathfinder/guide to international investors who are 
interested in the fortunes available in the Nigerian banking industry (deposit 
money banks). 
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iii.       Shareholders‘ will find in this study the underlining issues that have 
characterized profitability, return on assets, capitalization (shareholders fund) 
and market share  in the Nigerian banking industry (deposit money banks). 
iv.      Bank capital provides funds for bank‘s growth and the development of other 
sectors. For growth to take place in an economy, the financial and real sectors 
should move in the same direction that is, they should be linearly related.  This 
study is significant because it shows that apart from the issue of profit, 
expenses and non-performing loans that have bedeviled the deposit money 
banks, there is the issue of lack of good corporate governance. A study that 
investigates these issues or would do this is certainly significant in Nigeria.  
v.    The study will provide an insight to bank authorities on regulation with respect to 
indices affecting capitalization in view of the systemic distress witnessed in the 
banking industry in the mid-1990, early 2000 and January 2006. It also will also 
help ensure that the regulatory authorities drive individual banks to keep pace 
with capital adequacy to assist performance and to curb risk exposure of the 
banks. 
 
 
1.9                 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS  
 Chapter one study contains the following: introduction, statement of the problem, scope 
of the study, objective of the study, research questions, hypothesis, methodology, data 
sources, and significance of the study. Chapter two will discuss the development of the 
banking industry and banking regulation in Nigeria categorize into nine phases. Chapter 
three provides the conceptual framework and literature review. It reviews theories of 
capitalization and literature on bank capitalization/consolidation, management and 
corporate performance. Chapter four provides the methodology and covers the model 
specification; model estimation and data sources and collection while Chapters five and 
six will provide the data presentation and analysis (Results and Discussion); findings, 
conclusion, recommendations, contribution to knowledge, limitations and recommendation 
for future study.                                             
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                                    CHAPTER TWO 
      DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING, BANK REGULATION AND CURRENT  
            ISSUES IN THE NIGERIAN MACROECONOMY 
 
2.1   Development of Banking 
The institutional behaviour in Nigerian banking that has guided the development of 
banking, management and banking regulation in Nigeria will be discussed in this chapter. 
This will include an analogy of the nine phases (for convenience) in banking, the legal 
framework governing bank management, why banks are heavily regulated and the 
relevance. It will discuss the pre and post consolidation challenges in the Nigerian banking 
system. Despite the change in the capital structure from 1952-2005 (See table 1-1 
Chapter 1) systemic distress has been so pervasive from pre and post colonial rule in the 
Nigerian banking industry. It will also afford us the opportunity to compare the trend in 
bank development and results of the study. 
 
Phase 1        (1891-1928)  
Phase 11      (1929 -1951) 
Phase 111    (1952-1958) 
Phase IV      (1959- 1968) 
Phase V        (1969-1976) 
Phase VI       (1977-1985) 
Phase VII     (1986 - 1998)          
Phase VIII    (1999 -2003) 
Phase IX       (2004 - 2008) 
According to First Bank Plc Report (1998) the development of banking and regulation in 
Nigeria can be discussed under  the following  phases (for convenience):1891-1928, 1929-
1951,1952-1958, 1959-1968,1969-1976, 1977-1985 and 1986-1998,1999-2003 and 2004-
2008. Ajekigbe (2009) divided the phases of the banking industry into five. These are 
Indigenization era (1977-1985), Market deregulation (1986-1993), Guided deregulation 
(1994-1998), Universal Banking era (1999-2003) and the Consolidation era (2004-2008).                         
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In this study the development of banking and banking regulation in Nigeria will be 
discussed under nine phases (for convenience).  
 
Phase 1 (1891 – 1928)  
This first phase saw the emergency of the first set of banks. Prominent among the foreign 
banks were African Banking Corporation in 1892 which was absorbed by British Bank of 
West African  (B.B.W.A)  now First Bank of Nigeria Plc in 1894, and the Colonial Bank in 
1916 which was absorbed by Barclays Bank DCO in 1917 (now Union Bank of Nigeria 
Plc). These foreign Banks were found to be discriminatory against Nigerian indigenes in 
their credit operations.  
 
Phase 11 (1929 -1951) 
This period witnesses the emergence of the first set of indigenous banks because of the 
discrimination of foreign banks against Nigerian entrepreneurs. Also the coming of 
Nationalistic movements resulted in the opening of more indigenous banks. Unfortunately, 
this era that could be regarded as the era of free banking, also witnessed the failure of these 
indigenous banks with the same rapidity with which they sprang up. By 1954, 21 out of the 
25 indigenous banks operating in Nigeria had collapsed. The only three survivors out of all 
the indigenous banks are National Bank (dissolved) established in 1933 and Agbonmagbe 
Bank in 1945 (now Wema Bank) and African Continental Bank in 1947 now dissolved 
into Spring Bank in recent recapitalization on 1st January 2006 . Another important foreign 
bank, British and French Bank (now United Bank for Africa) was also established in 
1947.Several reasons were advanced as the cause of the failure of the indigenous banks. 
Poor assets quality, under capitalization, inexperience personnel, overtrading, illiquidity, 
and the complete absence of any form of regulation and supervision were responsible for 
their failure. 
 
Phase 111 (1952 – 1958) 
This era saw the beginning of banking regulation in Nigeria. The first banking ordinance in 
Nigeria was enacted in 1952, which provided for a system of licensing, minimum 
capitalization, liquidity ratio, maintenance of reserve and bank supervision and regulation. 
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As a result of the bank failures in the early 1950‘s, the banking ordinance of 1952 vested 
the power of control of banking in the Financial Secretary. Subsequent acts were passed to 
strengthen the authorities‘ regulatory control. These include the CBN Act of 1958 and 
Bills of Exchange in 1958.  
 
Phase IV (1959 – 1968) 
This period witnessed the establishment of Central Bank of Nigeria and its commencement 
of operations on July 1, 1959. A number of foreign banks were also established during this 
period, prominent among which were Bank of America (later changed to Savannah Bank 
now defunct) in 1960 and Arab Bank (later changed to Nigeria-Arab Bank) now merged in 
the new recapitalization on 1ST January, 2006. It was also during this period that Bank 
Examination began with the setting up of a Bank Examiners Unit at the Federal Ministry  
  
Phase V (1969 – 1976) 
This period witnessed a significant milestone with the promulgation of the Banking Decree 
of 1969, as amended in 1979. Most of the collapsed State/ merged State Government banks 
were set up during this period. The New Nigeria Bank owned by the former Bendel State 
was founded in 1970 just like the Rivers state Pan African Bank, which was established in 
1970. The Mercantile Bank of Cross River State was set up in 1971. Following the 
promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD), the Federal 
Government indicated its intention to acquire forty percent (40%) equity participation in 
the erstwhile foreign banks. When the scheme became operational, all those banks 
complied except City bank of New York, which left the country because of its belief in 
free market enterprises. This period also witnessed the setting up of a Financial System 
Review Committee in 1976 by the Federal Government. The Committee under the 
chairmanship of Dr.Pius Okigbo made recommendations, most of which the Federal 
Government accepted, to streamline the structure and improve the operations of the banks 
in particular and the entire financial system in general. This era could be regarded as the 
finest hour of glory for the banking system in particular and the financial system in 
general.  
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Phase VI   (1977– 1985) 
The NEPD that is the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree was amended in 1977 with 
banking business categorized under schedule 11. The Federal Government therefore 
increased its ownership in these expatriate Banks from 40 to 60 percent. This period 
therefore witnessed the indigenization of the top management of these former expatriate 
banks. Another major development during this period was the initiation and establishment 
of the rural bank schemes (phases 1, 11, and 111) by the C.B.N. There was also the 
establishment of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme in 1977. The Scheme was then 
managed by the Department for Agricultural Finance of the C.B.N. Many more State 
Government banks came into being during this period in 1982 and 1983, such as Owena 
Bank (Ondo) now defunct, Progress Bank (Imo) liquidated and Lobi bank (Benue) already 
liquidated. All these raised the number of commercial banks in the country from 14 in 
1970 to 29 in 1980. Three years later the number increased to 25. 
 
Phase VII (1986-1998) 
This was the inception of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) era, which brought 
about the deregulation of the financial system to allow for market-determined pricing 
system. However, SAP came on the heels of economic and financial crises which 
characterized the nation‘s life when the favourable trends in resource profile in the 1970s 
changed dramatically to dwindling fortunes in the 1980s. There was the deregulation of 
exchange control with the introduction of the second-tier foreign exchange market (FEM) 
in September, 1986 (Changed to FEM and now IFEM). There was also Liberalization in 
the granting of banking license from 1986 and by the end of December, 1990, 107 (58 
commercial and 49 merchant) licensed banks were operating in Nigeria from 40 (28 
commercial and 12 merchant) licensed banks as at the end of December, 1985 (CBN, 
1988). This was to allow for competition, creativity and efficiency in banking services 
delivery. In August 1987 came the deregulation of interest rates to assist banks maximize 
their deposit mobilization. This was seen as an integral part of the deregulation process of 
freeing the financial system for market forces to prevail, and motivate the banks to 
mobilize the reservoir of idle funds in the economy. The promulgation of Decree No. 22 of 
15th June, 1988 led to the establishment of Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). 
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The NDIC insures bank deposits in order to promote stability, confidence, safety and 
sound banking system in Nigeria. 
  
Phase VII1 (1999-2003) 
This was the era of Universal banking. With the return to civilian rule in May 1999, there 
was an apparent return to the path of economic reforms. Universal Banking was adopted in 
January 2000 in response to unprecedented pressure from merchant banks clamouring for a 
level playing field due to their disadvantage position especially with respect to cost of 
funds. In the five years to 2004, the CBN stepped up its supervisory role over banks while 
making concerted efforts to shut down arbitrage windows in the foreign exchange markets. 
In addition to the above, CBN undertook an internal reform programme tagged project 
EAGLE, which was designed to improve its regulatory efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Phase IX (2004 - 2008) 
The consolidation era/Soludo era has been discussed in chapter 1. According to Soludo 
(2004), this is the era tagged ―the 13 point reform Agenda for Repositioning the CBN and 
the Financial System for the 21st Century‖. 
 
2.2    LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING BANK MANAGEMENT 
The Central Bank Act, 1958 (as amended) and the Banking Act 1969 and Bank and Other 
Financial Institution Act (BOFIA as amended) constituted the legal framework within 
which the CBN operates and regulates banks. Overtime, these laws became grossly 
inadequate to cope with challenges in the banking and other financial services industry. 
The wide range of economic liberalization and deregulation measures following the 
adoption, in 1986, of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) resulted in the appearance 
of more banks and other financial intermediaries. Decrees 24 and 25 of 1991 were, 
therefore, enacted to strengthen and extend the powers of the CBN to cover the new 
institutions in order to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy, regulation and 
supervision of banks as well as non-banking financial institutions. Unfortunately in 1997, 
the Federal Government of Nigeria enacted the CBN (Amendment Decree No. 3 and 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions [BOFID (amended)] Decree No.4 to remove 
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completely the limited autonomy, which the bank enjoyed since 1991.The 1997 
amendments brought the CBN back under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. The 
composition of the Board was also changed to comprise a part-time Chairman, the CBN 
Governor. The Deputy Governors of CBN, the Director-General, Federal Ministry of 
Finance, the Managing Director, Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), and four 
other part-time members. The Board was empowered to approve, among others, the Bank‘s 
annual Budget, audited accounts, the formulation of monetary and credit policy, as well as 
devise suitable mechanism for the determination of exchange rate. 
 
The Act made CBN directly responsible to the Minister of Finance with respect to the 
supervision and control of banks and other financial institutions, while extending the 
supervisory role of the bank to other specialized banks and financial institutions. The 
amendment placed enormous powers on the Ministry of Finance while leaving the CBN 
with a subjugated role in the monitoring of the financial institutions with little room for the 
Bank to exercise discretionary powers. Similarly, in 1997, the NDIC Decree No.22 of 1988 
was reviewed and amended to give more powers to the NDIC as well as autonomy from 
the CBN. The corporation was given power to assume supervisory responsibility over 
insured banks. The legal framework within which the CBN operates is the CBN 
(amendment) Decree No. 37 of 1998, which repealed the CBN (Amended) Decree No. 3 of 
1997. The Decree provides a measure of operational autonomy for the CBN to carry out its 
traditional functions and enhances its versatility. Specifically section 2 of the 1998 Decree 
contains the amendments to the membership of the Board of Directors of the Bank, which 
restores its chairmanship to the CBN Governor. Other members of the Board are the 
Deputy Governors, the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and five part-time 
Directors.  The Decree also reconstituted the Financial Services Regulation Committee 
(FRSC) for the purpose of co-coordinating the supervision of financial institutions in the 
country. 
Membership of the committee comprises the CBN Governor who is the Chairman, 
Director General, Security and Exchange Commission, the Commissioner for Insurance, 
the Registrar General, Corporate Affairs Commission and a representative of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance not below the rank of Director. Furthermore, the regulatory power of 
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the CBN was strengthened by the Banks and other Financial Institutions (Amendment) 
Decree No. 38 of 1998 which repealed BOFID (Amendments) Decree No.4 1997. Through 
the amendments, the CBN may vary or revoke any condition subject to which a license 
was granted or may impose fresh or additional condition to the granting of a license to 
transact banking business in the country. The Decree also empowered the bank to examine 
the books of specialized banks and other financial institutions, including Development 
Banks plus all Primary Mortgage Institutions, Community Banks (Now Microfinance 
bank), Peoples Banks (already scrapped),  Bureau De Change and Discount Houses.  By 
the Decree, the CBN‘s power on banks, specifically those relat ing to withdrawal of 
licenses of distressed banks and appointment of liquidators of these banks, including the 
NDIC was restored. Thus the inconsistency in bank regulation has affected performance of 
bank management since they could not sustain the gains from frequent change of policies. 
 
2.2.1    Law   Regulating the Financial Environment 
Law refers to those statutes, Decree, Act, edict that guide and regulate the operations and 
activities of individual and companies operating within the financial environment. The 
financial environment consists of both banks and non-bank financial institutions. These 
laws include: banking laws, insurance law, money laundering law as well as economic and 
financial crime edicts. Banking laws regulates the banking environment. 
 
Nigerian Financial Environment 
The Nigerian financial environment consists of financial market (that is capital and money 
market), banks and other non-banks financial institutions as well as regulatory agencies 
regulating the activities of individuals operating within the financial environment. The 
banks are regulated by the Central Bank and the NDIC. SEC regulates the capital market 
and various bodies constituted to regulate their affairs regulate the non-banks. 
 
2.2.2    Banks Regulatory Agencies and Why Banks are Heavily Regulated 
Banks operating in Nigeria and in most other countries of the world must contend with 
heavy regulations as well as rules enforced by federal and state agencies governing their 
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operations, type of service offered, capital reserve, quality of their loan and advances, the 
way and manner in which they grow and expand their facilities for better services. 
As bankers work within the financial system to supply loans, accept deposits, and provide 
other services to their customers, they must do so within a climate of extensive regulation, 
designed primarily to protect the public. The regulatory agencies include the Central Bank 
of Nigeria and the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation regulating the banking system. 
 
Duties of the regulatory agencies 
 They are ever demanding for more capital, more reports, and more transparency on 
the bank management. 
 They approve new entrant into the banking industry. 
 They also approve types of deposits and other financial instruments banks sell to 
the public to raise funds. 
 They review quality of a bank‘s loans and the adequacy of its capital.  
 They approve construction of bank building, merger with other bank, setting up a 
branch office, acquiring or starting a non-bank business for existing banks. 
 They give approval in case of voluntary liquidation from the government agency 
that are granted license for operation. 
 
Why banks are heavily regulated 
According to the bank and other financial institutions act (BOFIA), banks are regulated for 
the following reasons: 
  
Leading repositories of public savings 
Individual, families, corporation and organization place their saving in bank in form of  
short or long term deposit of highly liquid instruments. Banks also hold large amounts of  
long-term savings in retirement accounts. The loss of these funds due to bank failure or  
bank crime would be catastrophic to many individuals and families. Many depositors lack  
the financial expertise and depth of information needed to correctly evaluate the riskiness  
of a bank therefore, the regulatory agencies are charged with the responsibility of gathering  
and evaluating the information needed to assess the true financial condition of banks in  
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order to protect the public against loss. 
 
Power to create money  
Banks are also closely watched because of their power to create money in the form of  
readily spendable deposit by making loans and investments. Money created by banks‘ has  
significant impact on the economy, it could bring about creation of jobs as well as presence  
or absence of inflation that is why they are regulated. 
 
Non- selective credit  
Banks provide individuals and businesses with loans that support consumption and  
investment spending. The public has a keen interest in an adequate supply of loans flowing  
from the banking system where discrimination in the granting of loans is not present. If  
access to loan is denied because of irrelevant factors, it deters progress in the nation.  
Government could eliminate discrimination by enforcing non-selective credit. 
 
Taxation and financing of government project— 
Banks have a long history of involvement with government. Government rely on banks to  
finance project embarked upon by the government and the bank tax form a large portion of  
the company income tax. 
 
Protection of depositors and bank solvency 
 Banks are heavily regulated because of the creation of NDIC who bears the cost of  
failures. This is to preventing banks from taking excessive risks that would impair the  
solvency of the bank. Excessive risk taking can be controlled by the imposition   of risk –  
related insurance premiums and close supervision. 
 
 
2.2.3   Role of Central Bank in Monitoring the System Through   
           Bank Supervision, Examination and Inspection  
Bank supervision – section 30 (1) -- (8) (BOFIA) provides guidelines for bank supervision. 
The supervisory function of the CBN is structured into three departments; 
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 Bank Examination, which carries out on- site supervision, 
 Banking supervision, which carries out off-site supervision and, 
 Other financial institutions department (OFID) which supervises the non- bank 
financial institutions under the purview of CBN supervision 
 
The directors of this departments report to the deputy governor, financial sector 
surveillance bank examination. The on -site supervision department provides independent 
assessment of banks‘ corporate governance, internal control system, reliability of 
information provided, etc. The field examinations is carried out within six month of 
commencement of the operation by a new bank and  addresses specific areas of operation 
of a bank e.g. credit and special examination which is carried out as the need may arise as 
provided in section 32 of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act. The Off-site 
supervision reviews and analyses the financial conditions of banks using prudential 
reports, statutory returns and other relevant information. The Bank Analysis System (BAS) 
is software developed for analyzing the data provided by banks. It also monitors trends and 
developments for the banking sector as a whole. Industry reports are generated on monthly 
and quarterly basis. Off-site supervisors also conduct spot-checks for quick 
confirmations/verification. 
 The supervisory departments operate a team-based structure in which supervisors are 
organized into teams. In the off-site department, individual supervisors within each team 
are attached to the banks as relationship managers. With this arrangement, the supervisor is 
able to have a complete picture of the condition of the institution he supervises. For on-
site, each team also has a set of banks attached to it for examination. In distributing the 
banks, related banks are grouped together as much as possible. That way, a supervisor 
would have a complete picture of the condition of the institution he supervises. Other 
Financial Institutions Department (OFID) handles the supervision of community banks 
(CBs) now Microfinance banks (MFBs), Primary Mortgage Institutions (PMIs), Finance 
Companies and Bureau de Change. The department carries out both on-site and off-site 
supervision of these institutions. OFID also operates a team-based structure like the other 
departments. 
Section 30 - (BOFIA) expressly specify as follows; 
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1. There shall be an officer of the Bank who shall be appointed by the Governor known 
as the Director of Banking Supervision or by such other titles as the Governor may 
specify. 
2. The Director of Banking Supervision shall have power to carry out supervisory duty 
in respect of banks and for that purpose shall- 
a. Under condition of confidential, examine periodically the books and affairs  
       of   bank; 
b.     Have a right of access at all times to the books, accounts and vouchers of   
        banks;  
                  c.    Have power to require from all directors, managers and officers of banks  
 such information and explanation as he deems necessary for the 
performance of his duties under this section. 
3. The Governor shall appoint to assist the Director of Banking Supervision such 
other officer of the bank as the Governor may, from time to time, decide. 
4. The officers may be designated examiners or have such other title as the Governor 
specify. 
5. For the purpose of this section, references to examiners; refers to the Director of 
banking supervision and any officer of the Bank appointed pursuant to subsection 
(3) 
6. In examining the affairs of any bank under this decree, it shall be the duty of the 
examiner to avoid unreasonable hindrance to the daily business of the bank. 
7. Every bank shall produce to the examiners at such times as the examiners may 
specify books, accounts, documents and information which they may require. 
8. If any book, document or information is not produced in accordance with the 
requirement, examiner may under this section or what is produced or furnished to 
an examiner is false in material particularly, the bank is guilty of an offence and 
liable on conviction to a fine of N5000 and in addition, to a fine of N1,000 for each 
day during which the offence continues. 
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2.3    BANK SUPERVISION 
Section 30 (1) empowers the Governor of the CBN to appoint an officer who shall be 
known as the director of banking supervision. The director of banking supervision shall 
have power to carry out supervisory duties in respect of banks for this purpose. He 
shall examine periodically the book and affairs of each bank, access at all times to the 
book and accounts and have power to require from the officers of bank such 
information and explanation as he deems necessary for the performance of his duties.  
Section 32 (i) empower the Governor to order a special examination or investigation of 
the books and affairs of the bank where he is satisfied that: 
(a) It is in the public interest to do so. 
(b) The bank has been carrying on its business in a manner detrimental to the  
         interest of the depositor and creditors.  
(c) The bank has insufficient assets to cover its liabilities to the public. 
(d) The bank has been contravening the provision of this decree. 
(e) An application made therefore by- 
(i) A director or shareholder of the bank 
(ii) A depositor or creditor of the bank. 
Section 32 (4) permits the governor of the CBN to order that the bank examined pay all 
expenses or an incidental to an examination or investigation or investigate. 
 
2.3.1    Supervisory   Power the Central Bank of Nigeria 
Section 59 confers on the CBN power to supervise and regulate the activities of non-bank 
financial institutions. The bank appoints examiners and any other person to carry on 
regular examination of the books and affairs of other financial institutions. Where it is in 
the public interest to do so, the CBN governor may also order special examination of any 
non-bank financial institution and for that purpose, appoint one or more qualified persons 
to conduct such special examination and under condition of confidentiality. 
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2.3.2   Importance of   Adequate Financial Condition and Supervision of the Safety  
             and Soundness of Nigerian Banks 
 
Maintenance of stability and confidence in the financial system 
The key objective of prudential supervision is to maintain stability and confidence in the 
nation‘s financial system, by reducing risk of loss to depositors and other creditors. Also, 
supervision is often directed towards verifying compliance with laws governing banks and 
their activities. 
 
Control of entry into the banking system  
Banking supervision is based on a system of licensing, which allows supervisors to 
identify the population to be supervised and to control entry into the banking system. In 
order to qualify for and retain a banking license, entities must observe certain prudential 
requirements. In addition to licensing new banks, they also have the authority to review 
and reject any proposal to transfer significant ownership or a controlling interest in existing 
bank to other parties. 
 
Timely corrective action – Bank supervisors have at their disposal recourse to legal 
power to bring about timely corrective action when a bank fails to meet prudential 
requirements, when there are violation of laws or regulations, or when depositors are faced 
with a substantial risk of loss. In extreme circumstances, the supervisor may have the 
authority to revoke the bank‘s license. 
 
Ensure high standard of bank audit  
Supervisors have a clear interest in ensuring high standards of bank auditing. Moreover, an 
important concern of supervisors is the independence of the external auditor who performs 
the audit of a bank, particularly when the auditor also provides certain types of non-audit 
services to the bank. 
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Source of information  
Effective supervision involves collection and analysis of information about supervised 
banks. For example, supervisors collect, review and analyze prudential reports and 
statistical returns from banks. These include basic financial statements as well as 
supporting schedules that provide greater detail. 
 
The Prudential guideline issued by CBN in November 1990 was aimed at ensuring a 
stable, safe and sound banking system. It is meant to serve as a guide to banks to: 
i. Ensure a more prudent approach in their portfolio classification, provisioning 
for non-performing facilities, credit portfolio disclosure and interest accrual on 
non-performing assets. 
ii. Ensure uniformity of their approach in (i) above and ensure the reliability of 
published accounting information and operations. 
The change in Nigeria‘s banking environment occasioned by the economy‘s new 
philosophy of deregulation and the introduction of a Deposit Insurance Scheme made the 
need for such guidelines more operative. Deregulation makes the industry to be more 
competitive and therefore there is the likelihood for depositors to get into more risky and 
unfamiliar undertakings. The overstatement of unearned profits by banks, which enables 
them to declare dividends thereby eroding their capital base, is a serious concern to the 
supervisory and regulatory authorities. The international nature of banking reinforces the 
need to strive to attain internationally acceptable prudential standards. In 1991, the Bank 
and Other Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID) No. 25 was issued which till date 
remains the statute governing the formation, administration, powers and duties of licensed 
banks and the supervisory and regulatory role of CBN over the licensed banks. 
 
2.4    PRE AND POST CONSOLIDATION CHALLENGES IN THE NIGERIAN  
          BANKING SYSTEM 
In a bid to raise the N25 Billion, banks that were unable had to merge with stronger banks 
through the process of consolidation. Nigerian banks were faced with both pre and post 
consolidation challenges. The pre-consolidation challenges experienced in the Nigeria case 
include the following:  
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Raising of Bank Capital using Laundered Financial Resources 
All banks that were in the capital market to source funds reported over subscription. The 
regulatory challenge here relates to how the Regulatory Authorities prevent money 
laundering in banks during consolidation period, especially when the instruments for 
payments might have been ‗coloured‘ beyond recognition by the various issuing houses 
and receiving agent? To what extent are co- investors compatible? The present ownership 
structures may make management of emerging banks very complex as it may be difficult to 
identify ‗fit and proper person‘ Therefore, all banks should adopt the Know Your 
Customer (KYC) principle in pursuing the consolidation programme. 
 
Raising Capital Using Depositors’ Fund 
There are indications that depositors‘ funds have been utilized to grant loans for share 
acquisition in the pursuit of the consolidation programme. Such a practice, apart from 
being a violation of CBN guidelines, may lead to asset/liability mismatch if depositors‘ 
funds are locked into equity investment. 
 
Increased Level of Risk during the Integration Process 
During the consolidation process, the overall risk profile of the new entity could increase 
because of the integration risk and the complexity of the rationalization process. Common 
reasons for possible escalation of the risk profile of the merged entity, especially initially, 
include failure of control system, lack of management focus and poor understanding of 
‗adopted‘ risk. This situation poses a challenge to the NDIC to the extent that the safety of 
depositors‘ funds could be adversely affected. 
 
2.4.1     Post-Consolidation Challenges in the Nigerian Banking System 
Most of the empirical literature suggests that bank consolidations do not significantly 
improve the performance or efficiency of the participating banks, Berger et al. (1999). 
The following are the possible post consolidation challenges in the Nigerian case: 
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Possibility of bank failure 
The possibility of multiple bank failure would inevitable task the financial resources and 
executive capacity of NDIC. The challenge of multiple bank failure becomes an issue of 
concern when account is taken of the impending review of the maximum deposit insurance 
from N50,000 to N200,000 before the National Assembly and the clamour for downward 
review of the premium rate paid by insured institutions The upward review has the effect 
of increasing the liability of the Corporation when a bank fails, a downward review of the 
premium rate has the effect of reducing the premium collectible from insured institutions 
(the major source of the deposit insurance fund, from where the obligation of payment of 
insured deposits is met). 
 
Weak Corporate Governance 
Responsive corporate governance is always an aspect that is closely monitored by the 
regulatory authority in order to ensure the transparency and accountability of management 
of banking institutions and the curtailment of their risk taking. Responsive corporate 
governance involves the enthronement of mechanisms, processes and systems for ensuring 
that there is appropriate direction and oversight by directors and senior management; there 
is transparency and accountability to the various shareholders; the organization complies 
with the applicable legal and regulatory requirements; there is disclosure of all material 
information to stakeholders such as investors, depositors, regulatory authorities and the 
organization viability and solvency is sustainable through adequate internal controls and 
audits as well as appropriate risk management framework. With the emergence of mega 
banks, weak or poor corporate governance becomes an issue as it can cause rapid collapse 
of an institution. In view of the fact that the systemic repercussion of the failure of a big 
banking institution is grievous, the regulatory authorities would therefore, continue to 
encourage the enthronement of responsive corporate governance structure for effective risk 
management both during and post consolidation. 
 
Inadequate Executive Capacity 
The ability of executive management to build and mould a management team that is able to 
lead the merged banking entity in the process of merging IT systems, business lines and 
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products, cultures and people should be of critical importance and of particular concern to 
NDIC. In that regard, the management of the merged entity needs to have the ability to 
identify the integration risks at an early stage and manage them effectively. 
 
Supervisory Approach 
The current supervisory approach in Nigeria, which is transaction and compliance based, is 
narrow in scope and uniformly applied to all supervised institutions. The adoption of a 
robust, proactive and sophisticated supervisory process, which is based on risk profiling of 
the emerging big banks is imperative with consolidation. Consolidation requires 
consolidated supervision that will involve consultation and cooperation amongst the 
various regulatory; supervisory institutions in the system. It is imperative that the present 
reporting format of banks be reviewed so as to incorporate all possible activities that banks 
undertake under the present dispensation. Therefore, it is necessary for supervisors to 
obtain a global view of the bank‘s operation. The current efforts of the CBN and NDIC in 
the development of electronic Financial Analysis Surveillance Regulation System (e 
FASS) and the activities of the Financial Service Regulation Coordinating Committee 
(FSRCC) would go a long way to assist in this regard. 
 
Information Asymmetry between banks and Investing Public 
There is need to bridge the current information disclosure requirements in the industry 
such that information asymmetry between banks and investing public that consolidation 
creates will be minimized. Some of the information asymmetry between banks and 
investing public in respect of Initial Public Offers (IPOs) are misleading. Adequate 
information disclosure requirement will force banks to pay greater attention to reputational 
risk that could result in loss of confidence as well as patronage.    
 
2.5   RISK EXPOSURE AND MEASUREMENT OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
The findings of Modigliani and Miller (1958), Berger, Herring and Szego, (1995) as 
reported in White and Morrison (2001) posited that in a world with perfect financial 
markets, capital structure and hence capital regulation are irrelevant. In White and 
Morrison (2001), Rochet (1992) stated that capital adequacy help to reduce   risk 
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– shifting by bankers whose assets are insured while Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
Diamond and Rajan (2000) posited that capital adequacy helps in preventing destructive 
bank runs. Ross (2002) used selected capital ratios to measure capital adequacy such as: 
total capital / total deposits, total capital /total assets. 
Where risk assets include all bank assets, if a bank has excessive asset quality and earning 
problems, more capital will likely be necessary. The idea of minimum capital on all banks 
actually began in the United States in December 1981. Prior to that date subjective 
approach was used and it relied on peer group comparisons to decide if a bank had enough 
capital. The judgment method for assessing the adequacy of a bank‘s capital looks at the 
following: Management quality, Asset liquidity, Earnings history, Quality of ownership, 
Occupancy costs, Quality of operating procedures, Deposit volatility and Local market 
conditions. It was reported by Nwude (2005): 
 
 “That the amount of capital funds a bank needs should be related to the risks it 
assumes. The greater the risks, the more the capital funds.  It can increase its capital 
as the risk it assumes increases, or invest in assets that are relatively free of risk. He 
opined that capital adequacy is the relationship between the degree of risk a bank 
takes and the amount invested by its owners”.  
 
Ross (2002), Macdonald and Koch (2003) explained that banks are faced with several 
risks,  such as credit risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, operating risk, exchange and 
crime risk all of which affect shareholders funds. Credit risk occurs when the customers 
fail to pay interest and principal payments on due date which eventually erode bank‘s 
capital. Liquidity risk is the danger of not being able to meet credit request of customers 
due to shortage of cash. Interest rate risk is the probability that fluctuating interest rates 
will result in significant appreciation or depreciation in banks assets. Operating risk results 
from fluctuations in economic conditions that could adversely affect the bank‘s 
performance. Exchange risk results from adverse movements in currency prices while the 
bank is trading for itself or for its customers. Crime risk is the danger that a bank will lose 
funds as a result of robbery.  
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Also in the CBN Banking and Supervision Annual Report (2003), the practice of 
specifying the minimum paid up capital for banks is in line with the provisions of section 9 
(1) of Bank and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA). According to the Basel 
Committee of the Bank for International Settlement of 1988 and 1992, banks are to 
maintain, as capital funds, not less than 8 percent of their total risk-weighted assets with 
effect from January 1992. Also 50% of the bank‘s capital must comprise of primary or Tier 
1 capital defined as paid –up capital and undisbursed reserves of statutory and general 
nature. The model used in evaluating performance of banks by CBN is the acronym 
CAMEL. According to CBN (2003), this stands for Capital, Asset, Management, Earnings 
and Liquidity. In the literature, MacDonald and Koch (2003) reported that Financial 
Institutions Rating System encompasses six general categories of performance labeled 
CAMELS: C = Capital Adequacy, A = Asset Quality, M= Management Quality, E 
=Earnings, L= Liquidity, S = Sensitivity to Market. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation in America (FDIC) as reported in Macdonald and Koch (2003) numerically 
rates every bank on each factor, ranging from the highest quality (1) to the lowest quality 
(5). A composite ranking of 1 or 2 indicates a fundamentally sound bank, while a ranking 
of 3, 4 or 5 signifies a problem bank with some near term potential for failure. A bank 
must adhere strictly to all capital adequacy guidelines issued by the CBN. According to 
CBN Bullion editorial comment (2004), capital adequacy can be measured amongst others 
by the following: 
*Equity/Total Asset Ratio 
Equity/*Risk Asset Ratio 
Equity/Fixed Asset Ratio 
Equity/Total Deposit Ratio 
Debt/Equity Ratio 
Where *Equity = Unimpaired or Adjusted Bank Funds and *Risk Assets = Adjusted loans 
& Advances. Where these ratios of our banks are below the industry average and as 
recommended by Basel Accord 1 and 2, the need for recapitalization becomes imperative. 
In finance literature, some of the identified weaknesses that led to bank recapitalization in 
Nigeria and the world over are size of banks and degree of soundness, stunted growth in 
the real sector, high lending rate and shunning of real sector, over-dependence on public 
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sector deposits, unprofessional and unethical conducts, illiquidity and insolvency (Soludo, 
2004). Like the CBN, the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) also oversees the 
activities of insured banks registered with it. One of the greatest risk facing banks is the 
inability to meet depositors request for demand deposit at the appropriate time. This form 
of risk is usually due to bank failure. As a result, the NDIC was set by Decree No. 21 of 
1988 to pay bank depositors on liquidation of any bank provided such bank as paid 1% of 
15/16 of its deposit liabilities to NDIC. 
 
2.6      BANK AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk Management is a discipline at the core of banking business and encompasses all 
activities that affect a bank‘s risk profile. It involves identification, measurement, 
monitoring and controlling of risks by ensuring that: the risk exposure is within statutory 
requirement; sufficient capital is available to serve as buffer in taking risk; risk taking 
decisions are in line with the business strategy and objectives set by the board; the 
individuals who take or manage risk clearly understand it and the expected pay offs 
compensate for any risks taken.  
Risk Management is the process whereby organizations methodically address the risk 
exposure of their activities with the aim of achieving sustained benefits. This is imperative 
now, more than any other time in the history of the Nigerian banking sector, considering 
the array of business activities Nigerian banks now engage in, post – consolidation. 
Banking is bed-rocked on risks; hence, the acceptance and management of risk remain an 
integral part of the business. Banking institutions should neither engage in any business in 
a manner that unnecessarily imposes risk upon it, nor absorb risks that can be transferred to 
other parties. It should rather accept those risks that are uniquely part of the array of bank‘s 
services. Zero tolerance of risk is certainly not good banking business just as one hundred 
per cent tolerance is also not good banking. Risk management requires the involvement of 
all key stakeholders including the Board, Management and Staff. For effectiveness, the risk 
management process requires: commitment from the Chief Executive and Executive 
Management of the organization; assignment of responsibilities within the organization; 
allocation of appropriate resources for training and development of enhanced risk 
awareness by all stakeholders.  
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2.6.1   Consequences of Not Managing Risk in Banks 
Banking business thrives on public confidence and such confidence is bed-rock on 
everything about a bank being seen to be going in the positive direction. Any negative 
development usually sends wrong signals to the banking public. That makes banking wide 
risk management imperative especially in this post-consolidation era in Nigeria. Failure to 
effectively manage risks in banks can therefore lead to such adverse consequences such as: 
Capital losses, losses of business opportunities; runs on banks; loss of professional 
standing; loss of public confidence; loss of reputation; possible financial distress. Risk 
management requires that management should know the severity of the consequences and 
that management respond accordingly and promptly.  
 
The issue of bank capitalization which often metamorphose into consolidation of banks 
around the globe has fuelled an active policy debate on the impact of consolidation on 
financial stability,  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003), Boyd and Graham (1991 and 
1998). They concluded banks capitalization/consolidation exercise was designed to 
improve Nigerian banking system efficiency through the enhancement of the composite 
units. In the literature, concentration levels have been a major determinant of banking 
system performance by way of efficiency. The just concluded banks consolidation exercise 
at the end of 2005, mainly through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in order to attain a 
minimum capital base of N25 billion (approx $250 million), is an aspect of the first phase 
of the reforms. It resulted in the compression of 74 banks, which accounted for about 93 
percent of the industry‘s total deposit liabilities, into 25 new banks (Komolafe and Ujah, 
2006). The recent merger of IBTC and Stanbic banks in 2008 has reduced the number of 
banks in Nigeria to 24. The greater subsidy for large banks may in turn intensify risk-
taking incentives beyond and diversification advantages enjoyed by them, thereby 
increasing the fragility of concentrated banking system. Berger, et al (1995) find evidence 
that the increase in the proportion of banking industry assets controlled by the largest 
banking organizations in the 1990s, due to the liberalization of geographic restrictions on 
banking in the United States, may have been responsible for part of the credit crunch 
observed in 1989-1992.   
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Berger and Udell (1996) and Canonero (1997) find that large banks not only tend to have a 
smaller proportion of their loans made to small borrowers, but also tend to charge lower 
prices than other banks to small borrowers, indicating that large banks only issue business 
loans to higher-quality credits. It has also been argued that the higher the concentration in 
the local banking market, the higher the prices for financial services and that may lead to 
increase in the banks profit. This is because banks in less competitive environments charge 
higher interest rates to firms. If concentration is positively associated with banks having 
market power, then concentration will increase both expected rate of return on bank assets 
and the standard deviation of those returns (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2004). One 
can infer that the policy implication is that higher market concentration is associated with 
lower socio-economic welfare and therefore is undesirable. As a consequence of the above, 
Holden and El-Bannany (2006) opined that   in the United Kingdom the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (1996) became wary of a concentration ration that is 25 percent or 
more of the banking market in terms of total assets or deposits. According to Ebhodaghe 
(1994), reported in Oluitan (2004):  
 
“Capital inadequacy has affected the financial health of banks. He explained that an 
analysis of bank capitalization revealed that as at the end of 1992, almost all banks 
(120) operating in Nigeria required additional capital totaling N0.6billion to support 
their volume of trading. This amount was the variance between the amount stipulated 
by the monetary authorities for prudential minimum capital and the aggregate capital 
outlay. By 1993, this variance further deteriorated to N9.1 billion”. 
 
No one wish to see a bank collapse inspite of the leverage provided by Deposit Insurance 
Corporation to customers when it occurs. To instill confidence in bank customers and other 
stakeholders‘, safety, soundness and financial condition of banks are crucial. Sachs, et al 
(1995) reported in Oluitan (2004) in his study of 20 emerging banks, observed low 
reserves as one of the crisis plaguing banks. Oluitan concludes that these anomalies have 
led to erosion of public confidence in the banking sub-sector as a result of the growing 
number of distressed banks experienced in the past, which affected the liquidity position of 
banks. In recent years, a wave of bank consolidations has spread across the world. 
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According to Amel et al (2002), ―more than 8000 bank consolidations occurred between 
1990 and 2001 and the total value of the deals reached about $1,800 billion‖. It is notable 
that one of the major driving forces of the recent wave of bank consolidations has been 
government policy. For example, since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the financial 
authorities of Asian countries have been promoting bank consolidations and the Japanese 
government initiated a policy of promoting consolidations among regional financial 
institutions on the grounds that this policy would contribute to the stabilization of the 
banking system Berger et al. (1999); Shih (2003). The idea underlying the use of a 
consolidation promotion policy during a financial crisis is that bank consolidations would 
assist in risk asset diversification, Shih (2003). 
 
2.7   PROTECTING OF BANK DEPOSITORS AND COLLECTION OF  
           INSURED SUMS 
The Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) protects bank depositors against loss. 
Firstly, the NDIC guarantees the payment of deposits up to a maximum of N50,000 but 
N200,000 has been proposed in the NDIC Amendment Act before the National Assembly 
to a depositor in the event of the failure of a participating financial institution. Balances in 
all deposit accounts held in the same right and capacity by a depositor in all branches of 
the closed insured institution, net of outstanding debts, are aggregated to determine the 
maximum insured amount. Secondly, the Corporation is empowered to provide financial 
and technical assistance to failing or distressed banks in the interest of depositors. The 
financial assistance can take the form of loans, guarantee for loan taken by the bank or 
acceptance of accommodation bills. On the other hand, the technical assistance may take 
the following forms: take-over of management and control of the bank; change in 
management; and/or assisted merger with another viable institution. 
 Thirdly, the corporation supervises banks so as to protect depositors, ensure monetary 
stability, and effective/efficient payment system as well as promote competition and 
innovation in the banking system. Banking supervision seeks to reduce the potential risk of 
failure and ensures that unsafe and unsound banking practices do not go completely 
unchecked. It also provides the oversight functions required to preserve the integrity of and 
promote public confidence in the banking system. Insured sums are collected by depositors 
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filing their claims through the completion of relevant forms provided by the corporation. In 
addition, they have to furnish the Liquidator with account documents such as unused 
chequebooks, old cheque stubs, passbooks, fixed deposit certificates e.g. the depositor 
would also be required to identify him/ herself with a valid identification document like 
driver‘s license or International Passport. After verification of ownership of the account as 
well as the account balance, the depositor would be duly paid the insured sum by a 
designated Pay Centre which is usually not far from the branch where he/she maintains the 
account. However, where claims are filed later but within the statutory period of 18 
months, agent banks duly appointed by the Corporation would make such payments.  
 
If a depositor loses his/her passbook or saving documents, a police report along with a 
sworn affidavit duly certified by the court must be presented. The depositor will also be 
required to identify him/herself with a valid Identification document like driver‘s license or 
International Passport. The primary mandate of the NDIC is to protect depositors. 
However, through supervision to ensure safety and soundness of banking institutions, the 
interests of creditors and shareholder are also protected. In the event of bank failure, 
creditors and shareholders could be paid liquidation dividends after depositors have been 
fully reimbursed. 
NDIC pays depositors liquidation dividend in case of bank failure. Liquidation payments 
are payments made to depositors of failed institutions in excess of the insured sum. While 
the insured sums are paid from the Corporation‘s Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), 
liquidation dividends are paid from funds realized from the sale of the assets and 
recoveries from debtors of the failed institutions. However, the system is designed to 
protect small depositors since they are generally more in number and less informed about 
the safety and soundness of depository institutions. Unlimited coverage could induce 
excessive risk-taking, promote moral hazard and weaken market discipline. 
The Deposit Insurance limit is not increased merely by dividing funds owned in same right 
and capacity among different types of deposits in the same bank. For example, current and 
saving accounts owned by the same depositor, in the same right and capacity, in the same 
bank are added together and insured up to the maximum. The maximum insurance limit is 
applicable to deposit in each of the participating banks. In the case of a bank having one or 
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more branches, the main office and all branch offices are considered as one bank. 
Therefore, if a person has many accounts in one bank, all the deposits are taken together as 
one account even if the deposits are in various branches of the same bank. However, if a 
depositor has accounts in more than one bank, they are insured independently up to the 
maximum insured sum per bank. 
 
2.8   CURRENT ISSUES IN THE NIGERIAN MACRO-ECONOMY 
Despite the recent recapitalization of banks, the Nigerian government needs to address the 
drawbacks plaguing the system or else the economy will continue to experience negative 
indices. Ige (2006) posited that the country could go into the doldrums if: 
i. The current socio-economic reforms fail to addressed the desired objectives of  
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (see NEEDS); 
ii. Corrupt leaders continue to have their way without being confronted and 
brought to justice; 
iii. The neglect of rural transformation continues or intensifies; 
iv. The current democratic dispensation turns out to be incongruous with economic 
realities 
v. The international community fails to tighten the noose on Nigerian politicians 
who have illegal accounts in foreign banks. 
The economy has suffered neglect in many sectors such National Electric Power Authority 
(NEPA) now commercialized and called Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), 
privatized Nigerian Telecommunications (NITEL). Competition, technology and 
innovation constitute the game of industrial progress, in a world that is in the grip of 
globalization. In the past, government had simply announced a new petrol price and faced 
the wrath of hostile citizenry. Despite the frequency of increases, the government 
discovered that this did not make things work. This can be traced from the 1970‘s and it 
goes to show that only a backward economy government fixes the prices of goods that 
should be available freely in the market. That was the route Soviet Union took which led to 
its ruinous end and subsequent disintegration. Reform is an endless matter in a dynamic 
world. Besides PHCN and NITEL, reforms are ongoing in various sectors of the economy 
such as: 
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i. Privatization of public enterprises and government holdings in banks and oil 
marketing companies. 
ii.  Establishing of Petroleum Products Price Regulatory Agency (PPPRA); 
        Government is seeking to achieve the following; 
i. Ensuring additional financial resources which government itself cannot afford; 
ii. Encouraging additional financial resources which government itself cannot 
afford. 
iii. Establishing a culture of management and cutting edge for excellence;  
iv. Prioritizing the use of resources rather than dissipating a large chunk on 
unproductive ventures thereby encouraging corruption. 
 
2.8.1       Bank Performance and Macroeconomic Variables and Some Theoretical  
                Perspectives               
McConnel and Brue (2001) argued that the rate of interest, the exchange rate, and the 
general price level play an important but complex and interdependent role in any economy. 
Nyong (1996) in his study included interest rate and exchange rate, bank resources, 
banking structure, unit labour costs and size of banks as dominant factors affecting the 
behaviour and performance of commercial banks. It is important to note that the spread 
between deposit rate and lending rate is a significant explanation of the profit while black 
market premium on exchange rate plays the same role. Other factors include management 
efficiency, labour cost, bank reserves, capital investment and operating efficiency. Neither 
the effect of capitalization nor the structure of the capital base feature in Nyong and other 
studies till date. 
Macroeconomic indicators such as interest rate and exchange began to gain importance in 
macroeconomic models in Nigeria after the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986. 
Before then; there was a lid on interest and exchange rate as these were usually fixed by 
government fiat. Olofin and Iyoha (1999) confirmed in their studies that exchange rate and 
interest are hardly statistically significant because they were fixed variables and not 
because they were inconsequential. Molyneux and Tornton (1992) were the first to explore 
thoroughly the determinants of bank profitability on a set of countries. They used a sample 
of 18 determinants of European countries during the 1986 – 1989.They find a significant 
 49 
positive association between return on equity and level of interest rates in each country, 
bank concentration and government ownership. Abreu and Mendes (2002), investigate the 
determinants of bank‘s interest margins and profitability for some European countries in 
the last decade. They find that well capitalized banks face lower expected bankruptcy costs 
and this advantage translates into better profitability. 
Bashir (2000) examines the determinants of Islamic bank‘s performance across Middle 
Eastern countries for 1993-1998 periods using a number of internal and external factors 
there to predict profitability and efficiencies. The results show that higher leverage and 
large loans to asset ratios, lead to higher profitability. The study also showed that foreign 
owned banks are more profitable than domestic one. There is also evidence that taxation 
impact negatively on bank profitability. 
 
Corporate performance evaluation compares actual outcome on designated criteria with 
some notional standard in order to ascertain the extent to which expectations have been 
met or other-wise (e.g. ROA, ROE, Capital, profit and its derivatives). Essentially, 
performance, as measured by profitability, is a function of cost and revenue given the 
constraint imposed by economic, social, political and technological situations often 
dictated by government policies. Baumol‘s (1959), Marris‘s (1963) and Williamson‘s cited 
in Ade Ojo (1992), have as one of their facts, the profitability of business organizations, is 
a function of cost and revenue generated in course of production.  
Shepherd (1979) stated in his proposition that performance goals for market activity can be 
of efficiency, equity and other criteria. Our main concern here is the issue of efficiency. He 
classified efficiency into three main categories. Firstly, there is internal efficiency (X-
efficiency) and can be attained in well-managed firms which minimize costs for any given 
level of output. Secondly, there is   allocative efficiency in which all firms and consumers 
reach equimarginal conditions of price equal to marginal cost including marginal rates of 
substitution and transformation equal to price ratios. Allocation cannot be altered so as to 
raise the total value of output. Thirdly, there is the dynamic efficiency which deals on how 
present resources for future inventions and innovation are allocated efficiently. For 
instance, the X-efficieny is an excess of actual costs over minimum costs (excess 
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cost/actual cost). Where excess cost exceeds actual cost, bank management need to employ 
innovative ways of curtailing it so as not to erode profit of the organization.  
Ojo (1992) and Oluyemi (1995), cited in Eke (1999) opined that the financial condition of 
banks can be assessed using some basic indicators and trend analysis such as Capital 
Adequacy, Asset Quality, Earnings and Liquidity. Apart from quantitative factors, 
qualitative factors such as quality of management, the degree of compliance by banks with 
applicable banking laws and regulations (e.g Monetary and Credit policy Guidelines), as 
well as banking services to the local economy are relevant. We shall use the CAMEL 
parameter- Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity as one 
of the tools in the study. The measures of ascertaining a bank‘s financial condition and 
Performance by the regulatory authority are encapsulated in the acronym CAMEL, which 
stands for: 
 
Capital Adequacy (Owners fund to total risk-weighted assets): Capital Adequacy, a 
quantitative factor is one of the important indicators of the strength and performance of a 
bank. The best management cannot turn around an ailing bank if it does not have adequate 
capital. Assets Quality (Non-performing assets to total loan and advances portfolio): the 
incidence of large amounts of non-performing loans (bad debts) can put bank management 
under severe stress. Management (in terms of quality, competence and depth of 
experiences): the quality of management can make an important difference between sound 
and unsound banks. Poor management often manifests itself in the form of excessive 
operating expenses, inadequate administration of loan portfolio, overly aggressive policies 
to attract deposits. Earnings/Profitability (adequacy and sustainability of earnings over the 
long term): continued build-up of non-performing assets, would seriously affect banks in 
generating adequate income on their loan portfolio. The implementation of CBN 
Prudential Guidelines in 1991 for licensed banks has reduced the paper profit formerly 
reported by some banks. Liquidity (in terms of adequacy to meet maturing obligations and 
demand for new credits: inadequate liquidity damages banks‘ reputation while excess 
liquidity will retard their earnings. 
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Where a bank management fails to pay close watch to any of these indices, it could have 
adverse effect on bank performance. Where a bank is distressed or healthy it would 
ultimately have recourse to new prospective investor, both local and foreign. Any attempt 
aimed at successfully recapitalizing any bank must focus on the bank‘s assets quality, 
management competence and experience, level of earnings, adequacy of liquidity and 
image/perception among other factors outside the control of the banks themselves.  
Healthy banks that intend to attract potential investors should start getting their overall 
business strategies and focus right. 
 
2.8.2   Shareholders Indicators of Performance 
Shareholders expectations of bank performance are mainly centered on the investor‘s 
returns and they are used for their analysis. They are: earnings per share, dividend per 
share, price-earnings ratio, dividend yield and earning yield. Investor‘s use a combination 
of these ratios to evaluate bank capitalization, management and   performance.  
 
 2.8.3   Bank Performance Indicators for the Study 
This study is an attempt to investigate the relationship between bank capitalization 
(dependent or explained variable) bank management and performance in Nigerian banking 
industry (independent variables) on the other hand. The following variables are used as 
indicators for gauging bank capitalization:  return on assets (ROA) and return on capital 
(ROC) are outcome from the use of bank capital and actual capital that is shareholders 
fund (SHF). The following bank characteristic indicators are used as internal determinants 
of bank management and performance. They are: Liquidity (BL/BD) ratio of bank loans 
and advances to total deposit (B DEPOSIT) and (LA/BD) ratio of liquid assets to bank 
deposits (LAD). There is also (EOM i..e Efficiency of Management) that is  (OE/TA) ratio 
of operating expenses to total assets and (BL/BA) ratio of bank loans to Bank assets (B 
LOAN) and Capital Adequacy (SHF/TA) ratio of Shareholders Fund to total assets, (CAP).   
 
Demerguc-Kunt and Huizingha (1999) examine the determinants of bank interest margins 
and profitability using a bank level data for 80 countries in the 1988-1995 periods. They 
used set of variables such as bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, taxation, 
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regulations, financial structure and legal indicators. They find that a larger ratio of bank 
assets to GDP and a lower market concentration ratio lead to lower margins and profits. 
Foreign banks also have higher margins and profits than domestic banks in developing 
countries, while the opposite prevail in developed countries. In a similar study, Demerguc-
Kunt and Huizingha (2001) investigated the impact of financial development and structure 
on bank profitability using bank level data for a large number of developed and developing 
countries over the 1990-1997 period. The study showed that higher bank development is 
related to lower bank performance resulting from tougher competition and explains the 
decrease of profitability.  
 
2.9   MERGERS/CONSOLIDATION THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN  
         NIGERIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Until recently, while deposit money banks avoided merger; significant progress was 
achieved in the merger of various development finance institutions (DFIs), which had 
overlapping roles. The process, which commenced in the year 2000, was an attempt to give 
the institutions a better focus and to promote socio-economic development of the country. 
The Bank of Industry Limited came into being in October 2001, by the merger of the 
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB), Nigerian Bank for Commerce and 
Industry (NBCI) and the National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND). Nigeria 
Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (NACRDB) were formed from the 
merger of Nigeria Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB), Peoples Bank of Nigeria 
(PBN) and the Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP). The Nigerian 
National Mortgage Bank (NinamBank) originated from the merger of Federal Mortgage 
Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) and the Federal Mortgage Finance Limited (FMFL). 
 
Lemo (2005) opined that consolidation of banks will stimulate overall investment climate 
and enhance growth and development. He expatiated that post consolidation would enable 
banking institutions to support public and private sector partnership in the financing of 
projects hitherto the exclusive reserve for the public sector, particularly in the areas of 
infrastructure and social services. Consolidation would help in no small way in meeting the 
long-term vision of National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 
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(NEEDS), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and also to meet the 
target of the Millennium Development Goals intended at creating wealth and reducing 
poverty. 
 
As stated in Ross (2002), the representative of the United States and representatives from 
11 other leading industrialized countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg) agreed on 
new capital standards-often referred to as the Basel Agreement. Banks were required to 
consider the off-balance sheet commitments in determining their capital position. Nwagwu 
(2000) opined that adequacy of capital structure has remained a major concern in the 
administration of indigenous commercial banks in Nigeria. One of the reasons for the 
collapse of indigenous commercial banks in the 1930‘s, 1940‘s 1950‘s 1990‘s was due to 
inadequate capital structure. Hempel and Simonson (1999) carried out a study on the effect 
of bank size on the acceptable and permissible levels of financial leverage. The result 
showed that small banks usually have a higher return on assets and a higher percentage of 
equity to asset The large banks usually have lower than average return on assets and a 
lower than average percentage of equity to assets, which produces a higher leverage 
multiplier (assets/equity), and a close to average return on equity because of the greater 
leverage. Nwude (2005) posited that recapitalization has both positive and negative 
implications:  
 
―The positive implications are strong, sound, competitive and reliable big banks, quality 
management and best practice in corporate governance, improvement in profitability, 
improvement in credit availability and enlargement of areas of operations, improved 
professionalism and ethical practices, diluted ownership structure giving rise to 
professionalism, improved capacity to finance projects, improved depositors/investors 
confidence, healthy competition, reduction in regulatory abuses, reduced lending rate, 
higher economic growth rate, deepened level of the Nigerian capital market, attractive 
investors returns, attractive concessions and creation of new entrepreneurs. The large 
banks have greater management depth. The negative implications of recapitalization 
include amongst others are loss of identity, sanction on erring banks, downsizing the 
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workforce, flight to safety by depositors, higher shareholders expectation, collusion to 
form monopoly, business failure, dilution of ownership control, merger and acquisitions, 
excessive pricing of assets and insufficient attention and follow-up efforts to post-merger 
implementation”.  
 
 A vibrant banking sector and an equally vibrant real sector would enhance capacity 
utilization, which will in turn boost employment and growth in the economy. However, 
this would be possible if there is good corporate governance. Chukwudire (2004) posited, 
that in the immediate past two decades the financial services industry has experienced 
fluctuating fortunes leading to high profile cases of corporate failure and consequent near 
loss of public confidence. The industry‘s problems are consequences (directly or 
indirectly) of bad corporate governance. Good corporate governance leads to public 
confidence, market efficiency, integrity, financial stability and growth and a fair share of 
global capital flow to the economy. Unegbu (2004) opined that the crisis witnessed in the 
Nigerian financial system, especially in the nineties could essential be linked to non-
compliance with the principles of sound management which therefore underscores the need 
to continually raise the awareness of the Nigerian private sector, especially the banking 
sector, in the area of good corporate governance. According to CBN Banking Supervision 
and Annual Report (2002) reported by Oyewale (2004); it stated that the twin evil that is 
distress and eventual liquidation experienced in Nigerian banks in the last one-and –a half 
decades can be traced to ineffective corporate governance when it declared as follows: ―A 
unique feature of banking business is the overwhelming dominance of depositors‘ fund in 
comparison with the shareholders equity‖. Therefore to check excessive insider lending, 
among other abuses, which characterized banking business there is need for 
institutionalization of good corporate governance practices. The issue of corporate 
governance requires purposeful leadership/management in the financial services industry. 
According to Ogubunka (2004,  
 
“the leadership we desire is one that breed‟s positive influence…it is about transformation 
of “value into actions, vision into realities, obstacles into innovations, separateness into 
solidarity, and risks into reward”.                                                                  
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2.10     CONSEQUENCES OF BANK CAPITALIZATION     
The consequences of the recent bank capitalization which culminated in consolidation of 
banks are as follows:  
  
Market power consequences of consolidation 
 It is argued in the literature that lending to small and medium enterprises may be 
adversely affected because banks with market power will tend to reduce lending volumes 
and increase loan interest rates. In the short run, it might be difficult for banks to make the 
require profit in the short-run but in the long run, as the bank wax strong,  profit will  rise 
beyond the optimal. Studies have also shown that return on assets (ROA) or return on 
equity (ROE) tend to improve where M&A occur, and the Nigeria banking sector will not 
be an exception. 
 
Efficiency consequences of consolidation 
 It could also be a means to change organizational focus or managerial behaviour towards 
improving efficiency through achieving risk-expected return trade off. Studies have shown 
that large organizations take the benefits of an improved risk-expected return trade off after 
consolidation. Such big organizations are able to diversify their risks through increased 
efficiency which in turn help to lower incidence of insolvency. 
 
Efficient payments system consequences of consolidation 
With fewer players in the banking industry, it is possible to agree on payment standards. 
The operation of payments system exposes banks and participants to various forms of 
risks, including credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, and systemic risk. It is expected 
that operations of the payments system would be further modernized and standard for 
realization of desired efficiency. 
 
Safety and Soundness effects 
 The assumption is that not many large institutions with substantial capital base will have 
bank run, rather they will experience some degree of soundness in the money market. The 
larger the institution, the higher the probability of having higher asset base which has the 
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effect of boosting the image and confidence of the banking public. On the other hand, if the 
risk of an institution is high, this could raise the probability that the institution will fail or 
become illiquid before settling some of its payments obligations, thereby exposing other 
institutions directly to risks as payees or indirectly contributing to panic runs. 
 
 Financial Safety consideration  
The Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) would have to create a formal safety 
net which involves additional cost to the corporation though; the premium payable by 
individual institutions might need to be reviewed. The safety net may give additional 
protection to institutions considered ―too big to fail‖, which may be created by the 
capitalization/consolidation.  
 
Supervisory effects of consolidation 
There is need for the supervisory body (CBN) to improve the level of transparency, good 
governance and the degree of supervision of risk management systems. Transparency has 
been a recurring problem in the financial industry in Nigeria, and unless, it is improved 
upon, it has the potential of making nonsense of the efforts of the supervisors in the present 
dispensation (New Capital Accord). 
 
 Service availability consequence of consolidation  
With few players in the banking industry giving rise to additional market power will lead 
to unavailability of services through shut down of unviable branch offices, as well as 
avoiding not so profitable business loans. It is also possible to increase the supply of 
services to customers because better and dynamic banks are able to serve their customers 
more profitable. Although this does not mean that large, complex financial institutions 
associated with M&As would reduce services to all small customers, but for those with 
strong financial statements and valuable collateral, they may receive essentially the same 
transactions based services as large customers. 
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Employment effects of consolidation 
It is argued in the literature that safety of bank deposits rather than high retrenchment costs 
(job cuts) should be the concern of policy makers. There is no doubt that the recent 
capitalization of the Nigerian Banking industry would bring about a change in the nature 
and quality of employment. Bankers with traditional banking skills and information 
technology (IT) knowledge may not be seriously affected. The capitalized banks (mega 
banks) will require management and IT skills as well as other specializes knowledge. 
 
Promotion of depositors’ confidence in the system 
 There is no doubt that in the recent past the banking industry in Nigeria was characterized 
by failure and loss of depositors‘ fund, which led to lost of confidence. Thus, Soludo noted 
in his July 2004 address to the Bankers Committee that the capitalization/consolidation in 
Nigerian banking industry is expected to promote depositors confidence. Increase in capital 
base of the banks will make the banks stronger. Financial Commentators in the banking 
industry have noted that lower capital makes the bank to be weak. For instance, in 
December 2003, aggregate paid up capital of the banks had increased by 18% from 2002 to 
N120.3 billion. Similarly, at December 2003, the aggregate shareholders funds stood at 
N211 billion (CBN, 2004). These figures compare unfavourably with the scenario for 
banks in South East Asia and even South Africa. Similarly, the share capital requirement 
was a low N3 million (US$140,000), in 1989, N2 billion in 2003 (US$14.6 million) which 
are rather low by international standards. The raising of the shareholders funds unimpaired 
by losses to a minimum of N25 billion (US$180m), is expected to put the banks in a better 
position to fund the economy.  
 
Better Funding of the Economy  
The above point as outlined by the CBN Governor is expected to hold a priori. However, 
studies elsewhere have found mixed results. For instance, Studart (2004) notes that the 
World Bank‘s forecast that consolidation in Latin American countries would increase 
access to credit did not materialize. Also in a similar vein, Peek and Rosengreen (1997) 
reported that there was no conclusive evidence that consolidated banks will discriminate 
against small business. Rather they found that the position shifts from sticking to their pre-
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consolidation portfolio to liberalization towards SMEs. Specifically, they noted that first in 
roughly half of the commercial and savings bank mergers, the portfolio share of SMEs 
loans of the acquirer rise rather than fell after the merger. In slightly less than half of the 
cases, the acquirer had a larger portfolio share of SMEs loans than its target. Finally, it is 
only when the acquirer is large and less active in SMEs lending, that its loan portfolio 
share of the consolidated bank is much more likely to decline than to rise after the merger, 
(Peek and Rosengreen,1997).  
  
Furthermore, consolidation should improve the capacity of Nigerian banks for cross -
border businesses.  
The fast track integration framework for ECOWAS has been on for some time. However, 
weak and under-capitalized banks are ill-prepared to participate in the post integration era. 
Mailafia (2004) and Ekaete (2004 have all pointed to the prospects for increase inter-
regional businesses post-consolidation. In South East Asia, they found that the level of 
cross-border transactions rose following the consolidation of the 1990s and the beginning 
of this century. Weak banks cannot participate in the mega-dollar businesses. Apart from 
the benefits discussed above, Mailafia (2004) also pointed out that consolidation/bank 
capitalization involves geographic diversification as a bank can expand into new areas 
where it was not well represented. This increases its deposit base and enhances the 
profitability potentials. The result will be some synergy in terms of the composition/types 
of loans, maturity structure, risks, etc. The prospects of higher returns on the investors is 
also worthy of mention as we consider the benefits of banks consolidation. Traditionally, it 
is realized that returns are often directly correlated with the level of investment. 
Consolidated banks are expected ab initio, to have access to more capital and as they invest 
large sums, they would also receive higher returns. This is facilitated by the improvement 
in the pressure put on them by the expanded shareholders. Moreover, the reduction in 
inter-bank borrowing would cut cost and enhance profit margins. Also, the availability of 
more funds should reduce the level and magnitude of unethical practices with their 
attendant adverse impact on profitability. 
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Another area where consolidation can be beneficial is cost reduction  
While there is evidence on cost reduction potentials of consolidation, there is also 
opposing evidence. For instance, Linder and Crane (1992) investigated the cost profile of 
merged and non-merged banks in the USA and concluded that there was no significant 
difference between the two groups in regard to results that bank mergers raise profits by 
reducing cost. The evidence from their study of Bank of America and Security Pacific, 
Chemical and Manufacturers Hanover, etc, showed that reduced operational costs rarely 
translated into higher profits because of increased loan losses, among other reasons. Later, 
Kwan and Wilcox (2001) studied a sample of 1,134 bank mergers between 1987 and 1995; 
employing a change in relative operating costs for the bank merger. They measured the 
variables of the ratio of total non-interest expenses to total assets, ratio of labour expenses 
to total assets and ratio of premise to total assets. The main finding was that ―bank mergers 
reduced operating costs … both labour cost and occupancy expense are found to decline 
significantly after the merger‖ (Kwan and Wilcox, 2001). Finally, the issue of cost-
reduction in mergers/consolidation is a controversial and an empirical one. 
 
On the flip side of the benefits of capitalization/consolidation are the costs. Since 
consolidation started, costs have been incurred and the trend is likely to continue. An 
aspect of the costs is the necessity of the process undertaken in the exercise. The merger 
entails legal expenses such as those on issuing houses, stock brokers, reporting 
accountants, etc. These are expenses that are avoidable in the absence of consolidation. Of 
course, this would include security and exchange commission (SEC) fees as well as 
consultants‘ fees.  Ibrahim (2004) notes that the CBN had pledged to underwrite all these 
expense and provide a team of technical experts in this regard. 
A cause for worry about in the recent bank capitalization/consolidation in the Nigerian 
banking industry is the future fear of job losses. Already some bank staff have lost their 
jobs in the processes leading to the merger as the weak banks downsized in the bid to meet 
the conditions for absorption by the healthy banks. The consequent job loss would swell 
the unemployment market (Kwan and Wilcox, 2001). One of the cost saving areas is in job 
reduction. 
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Empirical work across the areas where capitalization/consolidation had taken place 
indicated that it resulted in concentration of banking and the consequent reduction in the 
number of banks in the post consolidation era. There is the implication that the rural areas 
could be marginalized in the service delivery. Indeed, Shields, et al (2004) found that in 
rural Pennsylvania State, USA, ―the results show that consolidation is dramatically 
reducing the number of banks in rural areas‖, they submit that ―should the trend continue, 
then there would be no banks headquartered in rural Pennsylvania by 2005‖.  
In addition, consolidation has triggered off runs on some banks as customers move to 
prevent their funds being trapped in the banks, coupled with a lull in the interbank market. 
This arises from corporate customers making massive withdrawals as that of the Oyo State 
Government (pre recapitalization in 2005) from Trans International Bank Plc. 
Consequently, the bank was unable to pay its numerous customers and it was barred from 
the clearing system. While the appropriate authorities (CBN and NDIC) responded by 
extension of financial assistance to the banks, this will need to be intensified in order to 
calm down nerves and curb the anxiety that usually accompanied 
capitalization/consolidation. 
In spite of all the efforts of the CBN and NDIC, all unsound banks were unable to meet the 
requirements for merger or acquisition (M&A). Those that failed impose losses on the 
depositors, on the one hand, and the shareholders, on the other. We have found that in 
some of the countries that have undergone capitalization/consolidation of their banking 
sectors, not all banks succeeded. Some inevitably failed. It was therefore not surprising 
that the CBN allowed some to fail partly in order to sanitize the system and partly as 
lessons for those who had mismanaged their banks before the advent of the consolidation 
policy. According to Ige (2006), the reasons for the CBN decision to recapitalize the 
Nigerian banking industry are not unconnected with the following, among others: 
Bad management was rampant in many of them as they were unable to afford the desirable 
skills and technology, the uncompetitive and distress banks were better acquired or merged 
with successful banks, or else liquidate a spectre of gloom for depositors, the owners and 
the economy, the high interest rates for money borrowed, which were far beyond any 
internal rate of return in Nigeria, could suggest given the appalling management capacity, a 
good number of them derived a sizeable proportion of their profit from illegal practices, 
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encouraging bunkering, foreign exchange malpractices e.t.c  and many of the banks at their 
previous levels could not compete globally with their foreign counterparts in the developed 
and emerging industrial countries of South East Asia and South America. The 
recapitalization of Nigerian banks until recently in 2006 was very infinitesimal.  
 
Many of them lacked the resources, ingenuity and besides, they were unable to utilize 
business opportunities in Nigeria let alone those in other countries. Bribery, over-
invoicing, illegal deals in foreign exchange and corruption were the modus operandi of 
Nigerian banks. Sharp banking practices such as high interest rate, exchange rate, inflation 
stunted the   development of a credible macro- economic framework in Nigeria. Therefore, 
in this research, we look back into the past of these banks using macro-econometric models 
with aggregate data, draw and extrapolate conclusions about the likely consequences of 
bank capitalization, management and performance and the effect on the economy. The 
major variables of interest include shareholders‘ funds of the banks, interest rate, inflation, 
bank capital, liquidity and asset ratios exchange rate and change in the growth rate of the 
economy over a period of 20 years (1986– 2006). This study is an addition and extension 
of past studies such as Nyong (1996), Uchendu (1995) and Ben Samy (2003). The study 
attempts to unravel questions that continue to emerge in enlightened discussions of the 
Nigerian deposit money banks regarding the role they played or failed to play in the 
evolution of the Nigerian economy and whether they will continue to behave the same 
way. For instance, the trend in the capital base of banks coupled with manifold expansion 
of the recent capitalization, could translate to lower rates of interest to the industrial sector 
if well managed. It may also result in an increase in the return to ordinary shareholders.  
 
2.11   CONDITIONS INFLUENCING CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
According to CBN Bullion (2005), the following should be considered along with capital 
ratios as conditions influencing capital adequacy: the quality of management influences 
outsider‘ perception of capital adequacy because, if management is good the bank will be 
profitably, and efficiently operated and there will be no need to rely unduly on capital to 
cushion disaster; a bank carrying good quality and adequate liquid assets will not be in 
danger of prolonged and damaging illiquidity. Consequently, the need for capital will be 
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minimized; the history of earnings and retention thereof: good earnings and write-back 
policy will continually enhance the capital adequacy of a bank. A bank that allows itself to 
be politicised and which put ethnic consideration before business prudence can only 
contribute to the failure of the bank and increase its need for capital; the potential volatility 
of deposit structure will affect the liquidity of a bank which will in turn affect the 
profitability and need for capital; the quality of management will impact on the efficiency 
of operation and consequently the need for capital;  the restrictions placed on the 
maintenance between capital funds and loans and advances, the higher a bank‘s capacity to 
meet the potential credit needs of its environment. With Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
and Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), technical and financial support 
traditionally given to banks in Nigeria, it is easy to tolerate temporary and relative 
inadequacy of bank capital in our banking system.  
 
2.12    IMPLICATION OF RECAPITALIZATION OF BANKS 
The introduction of Universal Banking in 2000 in Nigeria created a level playing field for 
all the operators (commercial and merchant). The recapitalization of banks resulted to:  
contraction in the number of operating banks to twenty-five (25) in 2006 and further to   24 
in 2008; a temporary resolution of the distress problem in the system; emergence of a few 
super strong and efficient banks; local capital flight from perceived distress banks to those 
adjudged safe and sound by depositors; and increase and severe competition among the 
surviving banks for both deposits and available business opportunities. The recent review 
of bank capital requirement in Nigeria became effective on 1st January; 2006.This led to 
the reduction in the number of banks from eighty-nine to twenty-four in 2008. For the first 
time, the Nigerian banking industry witnessed merger between the small and big banks 
(See table 1 in chapter 1). 
 
2. 12.1   Options Open to Banks for Meeting New Minimum Paid-Up Capital  
From the Security and Exchange Commission Report (various issues), the following 
options can be used by banks to meet new minimum paid-up capital: 
i. Capitalization of  general reserve; 
ii. Conversion of deposits to shares by willing and interested depositors; 
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iii. Rights Issue by existing shareholders; 
iv. Private placement by those banks that wish to remain private; 
v. Conversion to a Public limited liability company and raising funds by way of a 
public offer for subscription; 
vi. A combination of any of the above options; and/or 
vii. Mergers of suitable and compatible banks or outright acquisition 
 
The most straight forward and easy to implement is the capitalization of reserves other than 
statutory requirement. Banks with robust balances in their general reserves accounts 
exercised this option. All they need to do is to obtain the statutory approval of their 
shareholders to capitalize by issuing bonus shares to members. Banks with some level of 
reserves can take this window to bridge the gap or reduce the short fall that would have to 
be raised through one or a combination of available routes. The decision as to which option 
to adopt will, however, to a large extent, depend on the perception of existing shareholders 
and the bank‘s long term corporate objectives vis-à-vis expected return. Conversion of 
deposits may not be too attractive given the not-so-pleasant experience of depositors in the 
past. A lot of high net-worth individuals with sizeable deposits running into billions of 
naira may decide to move their funds ―in flight to safety‖ to the big banks which they 
consider quite safe and sound. The big banks did not look at this option given their huge 
general reserves. What may likely hamper the success rate of this option is the statutory 
constraint of a maximum of fifty (50) shareholders for a private company. 
Banks can also use the rights issue. The success of a rights issue to existing shareholders 
will depend on the quantum of the shortfall and the preparedness of the shareholders to 
undertake additional investment. Where the shortfall runs into hundreds of millions of 
naira as is usually the case the shareholder may not be in a position to provide the entire 
requirement. 
Private placement can also be used to widen its ownership base (subject to the maximum 
number of fifty (50) shareholders) by inviting prospective private investors to subscribe to 
the new shares to be issued. To do this, the existing shareholders would need to first waive 
their presumptive rights as required under the Companies and Allied Matters Act CAMA 
of 1990 so as to facilitate a smooth offering. With the present liberalized foreign 
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investment environment, foreign portfolio investors could be invited to participate in such 
a share issues exercise. Bank capitalization is an on going process; foreign investor avail 
themselves of this opportunity, as it will go a long way in assisting recapitalization efforts. 
Conversion to a public limited liability company is another feasible option. Banks should 
consider if existing shareholders are unable or unwilling (or both) to come up with the 
shortfall. In order to avail itself of this option and raise the required financing through the 
capital market, Securities and Exchange Commission provide conditions that should be 
met by a private owned company or any aspiring private company must possess the 
following attributes: 
a. it must convert to a public company and be prepared to divest (leave) 25% of its 
outstanding shares to the investing public; 
b. It must have operated for not less than five years to qualify for listing on the first-
tier market of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (or three years on the second-tier 
market) unless waived by the council of the Exchange; 
c. It must give full and maximum disclosure of all relevant information pertaining to 
its operations and in particular, its financial circumstances; and  
d.    It must imbibe strict financial discipline and prudent management practices as  
         part of its basic operating system and procedures.  
 
The only snag with this method is that if many banks are involved in this process of raising 
finance, it may overstretch the absorptive capacity of the market. Also the manpower 
capability of the regulatory authorities of the capital market that is Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) in mid-wifing the exercise within 
the stipulated time frame was equally tasked. The introduction of information technology 
in the Nigerian Stock Exchange as, however, taken care of this drawback, and even then 
the limitation will still be there. 
The last of the options open to banks is mergers and acquisition (M&A). This is when two 
or more compatible banks come together in merger exercise under a Scheme of 
Arrangement that would entail the approval of the Federal High Court, Nigerian Stock 
Exchange and Securities and Exchange Commission. Before a consensus is reached in M 
& A, there may be several boardroom squabbles, in-fighting and management divisions 
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that may occur. The Central Bank of Nigeria did not increase the paid-up capital of banks 
from N2 billion to N25 billion. What the CBN raised to N25 billion was the minimum 
capital base of banks defined as paid-up capital and reserves. It is also important to note 
that whereas there are several ways of achieving the minimum paid up capital in banking 
consolidation, only mergers and acquisition/takeover are the acceptable legal modes of 
consolidation under the Soludo solution. Table one (Chapter 1, p.3) shows the banks that 
form alliance to consolidate into one entity in the last N25 billion recapitalization in 
Nigeria, which came into effect on 31st December 2005. For M&A to succeed 
incompatible bedfellows should be avoided. Outright acquisition is also possible where 
existing owners of weak banks permit themselves to be acquired by the big banks. The 
issue that, however, needs to be contended with in either a merger or acquisition option is 
the typical giant size ego of the average Nigerian entrepreneur. 
 
2.13     CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR BANKS    
 Bank capitalization, management and performance cannot be sustained without good 
corporate governance. Management inefficiency in the banking industry according to 
Ebhodaghe (1994) is poor bank management, which had resulted in excessive operating 
expense, inadequate administration of loan portfolio, an overly aggressive growth policy to 
attract deposits, interest speculation coupled with other instances of poor judgment that 
resulted in stress for the banks. Corporate governance is about building credibility, 
ensuring transparency and accountability as well as maintaining an effective channel of 
information disclosure that would foster good corporate performance. It is also about how 
to build trust and sustain confidence among the various interest groups that make up an 
organization, Mark (2000). Literature on corporate governance comprise of attributes such 
as financial transparency, disclosure and trust among others. 
Etuk (1993) posited that accountability is a process whereby one renders account of its 
activities to someone who has the power to ask for it and also to evaluate and reward one‘s 
performance. For example, the political and financial resources of a nation are entrusted 
into the hands of those in government. The governments are therefore expected to account 
for the exploitation and use of the resources so as to enable the citizens evaluate their 
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performance and exercise their ultimate voting power to retain or remove them from the 
position of trust. 
The Banker‘s Committee was particular involved in the emergence of the final document 
on Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria which came into effect on April 3, 
2006.The document outlines weaknesses and challenges of corporate governance in 
Nigeria and states best practices that banks are mandated to comply with in order to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness in the management of Nigerian banks. Extract 
from www.cenbank.org revealed that the weaknesses identified with the banks include: 
Ineffective Board oversight, overbearing influence of Chairman or MD/CEO, or that of the 
position of Chairman/CEO combined, especially in family-controlled banks, weak internal 
controls, non-compliance with rules and regulations, poor risk management practices, 
technical incompetence, poor leadership and administrative inability and ineffective 
management information system. The challenges highlighted in the Code include: poor 
integration and development of information communication technology, inadequate 
management capacity, insider-related lending, rendition of false returns, and non-
disclosure of material information. The provision of the code covers the following main 
issues: 
 
Equity Owner in Banks 
Government equity holding is limited to 10 percent in any bank while 
individual/corporation private investors require regulatory approval to have more than 10 
percent holding. This is necessary to prevent overbearing influence on the resources of the 
bank by a single individual. 
 
Structures and Composition of Board and Board Committees  
 Maximum board of 20 members was specified for each bank, two of whom must be 
independent directors. The positions of Chairman and CEO are not be combined by any 
one person and two members of the same extended family would not be allowed to hold 
executive board membership in a bank at same time. Appointments to boards were to be 
made strictly on merit. This will ensure that the right human capital is employed at the top 
management where major decisions affecting the future of the bank are taken. 
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Board Oversight Functions 
 To enhance board oversight functions, regular training and education of members was 
institutionalized. Also, the board should have the latitude to hire independent consultants 
to advise it on certain issues of importance and the cost borne by the bank. This will also 
facilitate and enhance the internal control measures put in place by the bank. 
 
Tenure of directors 
To ensure both continuity and injection of fresh ideas, the tenure of non-executive directors 
had been limited to a maximum of three terms of four years each. 
 
Code of Conduct for Directors and Conflict of Interest 
 Adherence to the existing Code of Conduct for directors was emphasized and board 
members were expected to make full disclosure in respect of companies/entities/persons 
related to them that are service providers to their banks. 
 
Board Performance Appraisal 
To ensure a focused, purposeful and successful board, a performance appraisal of the 
board‘s activities is to be carried out by an external consultant on an annual basis.  
 
Management Reporting Relationships 
 The Code recognized the need for clearly defined lines of responsibility and hierarchy 
such that officers would be held accountable for duties and responsibilities attached to their 
offices. 
 
Data Integrity and Disclosure Requirements 
Zero tolerance on false rendition of returns was stated while Chief Executive Officers 
(CEO) and Chief Finance Officers were to be held accountable for infractions. Sanctions 
including removal from office and blacklisting were specified  
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Compliance Procedure and Whistle-blowing 
 Banks should appoint Compliance officers to monitor and report compliance with the 
code. There should also be dedicated lines for whistle-blowing by all stakeholders with 
respect to breaches/unethical behavior. 
 
 Risk Management Procedures and Internal Controls 
The Code emphasized the risk oversight functions of the board and required that the Head 
of Internal Audit report directly to the Audit Committee rather than the CEO. 
 
 Role and Tenure of Auditors 
External auditors were excluded from performing non-audit functions such as book-
keeping, consultancy and actuarial services for the banks they audit. Also, their tenure was 
limited to a maximum period of 10 years after which they would not be eligible for 
appointment by the same bank until after another 10 years. According to the Banking 
Supervision Annual Report (2006) a verification exercise on the status of compliance 
showed that much progress had been made by the banks in their compliance status, 
continuous monitoring would be required to enforce and sustain compliance. 
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                                    CHAPTER THREE 
 
         THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1      Introduction 
Bank capital can be seen in two ways. Narrowly, it can be seen as the amount contributed 
by the owners of a bank (paid –up share capital) that gives them the right to enjoy all the 
future earnings of the bank. More comprehensively, it can be seen as the amount of 
owners‘ funds available to support a bank‘s business (Athanasoglou et al., 2005).The latter 
definition includes reserves, and is also termed shareholders‘ funds (Anyanwaokoro, 
1996). Adewunmi (1997) gives two connotations of capital in banking. He opines that at 
the outset, capital in the form of issues and paid-up share is money with which the business 
of banking is started. Overtime, the capital funds of the bank reflect the accumulated 
(addition or depletion) capital. The question that at which level can the capital of a bank be 
said to be adequate is complex. In fact, question as to whether existing levels of capital are 
considered adequate for the increasing levels of risk has been an issue of debate between 
bankers and the supervisory authorities. Universally, Basel Committee‘s specified 
minimum capital adequacy ratio of eight percent relating to banks‘ credit is taken as the 
benchmark of measuring the capital adequacy of a bank. This implies that for every Naira 
given as credit a bank needs 8 Kobo capital. A bank that has lesser ratio is said to be 
undercapitalized. No empirical method has been used to determine banks‘ capital adequacy 
in Nigeria. This chapter will dwell on review of theoretical issues, review of empirical 
literature, theoretical framework and a summary of theoretical framework and literature 
review. 
 
3.2    REVIEW OF THEORETICAL ISSUES 
Furlong (1992), Haubrich and Wachtel (1993), and Berger and Udell (1994) investigated 
whether the 8 percent capital backing for loans to private enterprises required by the 1988 
Basle Accord encouraged banks to reallocate their assets from such loans to government 
securities. With the exception of Berger and Udell, these authors find evidence that the 
risk-based capital requirement set by the Basle Accord significantly contributed to the 
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credit crunch. No matter the definition adopted, a bank‘s capital is widely used to analyze 
the status of its financial strength (Bobakova, 2003). Positive correlation between returns 
and capital has been demonstrated by Furlong and keeley (1989), Keeley and Furlong 
(1990), Berger (1994), Berger (1995b), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Naceur 
(2003) and Eisenbeis (2005). Investigating the determinants of Tunisia banks‘ 
performances during the period 1980-1995, Naceur and Goaied (2001) indicated that the 
best performing banks are those who have struggled to improve labour and capital 
productivity and those who have been able to reinforce equity. Bourke (1989), Abreu and 
Mendes (2002) and Naceur (2003) agree that well-capitalized banks face lower need to 
external funding and lower bankruptcy and funding costs; and this advantages translates 
into profitability. Therefore, researches widely posit that the more capital a bank has, the 
more resistant it will be to failure e.g Uche (1998). Capital regulation is motivated 
principally by the concern that a bank may hold less capital than is socially optimal relative 
to its riskiness as negative externalities resulting from bank default are not reflected in 
market requirements. In this framework, an unregulated bank will take excessive portfolio 
and leverage risks in order to maximize its shareholder value at the expense of the deposit 
insurance (Benson et al., 1986, Furlong and Keeley 1989, and Keeley and Furlong 1990). 
Capital requirements can reduce these moral hazard incentives by forcing bank 
shareholders to absorb a larger part of the losses, thereby reducing the value of the deposit 
insurance put option. With more capital and less risk-taking, the effect is clearly a decrease 
in the bank‘s default probability.  
 
 Mullins (2005) posits that the primary objectives of the business organization may be seen 
as: to continue in existence – that is to survive; to maintain growth and development; and 
to make profit. The attainment of these objectives requires the performance of 
management. Management is expected to demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness in the 
application of inputs to generate output. Porter and Lawler performance theory (1968) 
cited in Onwuchuruba (2003) demonstrated that effort, performance, reward and 
satisfaction are key variables. The model was initially developed for the purpose of 
investigating the relationship between manager‘s attitude towards pay and the 
performance. The worker is rewarded for performance either through intrinsic factors. 
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However, the satisfaction the worker gets from the reward will depend on how equitable he 
receives the reward to be in relation to the amount of efforts he has put in. 
According to Thakur and Burton (1995), efficiency involves doing things right that is 
using resources wisely and with minimum waste. Effectiveness, on the other hand, 
involves doing the right things to move the organization closer to its announced objective. 
Some organizational activities may be viewed as very efficient but not very effective. That 
is, hiring cheaper, untrained labour might result in short-term savings in labour cost but it 
might also result in a product of such poor quality that cannot be sold. Organizational 
effectiveness is the ultimate criterion against which managerial performance is measured. 
Thus, organization effectiveness may be defined as the ability of the organization to attain 
and efficiently utilize resources for the attainment of stated organization objectives.  
Effectiveness is a function of efficiency as it contributes to goal attainment.  The need to 
reduce unnecessary expenditure as stated by CBN in the ongoing restructuring of banks 
underscored this submission that bank management need to avoid waste. Some of the 
studies on bank performance conducted in the United States, emerging markets and other 
related published works are summarized in this section.  
 
The empirical evidence in the US is due to Berger (1995), Neeley and Wheelock (1997) 
and Angbazo (1997). Berger (1995) examines the relationship between the return on equity 
and the capital asset ratios for a sample of US banks for the 1983-1992-time period. Using 
the Granger causality model, he found that the returns of equity and capital to asset ratio 
are positively related. Neeley and Wheelock (1997) cited in Naceur Ben Samy (2003) 
explored the profitability of a sample of insured commercial banks in the US for the 1980-
1995 period. Their work showed that bank performance is positively related to the annual 
percentage changes in the states per capita income. Anghazo (1997) investigates the 
determinants of bank net interest margins for a sample of US banks for 1989 - 2003 period. 
The results for the pooled sample documents showed that default risk, the opportunity cost 
of non-interest bearing reserve, leverage and management efficiency are all positively 
associated with bank interest spread. The main determinants of bank‘s performance in 
emerging countries were carried out in the studies of Colombian (Barajas et al., 1999), 
Brazil (Afanasieff et al., 2002), Malaysia (Guru et al.,) and Tunisia (Ben Naceur and 
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Goaied, 2001). For instance, Barajas et al (1999) found that there is a significant effect of 
financial liberalization on bank‘ interest margins for the Colombian case. His study shows 
that liberalization process is linked with an increase in the coefficient of loan quality after 
liberalization. Afanasieff et al. (2002) make use of panel data technique to uncover the 
main determinants of the bank interest spread in Brazil. Ho and Saunders (1981) cited in 
Naceur Ben Samy (2003) results suggest that macroeconomic variables are the most 
relevant elements to explain bank interest spread in Brazil. Ben Naceur and Goaied (2001) 
investigated the determinants of the Tunisia bank‘s performances during the period 1980 –
1995.Their finding shows that the best performing banks are those which have struggled to 
improve labour and capital productivity, maintained a high level of deposit accounts 
relative to their assets and those who have been able to reinforce their equity. Guro et al. 
(2002) in their study brought to the fore the main determinant of successful deposit banks 
that would enhance and improve bank profitability. The study, which was a sample of 
seventeen Malaysian commercial banks over the 1986-1995, divided the profitability 
determinants into two main categories, namely the internal determinants (liquidity, capital 
adequacy and expenses management) and the external determinants (ownership, firm size 
and external economic conditions).  
The findings of this study revealed that efficient expenses management was one of the 
most significant issues that can be used in explaining bank profitability. The macro 
indicators showed that high interest ratio was associated with low bank profitability and 
inflation was found to have a positive effect on bank performance. The importance of 
managerial performance and effectiveness has long been recognized by major writers such 
as, for example, Drucker cited in Mullins (2005) who, originally in 1955, propounded that: 
 
“The manager is the dynamic, life-giving element in every business. Without their 
leadership „the resources of production‟ remain resources and never become 
production. In a competitive economy, above all, the quality and performance of the 
managers determine the success of a business; indeed they determine its survival. For 
the quality and performance of its managers is the only effective advantage an 
enterprise in a competitive economy can have”.  
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The importance of management performance has also been emphasized by Foppen (2000): 
Management is of pivotal importance for modern society. It is for this reason that, no 
matter what thinking about management, certainly at university level, is of great relevance 
to management practice. So apart from the question of whether management‘s claim that it 
is indispensable is really valid or not, the fact that practically everyone believes it is, is 
what counts. Stewart (1999) suggests that effectiveness is more important than efficiency. 
Managers who want to improve should review both their effectiveness and their efficiency. 
Effectiveness is doing the right things; Efficiency is  making the most economic use of the 
resources. Effectiveness is more important than efficiency because one must be doing the 
right kind of work. Only then does it matter whether the work is done efficiently. 
Managerial effectiveness can also be measured if we ascertain the adherence of managers 
in keeping within agreed cost or budgetary control limits. This is very critical to bank 
management who like to expend depositors fund on wasteful investment that may not 
guarantee any return. 
The Management of the banking institution itself is also a prerequisite for achieving 
profitability and stability of a bank. There is evidence that superior management raise 
profits and market shares (Berger, 1995a and Athanasoglou et al 2005). On the other hand, 
Montinola and Moreno (2001) argued that where management quality is low and 
managerial monitoring is imperfect, some workers will not exert full effort, thereby ―free 
riding‖ on good workers. Observing that a poor worker next to him is shirking, a good 
worker may reduce his own effort; so over time average effort falls to that of the poorest 
worker. From time to time, good workers may be hired, but their effort will eventually 
drop down to the preexisting level. At other times, workers who are lazier than existing 
employees may be hired, dragging down performance of current workers. Where 
management quality is low and the board of directors does not provide honest and effective 
leadership, being often more concerned with securing credit facilities for themselves, 
prudent lending practices cannot be followed. This has the net effect of increasing the ratio 
of substandard credits in the bank‘s credit portfolio and decreasing the bank‘s profitability 
(Mamman and Oluyemi, 1994). But Gambs (1977) argues that extremely bad management 
may not prove fatal to a bank unless adverse economic conditions take a toll on the bank 
and lead to unexpected capital outflows or loan losses. 
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Claessens et al (1997) explained that enterprise restructuring involves depoliticizing 
management by giving managers more autonomy, adopting new accounting standards and 
practices, shedding labor and concentrating on activities in which the enterprise has a 
competitive advantage. The better corporate governance that can result leads to higher 
market value and profitability. Kolari, Glennon, Shin, Caputo (2002) predicting large U.S 
commercial bank failure, found evidence that capital deficient banks tended to have lower 
profitability, higher risk, and higher levels of expenses than other banks. Cost controlling 
strategy shows the emphasis to minimize cost by relating expenditure to returns and it is 
measured by the total cost-to-total income (CIR) As a result of economies of scale and 
scope deriving from the combination of similar skills, a firm competing on the basis of 
low-cost and operating efficiency is expected to benefit from merging with another 
organization characterized by a set of similar competencies (Bollenbacher, 1995). Firms 
characterized by different cost controlling strategies, however, may show a drop in 
performance if they decide to merge (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986 cited in Altunbas et al., 
1997). As a consequence, the cost to income (CIR) is expected to be negatively correlated 
with overall performance (ROE). On the other hand, this kind of relationship may not be 
significant in the long term if a cost-efficient bidder manages to implement their cost 
strategy to the broader merged firm.  
 
The recent bank recapitalization and the option of merger adopted helped in reducing 
operating cost as a result of economies of scale and scope derived from combination of 
similar skills. It has been argued that the effect of a growing size on bank profitability is 
significantly positive to a large extent (Smirlock, 1985). Kwan and Eisenbeis (2005) 
suggest that the difference in profitability among large and small banks is due to 
production technologies and outputs, which vary across them. The relative efficiency 
hypothesis (Clarke et al 1984) presupposes that larger banks (where size is measured by 
assets) are more efficient than smaller ones, and are more profitable as a result of this 
superior efficiency. The preceding arguments on the effect of size on bank profitability 
overlap with the idea that large banks can benefit from economies of scale (Baumol, 1959). 
However, some researchers suggest that little cost saving can be achieved by increasing the 
size of a banking firm (Berger et al., 1987). They suggest that eventually very large banks 
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could face scale inefficiencies, perhaps due to bureaucratic reasons (Athanasoglou et al., 
2005). Using data for more than 700 Czech firms that were consistently listed on the 
Prague Stock Exchange over the period 1992-95, empirical evidence from Classens et al 
(1997) identifies strong positive relationships between ownership concentration (top five 
investors‘ shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding) and firms 
management/profitability/market value. They explained that concentration ownership gives 
the owners better incentives to monitor firms and make necessary changes in management. 
By contrast, in firms with diffuse ownership, no single owner has an incentive to ―mind the 
store‖ so management is not disciplined for bad performance or rewarded for good 
performance‖. Mitton (2002) also shows that firms with concentrated ownership showed 
better stock market performance during Asian economic crisis. 
 
Capital adequacy levels, which show banks strategy regarding their capital structure, 
measure as the ratio of equity to total assets (CA/TA). From a prudential regulatory 
perspective, bank capital has become a focal point of bank regulation as the general trend 
is to introduce competition in banking and to check risk-taking with capital requirements 
and appropriate supervision (Vives, 2000).The effect of changes on the capital levels on 
performance hinges on the recent theory of the banking firm, which is based on the 
‗specialness‘ of banks in a setting in which there are asymmetries of information. In this 
setting, according to the ‗signalling hypothesis‘, commercial banks specialize in lending 
information to problematic borrowers (Berger et al., 1995). Therefore, banks can signal 
favourable information by merging with banks with larger capital ratio indicating a 
positive correlation between capital and earnings, and suggesting a positive relationship 
between capital structure dissimilarities and performance (Acharya, 1988). Alternatively, 
Ross (1977) argues that lower, rather than higher, capital ratios signal positive information; 
since signaling good quality through high leverage would be less onerous for a ‗good‘ 
bank than for a ‗bad‘ bank. Another argument relating changes in the capital structure and 
performance relates to agency problems between shareholder and managers. Part of the 
corporate finance literature suggests that increasing financial leverage could reduce this 
type of agency problems. The reason is that leverage may increase pressure on bank 
managers to become more efficient due to short-term pressure derived from the needs of 
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servicing the debt (Jensen, 1986) In addition, leverage is also reducing the scope for 
managers to keep the firm going after the point at which shareholders would gain 
liquidation (Berger et al., 1995). Liquidity risk strategy refers to banks‘ strategy towards 
managing liquidity risk measured by the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term 
funding. Credit risk management is a structured approach to managing uncertainties 
through risk assessment, developing strategies to manage it, and mitigation of risk using 
managerial resources. The objective of risk management is to reduce the effects of 
different kinds of risks related to a preselected domain to the level accepted by the society. 
Banks with little capital of their own (equity capital and retain profits) and many assets that 
might substantially decline in value (e.g. defaults on loans to companies or on mortgages, 
declining value of equity, bonds or derivatives investments) obviously face greater risks in 
terms of their overall viability. To make things worse, the collapse of weaker banks can 
have systemic repercussions if it sparks bank panics that also undermine economically 
―healthier‖ banks. The Asian crisis, the recession in Japan in the 1990s, and the Mexican 
crisis of 1994, for example, drove several large and many small banks into insolvency 
(Mishkin, 1997).  
Requiring banks to increase their capital-asset ratios seems to be the obvious regulatory 
response to weaknesses in the banking system; (Berger, Herring and Szego (1995) for the 
role of capital in financial institutions, Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) and Santos (2000) 
for bank regulation. This measure rests on two assumptions: first, more capital (or reserves 
more generally) equip banks with a stronger financial ―cushion‖, should they experience 
unexpected losses and/or a bank run. Second, increasing equity capital implies that the 
respective bank‘s risk-taking has a greater effect on shareholders, motivating the latter to 
more effectively monitor and if necessary, constrain the management‘s risk-taking 
behavior. In addition to pressure from regulators, banks may also have their reasons for 
increasing capital-asset ratios during recession: for instance, to signal to the market that 
they are economically strong, which tends to lower funding costs. Regulatory capital 
requirements may, however, have unintended consequences, notably, a contraction in bank 
lending (i.e. a credit crunch). Banks can increase their capital-asset ratio either by 
increasing capital (particularly by issuing new equity), or by reducing their assets 
(divesting, reducing lending). Because raising new capital is difficult for banks during 
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recessions, most weak banks are likely to focus more on divesting and loan reduction. This 
reduction of assets, particularly in the supply of loans, can cause a credit crunch. Hannock 
and Wilcox (1993), Berger and Udell (1994), and Shrieves and Dahl (1995) investigate 
whether during the 1990-1991 period US banks made fewer loans to reduce risk. Hancock 
and Wilcox, and Shrieves and Dahl find that this factor played a role in the reduction of 
loans. Berger and Udell, on the other hand, find little support for this hypothesis. The 
conceptual and theoretical framework of this study so far centers on the buffer theory of 
capital adequacy, expense theory, deposit insurance, portfolio regulation theory, 
intermediation theory, diversification and capital structure theories on capital adequacy, 
concentration theories, performance theory, structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
paradigm, efficiency-structure (ES) paradigm and Basel Agreement, which happens to be 
the known significant model on capital adequacy.                              
 
3.2.1   Measuring Market Concentration 
           Market concentration can be measured through: 
(i). Concentration Ratio (CR) 
(ii) Concentration Curve 
(iii) Hirschman-Herfinderdahl Index (HHI) 
(iv) Lorenz curve. 
The concentration ratio gives us an idea of the percentage of the total market and how it is 
controlled by the biggest 3, 4 and 5 firms in an industry. Hence, if for the Nigerian banking 
industry CR3 = 80, then we can say the three biggest banks in Nigeria control 80% of the 
market share in Nigeria. A Concentration Curve provides us a visual aid in measuring the 
concentration. It is a representation of the concentration ratio.  The examples below on 
Table 3 shows United States aggregate economic concentration of Fortune Magazine‘s 
data for 1988 as cited in (Bronfenbremmer e tal:1990). Table 3 lists the sales of the 10 
largest industrial firms in the United States and their cumulative percentage of the sales of 
the 500 largest U.S industrial firms. General Motors  (one-fifth of 1 percent of the 500 
largest firms) accounted for 6% of their sales, one percent of these firms (the top five) 
accounted for nearly 20% of the sales of the top 500, and 2% accounted (of the 10 firms 
listed) accounted for 29 percent of their sales. Similarly, for Table 3-1 commercial 
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banking sector‘s aggregate concentration, as measured in assets, is quite high. The five 
firms listed (5 percent of the largest 10 firms) accounted for 26% of their total assets.  
Table 3:    United States Industrial Sector 
Rank (by 
Sales) 
Company Sales (in millions of 
dollars) 
Cumulative Percentage 
of 500 largest 
1 General Motors 121,085 6.0 
2 Ford Motors 92,446 10.6 
3 Exxon 79.557 14.5 
4 I.B.M 59,681 17.4 
5 General Electric 49,414 19.9 
6 Mobil 48,198 22.3 
7 Chrysler 35,473 24.0 
8 Texaco 33,544 25.7 
9 E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours 
32,514 27.3 
10 Phillip Morris 25,860 28.6 
A Sample of Fortune Magazine’s Data for 1988 Cited in Economics (1990) p.6 
 
Table 3-1 U.S Commercial Banking Sector 
Rank (by 
assets) 
Company Assets (in millions of 
dollars) 
Cumulative 
Percentage of 100 
Largest 
1 Citicorp 207,666 9.6 
2 Chase Manhattan 
Corp 
97,455 14.1 
3 Bank America 94,647 18.5 
4 J.P Morgan & Co. 83,923 22.4 
5 Security Pacific 
Corp. 
77870 26.0 
A Sample of Fortune Magazine’s Data for 1988 Cited in Economics (1990) p.653  
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Two common measures of concentration, the four-bank concentration ratio, CR4, and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HERF), are used. CR4 is defined as the ratio of the total 
deposits of the four largest banks to the total deposits of all the banks in a given year.CR4 
should be closed to 0 for a perfectly competitive market and 100 for a monopoly. HERF is 
defined as the sum of squared market shares of deposits of the sample of banks in a given 
year. The index is slightly greater than 0 for a perfectly competitive market and 100 for a 
monopoly. HERF takes into account both the number of banks and the inequality of market 
shares. Generally, the more banks there are in a market, the lower is the value of HERF, 
ceteris paribus. HERF increases as the market shares of a given number of banks become 
less equal (Waldman and Jensen, 2001). However, Hay and Morris (1991) criticized the 
HERF measures because it uses a particular weighting between the inequality of the firms‘ 
market share and the number of firms. Nonetheless, HERF and CR are the most common 
used in virtually all the published studies. In this study, CR4 and CR10 is employed to 
depict the market share in the Nigeria banking industry with respect to deposit, asset, loans 
and advances, capital etc.  Bronfenbremmer e tal  (1990) stated that HHI is an alternative 
measure of  market concentration, which  includes all of the firms in a market and gives 
proportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger firms in the market. It 
takes into cognizance of both the number of firms in the market and their relative size.  
 
Adegbite (2006) stated that HHI is calculated as the sum of the square market shares of all 
firms in the industry of interest. This means that if a firm controls 10% of the market share, 
it will be given a weigh of 10 x10 =100 in index while a firm accounting for 20% will have 
a weight of 20 x 20 = 400.The HHI has benchmarks, the benchmarks are: 
HHI     1800 ……………..  Highly concentrated market 
HHI     1000………………  Low concentrated 
1000       HHI   1800  ……. Averagely concentrated market. 
The third method used to measure market concentration is the Lorenz Curve. The LC is 
used to measure income inequality and inequalities in the size distribution of firms. The 
LC cumulates the sales or output of the firms in an industry and cumulates the numbers of 
firms accounting for that sales volume or output e.t.c. The Lorenz curve measures the 
extent of deviation from the absolute equality by the diagonal line. Where all firms are 
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equally sized, then the Lorenz curve will lie on the diagonal line. If the LC lie below the 
diagonal line, the greater the inequality. The bigger the shaded area the larger the size 
inequality among firms in the market.  
 
3.2.2   Bank Concentration 
 In the literature of finance there are cases that link concentration with bank    
capitalization/consolidation. There are those by Berger et al (1999); Shih (2003); Studart 
(2003, 2001); Yacaman (2001). For instance, Studart (2001, 2003) found that four Latin 
American countries‘ effort towards instituting an efficient and competitive banking system 
pushed for a policy of concentration in the period (1997-98). This was facilitated by more 
effective supervision by the apex banks. The tightening of the regulatory environment 
resulted in ―more international and more concentrated banking sector‖ (Studart 2003).The 
world bank (2002) noted that the features of market concentration in the Latin American 
countries (Argentina, brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela) could lead to greater 
competition and efficiency, which would also result in a higher supply of credit at lower 
spread as well as stability. Shih (2003) has argued that concentration policy with the fewer 
banks should reduce the insolvency risk through asset diversification. It is necessary to 
bear in mind though, that a merger between a sound and unhealthy bank has the potential 
to result in calamity for the emerging bank. Berger et al (1990) posited that governments 
usually promote concentration because they believe that it stems distress in the system, 
citing the case of the USA‘s Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The case of 
Latin America countries is used to buttress the salutary effects of concentration (See table 
3-2 in Chapter 3). 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HH) measures concentration in the banking system. For 
each market, say Nigeria‘s, the index equals the sum of the squared percentage deposit 
share of all banking firms competing in the market. The HHI takes on the values 
representing higher levels of concentration. According to Shields, et al (2004) quoting the 
US department of Justice‘s (DOJ), a market with an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 is 
considered to be moderately concentrated. Evidence exists that in the USA, for instance, 
when the post merger HHI is higher than 1,800 the DOJ takes action to check 
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concentration which could be inimical to the competition. This is a point that the monetary 
authorities will need to watch out for in the post-merger/concentration era in Nigeria. 
Table 3c below shows that the picture for Latin America is mixed. In some instances, the 
HHI index rose showing an increase in concentration, while in other it fell. Countries that 
experienced a rise in the HHI were Argentina, Brazil Chile and Mexico. Only that of 
Venezuela fell from 979.2 to 923.1. We proffer no explanation, as the country was not in 
the sample used below. In the study of Pennsylvania State in the USA, Shields et al (2004) 
found that the HHI was not fixed overtime, but tends to be influenced by the consolidation 
activities. For instance, while the state was moderately concentrated in 1994, by 2003, it 
became more concentrated. This means that the policy of merger/acquisition can be 
adjusted for or against concentration. 
 
TABLE 3-2:  Concentration in the Banking Sector Share in Total Deposit  
                1994               2000 
No. of 
banks 
   3 
largest     
   10 
largest 
 HH 
index 
No. of 
banks 
   3      
largest     
10 
largest 
HH index 
Latin  America 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
 
206 
245 
37 
76 
43 
 
39.1 
49.9 
39.5 
48.3 
43.9 
 
73.1 
78.8 
79.1 
80.8 
78.6 
 
756.9 
1220.9 
830.4 
1005.4 
979.2 
 
113 
293 
29 
23 
42 
 
39.8 
55.2 
39.5 
56.3 
46.7 
 
 
80.7 
85.6 
82.0 
94.5 
75.7 
 
865.7 
1278.6 
857.9 
1360.5 
923.1 
Source: Studart (2003:41) 
NB: HH Index= Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.   
 
 3.2.3   Consolidation 
The process of improving banking performance is not new. Sawada and Okazaki (2003) 
provides evidence that the Japanese experience dates back to the Bank law of 1927. This 
stemmed from the recognition of the government that ―the market structure with many 
small banks was harmful to the stability of the financial system and hence launched its 
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consolidation promotion policy. By the 1920s, the direction of policy was in favour of 
consolidation rather than branching out with respect to Bank regulation policy of 1923. 
Specifically, it was provided that ―the establishment of a new bank consolidation would be 
promoted‖ (Sawada and Okazaki, 2003). Another perspective of the policy was that banks 
which failed to meet the capital requirement were allowed to fail rather than being bailed 
out by the regulatory authorities. Sawada and Okazaki further note that 807 of the 1407 
banks which did not meet the Y1 million in 1927 law failed in 1928. 
Consolidation could take any form of absorption, acquisition and combination. These 
forms arise from the power relationship among combination. These forms arise from the 
power relationship among the participant banks (Sawada and Okazaki (2003). For instance, 
combination describes a situation where the power of the participant banks is nearly equal, 
and their coming together result in a new bank. On the other hand, where a strong and a 
weak bank are involved, the strong one acquires or absorbs the other. Consolidations have 
been rather common in the Asian region in the wake of the 1997 crises. 
 
3.2.4      Country Experiences 
Capitalization experiences in some of the countries reviewed has taken the form of 
consolidation. In United States of America (USA) there were over 7000 mergers between 
1980 and 1998.The nineties recorded the largest mergers in the banking history of the US 
as the number of banks in the US declined by more than one third between 1980 and 
1997.Consequently, the proportion of the banking assets declined sharply from 75 percent 
in 1980 to nearly 50 percent in 1997. The same trend occurred in the United Kingdom and 
other European countries (Boyd et. al 1993). 
In the period 1997 -1998, 2003 cases of bank mergers and acquisitions took place in the 
Euro area. In 1998, a merger in France resulted in a new capital base of $688 billion, while 
the merger in Germany resulted to a capital base of $541 billion. In many emerging 
markets including Argentina, Brazil and Korea, bank capitalization/consolidation became 
prominent as banks try to reposition their operations in order to cope with the growing 
challenges in the globalized banking systems. Most mergers that took place in countries 
were as a result of the government efforts to restructure inefficient banking systems (as in 
many Latin American countries), or from intervention following banking crises (as in 
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Korea and Southeast Asia). Just like Nigeria, in Asia the capitalization/consolidation of the 
financial services was more or less government-led rather than market-driven. Bank 
mergers in this region were motivated by the need to strengthen capital adequacy and 
promote financial viability of many smaller, often family owned banks that were affected 
by the 1997-1998 crisis. Soludo (2004) posited that:  
 
 ―In Malaysia, the first round of bank consolidation was initiated by the government in 
2000, when it imposed a $526 million capitalization requirement on banks. The then 
54 existing banks were ordered to merge into 10 core groups, so called anchor banks. 
The government has fully liberalized the sector in 2007. In Indonesia, four of the seven 
state banks existing before the crisis were consolidated into a new state bank (Bank 
Mandiri), which now controls about a quarter of the total commercial bank deposits. 
In Singapore, a country with about three million people, banks are being consolidated 
to about six and further moving down to three, with the second largest having a 
capital base of about $67 billion”.  
 
Consolidation in Malaysia 
It would be recalled that the 1997 Asian crises particularly hit Malaysia hard and its highly 
integrated financial system was the worse for it. Indeed, under the leadership of Mahather 
Muhammed, the country undertook a comprehensive reform of the financial system, 
including the banking industry. Specifically, its hitherto fifty-five (55) banks were 
consolidated into ten (10). It has further been observed that even the 10 banking groups are 
to be consolidated into more manageable groups. This second stage is projected to be 
between the banks and their subsidiary finance companies, on the one hand, and in the near 
future, between the ten (10) banks on the other. 
Features of Malaysian Consolidation 
 The banking sector asset quality improved post consolidation. 
 There was an improvement in transparency and corporate governance in the 
banking industry. 
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 As a consequence, its banks are now rated high by the international rating agency. 
Moody, Malaysian bank was recently rated 15th in the world, as opposed to not 
being rated pre-consolidation era. 
 Weak banks were repackaged and additional funds injected into them before 
privatization. 
Other details on Malaysian consolidation are contained in Table 3-3 below (p. 85) 
In Korea, recent mergers were brought about by the government as a way of resolving the 
problem of unsound banks. The government who provided capital support to several 
private banks in 1998 to take over, through purchase and assumption operations, the assets 
and liabilities of five commercial and 17 merchant banks that were closed. In the fiscal 
2000, the system was left with only 8 commercial banks with about 4500 branches after 
consolidation. 
 
South Korean Consolidation Experience 
The consolidation process in South Korea has the feature of Japanese, Indonesian and 
Malaysian. Essentially, the programme consisted of supporting the banks with bright 
prospects and closing those whose position clearly showed that they are terminally ill. The 
greatest contributing factor was the presence of a high over hang of non-performing loans 
(NPLs). Furthermore, the action on the part of the government was prompt and decisive, 
ostensibly to forestall the spread of distress to other banks than infesting the entire banking 
system (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2004). In this regard, in the first round of 
consolidation, in the 1990s, ―five banks with capital adequacy ratios below the eight 
percent (8%) Bank for International Settlement (BIS) guideline were taken over by healthy 
banks and forced to exit the market in 1998, (Deloitte, 2004:8). This affected considerable 
number of banks. In a similar development, another seven banks merged to form three 
banks in 1999. The merger continued. As at  2003, banks that had benefited from funds 
injection at the initial stages were reviewed in the subsequent round of consolidation, (See 
table 3-4 below p.87). 
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Table 3-3: Bank Consolidation in Malaysia 
S/N Group Merged Banks 
1 Malaysian Banking 
Bhd (May Bank) 
Mayban Finance Bhd, Aseabankers Malaysia Bhd, Philoe 
Allied Bank Bhd, Pacific Bank Bhd, Sime Fin. Bhd and 
Kewangan Bersatu Bhd 
2 The Bumiputra 
Commerce Bank Bhd. 
Bumiputa-Commerce Fin. Bhd & Commerce Int. Merchant 
Bankers Bhd 
3 RHB Bank Bhd RHB Sakura Merchant Bankers Bhd, Delta Fin. Bhd and Inter-
Finance Bhd 
4 Public Bank Public Bank Bhd, Public Finance Bhd, Hock Hua Bank Bhd, 
Advance Finance Bhd & Sime Merchant Bankers 
5 The Arab Malaysia 
Banks Bhd (AMB) 
Aran Malaysia Fin. Bhd, Aran Malaysian Bank Bhd, Bank 
Utama Malaysian Bhd & Utama Merchant Bank Bhd 
6 Hong leong bank bhd Hong loeng Fin. Bhd, Wah Tat Bank Bhd & Credit Corporation 
Malaysia Bhd. 
7 Perwira affin bank 
bhd 
Affin Fin. Bhd, Perwira Affin Merchant Bankers Bhd, BSN 
Commercial Bank Bhd, BSN Fin. Bhd & Bsn Merchant 
Bankers Bhd. 
8 Multipurpose bank 
Bhd 
International Bank Malaysia Bhd, Sabah Bank Berhad, Mbf 
Fin. Bhd, Bolton Fin. Bhd,Sabah Fin. Bhd Bumiputra Merchant 
Bankers Bhd 
9 Southern Bank Bhd Ban Hin lee Bank Bhd, Cempaka Fin. Bhd, United Merchant 
Fin Bhd, Perdana Fin. Bhd, & Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd 
10 EON Bank Bhd EON Fin. Bhd, Oriental Bank Bhd City Fin Bhd, Perkasa Fin 
Bhd and Malasian  Internationalnal Bankers Bhd 
Sources : Various Websites 
 
Features of South Korean Consolidation 
 Troubled banks receive fund from the government and placed under 
government owned financial holdings companies. For instance, Shinhan 
Financial Group and Woori Financial Group were set up by the government to 
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handle consolidation in 2001. These groups injected fund into some banks and 
raise their capital ratios to 10%, a figure higher than the Bank For International 
Settlement (BIS) guideline; 
 Government‘s role in the programme continues to be strong and aimed at 
strengthening the banks so that they can create and enjoy economies of scale 
and scope, although it intends to divest itself after; 
 The rehabilitated banks are encouraged to form conglomerates by setting up 
subsidiaries in Securities Company, insurance and related companies. This was 
meant to enhance diversification and minimization of risk; 
 There was a merger between provincial and national banks. 
This option has been attractive as it affords the national banks access to the 
provincial economies and the cheap funds that can be obtained and channeled to 
more profitable segment of the market (economy). This programme is further 
supported by the granting of preferential tax treatment to the merged banks. 
 A plank of consolidation exercise in South Korea also entails merger 
between sound banks so as to create ‗mega bank‘ that would facilitate their 
competition in the expanding global market. This feature is similar to that 
observed in the merger plans by three big Japanese banks for the same 
reason 
 The consolidation and reform of the banking industry also aimed to attract 
foreign investors. Indeed, there is evidence that Citi bank of the USA has 
already invested in the country. It bought Korean Bank for US$2.7bn, while 
Lonestar (US based investment fund) acquired 51% of Korean Exchange 
Bank for US$1.16bn. 
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TABLE 3-4: Bank Mergers in South Korea 
s/n New bank Year Merged institutions 
1 Kookwin Bank Nov.2001 Kookwin Bank and Housing: Commercial 
2 Hana Bank Dec. 
2002 
Hana Bank and Seoul Bank 
3 Chohung Shinhan Jan. 2003 Shinhan Bank and Chohung Bank 
Source: www.deloitte.com Deloitte, T (2004) p.8 
In India the financial sector reforms provided the necessary platform for the banking sector 
to operate on the basis of operational flexibility and functional autonomy thereby 
enhancing efficiency, productivity and profitability. The case of India was quite different 
from the other emerging markets hitherto discussed. The country has not faced any major 
economic and financial crises, though in 1990/1991, there was some pressure on its 
external sector with the current account deficit and external debt servicing reaching large 
proportions. However, due to prudent macroeconomic policies, it was possible to reform 
the country to a sustainable growth path. 
 
According to Talwar (1995) the reforms in India: 
“brought about structural changes in the financial sector and succeeded in easing 
external constraints on its operations, introducing transparency in reporting 
procedures, restructuring and recapitalizing banks and enhancing the competitive 
element in the market through the entry of new banks. It is evident that the 
consolidation process in India has not gone far therefore its impact has not been 
significant. The consolidation and convergence of banks in India has, however, not 
kept with global phenomena”. This section analyses the bank 
capitalization/consolidation experiences of Japan and Indonesia in South East Asia 
and Nigeria. 
 
JAPAN 
As a fast emerging economies and one of the world‘s largest economy after the USA, 
Japan operates a market base economy and its banking sector has lagged behind those of 
its contemporaries in the G7 industrialized countries. Since 1990, it has witnessed an 
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economic crisis that has affected the entire sector thus requiring reforms. It has been noted 
by (Deloitte, 2004) that its banking system is plagued by the problem of non-performing 
loans (NPLs). As noted earlier, the consolidation plan of the 1920s had proved ineffective 
and this necessitated another round in the 1990s. As at today, the banking industry is 
dominated by the five groups. 
 
Features of Japanese Consolidation Programme 
 Consolidation that started in the wake of the economic crisis of the 1990s is 
continuing and there are plans to form the biggest bank in the world. It is a merger 
between UFJ, Mizuho Fin Group (MTFG), and Sumitomo Mitsui Fin Group 
(SMFG). 
 Current consolidation is market rather that public sector driven and it is thus 
expected to produce lasting result 
 The pre-consolidation position shows Japanese banks as less profitable than their 
OECD counterparts in terms of net income after tax, non-interest income and net 
interest income 
 The consolidation aims at increasing the coverage of banks both in terms of 
clientele and the geographical areas. For instance, the merger between MFTG, 
SMFG and UFJ is to extend the coverage beyond just Tokyo but to Osaka and 
Nagoya 
 We can deduce from the table 3-5 below that: 
i. The five groups are large in terms of consolidation assets. This should 
enhance their power to fund industry and the economy generally, and also 
to compete in the region and the world. 
ii. The number of banks has fallen from about 20 to 5 banking groups. 
Depending on the type of consolidation, there have been cuts in costs 
thereby leading to greater efficiency. 
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iii. The degree of concentration has risen as a result of a fall in the number of 
banking organizations. This is what consolidation is expected to produce. 
TABLE 3-5: Bank Consolidation in Japan 
S/N Banking Groups Year 
Established 
Major subsidiary 
banks 
Former Banks Consolidation 
Assets 31.3.04 
1 Mizuho Fin Group 
(MFG) 
Jan 2003 Mizuho Banks, 
Mizuho Corporate 
Bank, Mizuho Trust 
& Banking 
Industrial bank of 
Japan, Daiichi 
Kangyo, Fuji, 
Yasuda Trust 
Banks 
US$1,324bn 
2 Sumitomo Mitsui 
Fin. Group (SMFG) 
Dec 2002 Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking 
Corporation 
(SMBC) 
Sumitomo Bank, 
Sakura Bank 
US$983bn 
3 Mitsubishi Tokyo 
Fin. Group. 
(MTFG) 
April 2001 Bank of Tokyo, 
Mitsubishi (BTM), 
Mitsubishi & Trust 
Banking Corp. 
Bank of Tokyo, 
Mitsubishi Trust 
Bank, Nippon 
Trust Bank 
US$1025bn 
4 UFJ April 2001 UFJ Bank, UFJ 
Trust 
Sanwa Bank, 
Tokai Bank, 
Tokyo Trust & 
Banking 
US$789bn 
5 Resona Fin Group 
(RFG) 
Dec 2001 Resona, Saitama 
Resona, Kinki 
Osaka, Nara Banks, 
Resona Trust & 
Banking 
Asahi Bank, 
Daiwa Bank 
US$383bn 
Source: Company Websites 
 Consolidation in Indonesia 
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The Indonesian approach has been a combination of the sale of government owned banks 
so as to inject necessary capital and management into them.  
Features of the Consolidation Exercise 
 Government is at the heart of the consolidation process in Indonesia unlike in Japan 
or Malaysia. Thus indicating that there is not only one approach, but a combination 
of private-public partnership can also work. 
 The bank restructuring agency was closed thereby handing the job to the private 
sector 
 The Indonesian government intervened by injecting funds into many debt-ridden 
banks so as to prevent systemic collapse that could disrupt the consolidation 
programme. 
 There is a strong incentive for the foreign investors into the banking industry. 
Details of these in Table 3-6. 
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Table 3-6: Bank Consolidation and Government Divestment in Indonesia 
S/
N 
Activity Year Investor 
1 Selling controlling stake in Bank Central Asia 
(BCA) 
2003 US private equity investor 
2 Selling Bank Niaga 2002 Commerce Asset -Holding 
(Malaysia) 
3 Selling majoriry stake in Danamon Indonesia  2003 Consortium led by Temasek 
holdings (Singapore) and Deutch 
Bank (Germany) 
4 IPO of 20% Bank Mandiri dominant National bank 2003 Public 
5 IPO of 40% of bank Rakyat Indonesia, a state 
controlled bank 
2003 Public 
6 Selling 51% in Bank International Indonesia 2003 Kookmin Bank (S.Korea) and 
Temasek Holdongs (Singapore) 
7 Selling 52% stake in Bank Lippo 2004 Group of investors led by 
Raiffeisem Zentral Bank 
Ostevrich.  
Source: Deloitte Touch Tohmatsu (2004) p.12                
 
 3.2.5   The Nigeria Experience in Bank Consolidation: Government Framework for  
            Bank Capitalization/Consolidation in Nigeria 
On July 6, 2004, the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Prof C.C. Soludo, 
addressed the Bankers‘ Committee, in a special meeting, on the government policy toward 
―Consolidating the Nigerian Banking Industry to Meet the Development Challenges of the 
21st Century‖ (Soludo,2004). The focus of the policy framework was toward ensuring 
exchange rate and price stability, managing interest rate for payments system, financial 
sector diversification and regulatory reforms as well as strategies for integrating Nigeria‘s 
financial system into the African regional and global financial systems. 
Consolidation and strengthening of the banking system were taken to constitute the first 
phase of the reforms designed to ensure a diversified, strong and reliable banking sector 
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which will ensure the safety of depositors‘ money, play active development role on the 
Nigerian economy and as competitive players in the African regional and global financial 
systems. The goal of the reforms is to help banks become stronger players, and in a manner 
that will ensure longevity and hence higher returns to their shareholders over time and 
impact positively on the Nigerian economy. The beneficiaries in the Nigerian economy 
will include the ordinary men and women who can put their deposits in the banks and have 
a restful sleep; the entrepreneurs who can now have a stronger financial system to finance 
their businesses; and the Nigerian economy itself which will benefit from internationally 
connected and competitive banks that would also mobilize international capital for 
Nigerian development. 
The issue of bank capitalization which often metamorphose into consolidation of banks 
around the globe has fuelled an active policy debate on the impact of consolidation on 
financial stability, (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine:2003), Boyd and Graham (1991 and 
1998). They concluded banks capitalization/consolidation exercise was designed to 
improve Nigerian banking system efficiency through the enhancement of the composite 
units. In the literature, concentration levels have been a major determinant of banking 
system performance by way of efficiency. The greater subsidy for large banks may in turn 
intensify risk-taking incentives beyond and diversification advantages enjoyed by them, 
thereby increasing the fragility of concentrated banking system. Berger, e  tal (1995) find 
evidence that the increase in the proportion of banking industry assets controlled by the 
largest banking organizations in the 1990s, due to the liberalization of geographic 
restrictions on banking in the United States, may have been responsible for part of the 
credit crunch observed in 1989-1992. Peek and Rosengren (1996), combining a single 
cross-section data on lending businesses in the New England states for 1994 with some 
information on mergers and de novo entry, find that after big banking organizations 
merged with smaller organizations, the consolidated organization typically reduced the 
amount of small business lending that was conducted earlier by the acquired institution.  
The literature reviewed on bank capitalization, management and performance cut across 
published work related to the research. Most of the earlier studies reviewed here focused 
on the determinants of bank‘s performance. Bank performance with respect to macro-
economic variables and theoretical perspectives will be discussed in section 3.6  
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Restructuring of commercial banking system now deposit money banks in Nigeria began 
in mid-1980s, and was intended to instill competition in the banking sector, mobilize 
savings and lead to a more efficient allocation of resources. Reforms were articulated 
around five axes: liberalization of interest rates and credit allocation, introduction of new 
indirect monetary policy, strengthening prudential regulation, opening of the financial 
sector to foreign financial institutions and promotion of the equity market. All these 
developments certainly have implications on performance especially profitability of the 
Nigerian banking industry. Over the last decade, the international banking, particularly in 
emerging market economies, has undergone substantial structural changes. Particularly, 
noticeable is the tendency towards consolidation leading to a reduction in the number of 
banks and other deposit taking institutions with a simultaneous increase in size and 
concentration of the remaining entities in the sector (Bank for International Settlements, 
2001). Among other factors, these changes have been initiated and sustained by 
technological innovation, deregulation of financial services at the national level, opening 
up to international competition, changes in corporate behaviour- such as growing 
disintermediation and increased emphasis on shareholder value (see Berger et al 1999), 
repeated episodes of banking sector crisis, and privatization of state-owned banks, 
especially in emerging market countries (see De Nicolo et al (2003); Bank for International  
Settlements (2001); International Monetary Fund (2001).  
While there are a host of studies that have analyzed the impact of bank capitalization, 
consolidation on performance in mature markets (Boyd and Runkle (1993), and De Nicolo 
(2000), there are have been few attempts to study this issue in the context of emerging 
market countries. Studies of the U.S banking industry in the 1980s and early 1990s found 
mixed evidence of the impact of bank capitalization/ consolidation on financial firm‘s risk 
(De Nicolo and Runkle, 1993).  Related studies by Hayden, Porath and Westernhagen 
(2006) on the relationship between diversification and performance of German banks 
showed that diversification significantly improves banks‘ profitability only in case of 
moderate risks levels and industrial diversification. Susmel, Marston, Druck and Basu 
(2004) studied a large panel of more than 100 banks from Argentina to find the effects of 
bank consolidation on performance between December 1995 and December 2000, a period 
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of heavy bank consolidation and relative calm. Overall, they find a positive and significant 
effect of bank capitalization/ consolidation on bank performance. Bank returns increase 
with consolidation, and insolvency risk is reduced. The study suggests that mergers and 
privatizations have a beneficial effect on bank returns. Smith and Walter (1999) posited 
that because of the effect of the third-world debt crisis on the capital positions of banks, the 
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) sponsored an effort by the central banks of the 
leading industrial countries to establish a common, risk adjusted regulatory standard for 
capital adequacy. All the countries concerned agreed to these standards in 1988, to become 
effective at the end of 1992. In the opinion of  Largan (2000) if the host supervisor 
believes that any of the Basel standards are not met, it can impose restrictive measures or 
prohibit the establishment of banking offices. Basel standards had earlier been categorized 
into two major parts. They are the Basel 1 and Basel   11. The first official agreement 
between the United States, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and Luxembourg, formally approved in Basel, Switzerland, in 1988 and 
imposing common minimum capital requirements on banks headquartered in countries. 
 
  3.3         REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
 According to Valentine, McDonald and Schumacher (2009), the findings of their study on 
the determinants of commercial bank profitability in Sub-Saharan Africa have implications 
for policy makers. Bank profits are high in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions. 
This picture holds true whether profitability is measured as returns on assets, returns on 
equity, or net interest margins. High bank profitability can reduce financial intermediation 
if the high returns imply that interest rates on loans for same maturity are higher than in 
other parts of the world. Moreover, if high returns are the consequences of market power, 
this would imply some degree of inefficiency in the provision of financial services. Bank 
profits are also an important source of equity. If bank profits are reinvested, this should 
lead to safer banks, and consequently, high profits could promote financial stability. 
Research on the determinants of bank profitability has focused on both the returns on bank 
assets and equity, and net interest rate margins. It has traditionally explored the impact on 
bank performance of bank-specific factors, such as risk, market, and regulatory costs. More 
recently, research has focused on the impact of macroeconomic factors on bank capital and 
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performance. Using accounting decompositions, as well as panel regressions, Al-Haschimi 
(2007) studied the determinants of bank net interest margins/net profit in 10 Sub Saharan 
Africa (SSA) countries. He finds that credit risk and operating inefficiencies (which signal 
market power) explain most of the variation in net interest margins across the region. 
Macroeconomic risk has only limited effects on net interest margins/net profit in the study.  
Using bank level data for 80 countries in the 1988-1995 periods, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1998) analyzed how bank characteristics and the overall banking environment 
affect both interest rate margins and bank returns.  
Results suggest that macroeconomic and regulatory conditions have a pronounced impact 
on margins and profitability. Lower market concentration ratios lead to lower margins and 
profits, while the effect of foreign banks have higher margins and profits compared to 
domestic banks in developing countries, while the opposite holds in developed countries. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) also found that banks with relatively high non-
interest earning assets are, in general, less profitable. Banks that rely on deposits for their 
funding are also less profitable, possibly due to the required extensive branch network, and 
other expenses that are incurred in administering deposit accounts.  Gelos (2006) studies 
the determinants of bank interest margins in Latin America using bank and country level 
data. He finds that spreads are large because of relatively high interest rates (which in the 
study is a proxy for macroeconomic risk, including from inflation), less efficient banks, 
and higher reserve requirements. Although Al-Haschimi (2007) does not test explicitly for 
market power, the large association he finds between high operating costs and net interest 
margins could be evidence of market power. 
In a study of United States banks for the period 1989-1993, Angbazo (1997) finds that net 
interest margins reflect primarily credit and macroeconomic risk premia. In addition; there 
is evidence that net interest margins are positively related to core capital, non-interest 
bearing reserves, and management quality, but negatively related to liquidity risk. 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) analyzed the determinants of interest margins in six 
countries of the European Union and the US during the period 1988-1995. They find that 
macroeconomic volatility and regulations have a significant impact on bank interest rate 
margins. Their results also suggest and important trade-off between ensuring bank 
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solvency, as defined by high capital to asset ratios, and lowering the cost of financial 
services to consumers, as measured by low interest rate margins. 
Athanasoglou, Delis and Staikouras (2006) study the profitability behaviour of the south 
eastern European banking industry over the period 1998-2002.The empirical results 
suggest that the enhancement of bank profitability in those countries requires new 
standards in risk management and operating efficiency which, according to the evidence 
affects profits. A key result is that the effect of market concentration is positive, while the 
picture regarding macroeconomic variables is mixed. Athanasoglou, et al. (2006) apply a 
dynamic panel data model to study the performance of Greek banks over the period 1985-
2001, and find some profit persistence, a result that signals that the market structure is not 
perfectly competitive. The results also show that the profitability of Greek banks is shaped 
by bank-specific factors and macroeconomic control variables, which are under the direct 
control of bank management. The main source of bank-specific risk in Sub Saharan Africa 
(SSA) is credit risk. Poor enforcement of creditor rights, weak legal environment, and 
insufficient information on borrowers expose banks to high credit risk. At the 
macroeconomic level, weak economic growth adds to risk as it promotes the deterioration 
of credit quality, and increases the probability of loan defaults. We measure credit r isk 
using the ratio of shareholders fund to deposits, loans to deposit  and short term funding 
since this provide a forward-looking measure of bank exposure to default and asset quality 
deterioration. We expect a positive association between profits and bank risk.  
Well capitalized banks need to borrow less in order to support a given level of assets, and 
tend to face lower cost of funding due to lower prospective bankruptcy costs. Also, in the 
presence of asymmetric information, a well-capitalized bank could provide a signal to the 
market that a better-than-average performance should be expected (Athanasoglou et al., 
2005 and Berger, 1995). Well-capitalized banks are, in this regard, less risky and profits 
should be lower because they are perceived to be safer. In this case, we would expect to 
observe a negative association between capital and profits. However, while some 
researchers have used loan loss provisions to measure credit risk, we opted not to follow 
this as loan loss provisions are part of the accounting breakdown of the revenue itself, 
which would a priori, induce a significant negative correlation between the two variables.  
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Berger (2005) finds that if larger banks have a greater proportion of the domestic market, 
and operate in a non-competitive environment; lending rates may remain high (while 
deposit rates for larger banks are lower because they are perceived to be safer) and 
consequently larger banks may enjoy higher profits. Moreover, modern intermediation 
theory predicts efficiency gains related to bank size (proxied by total assets), owing to 
economies of scale. This would imply lower costs for larger banks that may retain as 
higher profits if they do not operate in very competitive environments. The results obtained 
by the literature for the relationship between size and profits are diverse. Using market data 
(stock prices) instead of accounting measures of profitability, Boyd and Runkle (1993) find 
a significant inverse relationship between size and rate of return on assets in U.S banks 
from 1971 to 1990, and a positive relationship between financial leverage and size. They 
do not provide, however, any theoretical model to rationalize this evidence. Goddards, 
Molyneux and Wilson (2004) use panel and cross-sectional regressions to estimate growth 
and profit equations for a sample of banks for five European countries over the 1990s. The 
growth regressions suggest that, as banks become larger in relative terms; their growth 
performance tends to increase further, with little or no sign of mean aversion in growth. 
 
Al-Haschimi (2007) finds that operating inefficiencies appear to be the main determinants 
of high bank spreads in SSA economies. Brock and Rojas Suarez (2000) also show that 
administrative and other operating costs contribute to the prevalence of high spreads in 
Latin America countries. Heggestad (1977) studied the interaction of market structure, 
profitability and risk, and argues that banks with monopoly power systematically reduce 
the risk they take at the expense of greater profitability. Given the importance of bank 
credit as factor of production for almost all firms, this effect may plausibly affect market 
concentration in other sectors of the economy by making the expansion of smaller firms 
more difficult. The extent to which inflation affects bank profitability depends on whether 
future movements in inflation are fully anticipated, which, in turn, depends on the ability 
of firms to accurately forecast movements in the relevant control variables. An inflation 
rate that is fully anticipated raises profits as banks can appropriately adjust interest rates in 
order to increases revenues, while an unexpected change could raise costs due to imperfect 
interest rate adjustment. Other studies, for example, Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thorton 
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(1992), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998), have found a positive relation between 
inflation and long term interest rates with bank capital and performance. 
 
Adewunmi (1997), Oyetan (1997) and Obadan (2004) agreed that there are other critical 
factors, which combined with capital adequacy, would guarantee a healthy banking sector. 
Oyetan (1997) argues that indicators or measures of a bank financial condition and 
performance are based on capital adequacy, asset quality, managerial capability, 
profitability and liquidity. The stakeholders in deposit money banks expect bank 
management to demonstrate trust, openness, reliability, competence, honesty, benevolent 
in utilization of bank funds entrusted in their custody. This is illustrated in chart one below. 
 
Figure One  
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The Nigerian economy is made up of two principal sectors, namely: the private sector and 
the public sector. In the private sector, resources are either managed by the owners or 
entrusted by them to professional managers in the private sector. Incorporated companies 
are corporate bodies whose affairs are runned by a board of directors on behalf of the 
stakeholders. These professional managers are perceived to possess special skills and 
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ability to manage the resources efficiently and profitably. Likert (1971) cited in Ade Ojo 
(1992) makes this point admirably well thus: 
 “All the activities of any enterprise are initiated and determined by the persons 
who make up that institution…Every aspect of a firm‟s activities is determined by 
the competence, motivation and general effectiveness of its human organization”.  
 
For instance, a huge capital can be squandered by an irresponsible and fraudulent 
management and the bank can fail (Obadan, 2004a). Empirical evidence suggests that 
higher equity is associated with lower overall bank risk. Virtually every bank failure model 
finds that a higher equity-to-asset ratio is associated with a lower future probability of 
failure (e.g. Lane et al., 1986; Avery & Berger, 1991; Cole & Gunther, 1995).   
Basel 1 accord of 1988 which deals on bank capital was reviewed to Basel 11 accord of 
1992 to meet with the challenges facing banks worldwide. However, the recent 2005 
recapitalization of banks in Nigeria was absolute measure of capital adequacy and not 
relative to the Basel Capital Accord. The issue of capital adequacy has been a controversial 
subject in finance and the recent recapitalization of Nigerian banks is a pointer to this. 
Hence, the need to establish to what extent bank capitalization has been influenced by 
management and performance. In the literature of finance, there are cases that link bank 
capitalization and market concentration especially where institutional behaviours by 
regulatory has pushed for a policy of minimum capital requirements. There are those by 
(Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999); Shih (2003); Studart (2001, 2003), Yacaman (2001). 
For instance, Studart (2001, 2003) found that four Latin American countries‘ effort 
towards instituting an efficient and competitive banking pushed for a policy of 
concentration in the period (1997-1998).This was facilitated by more effective supervision 
by the apex banks. The tightening of the regulatory environment resulted in ―more 
international and more concentrated banking sector‖ (Studart, 2003). Therefore, in this 
study, the nexus between market concentration and bank capitalization in the Nigerian 
banking industry will be investigated. 
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3.3.1             Review of Empirical Literature 
In the study of bank performance and credit risk management, Schuller (2008) using a 
time-series analysis of a five year financial data of Qatar Central Bank (QCB) examined 
the relationship between profitability (ROE and ROA, separately) which are capital  
indicators and loan losses (NPL/TL) which represent the credit risk management 
effectiveness. The regression model for the study is represented below: 
P (ROA, ROE) = α + ßNPL /TL + µ   
Where, NPL denotes non-performing loans, TL denotes total loan and P denotes capital 
variables (ROA, ROE). Also, α is the intercept and ß is the parameter of explanatory 
variable ROA and ROE, µ represent the disturbance terms. The result of ROE on NPL/TL 
show that non-performing loan of the financial institutions is significantly negatively 
related to return on assets and return on equity. The results verify the hypothesis that better 
credit risk management results in better bank performance. 
Grigorian and Manole (2005) investigated the determinants of commercial bank 
performance in transistion using data envelopment analysis (DEA), a non-parametric 
method that allows one to account for a wide range of functions performed by the banks. 
The study compared relative performance of decision-making units (DMU) in this case, 
banks by building a frontier comprised of the most efficient DMUs and focusing on how 
close other DMUs are to this frontier The DMUs falling inside the frontier are termed 
inefficient, and their performance were measured vis-à-vis the frontier DMUs. The study 
found that tighter minimum capital adequacy ratios are associated with stronger revenue-
generating capacity and more aggressive deposit-taking behavior. It also found that 
banking sectors with a few large, well-capitalized banks are likely to generate better 
efficiency and higher rates of intermediation. 
 
Okazaki and Sawada (2006) investigated the effects of policy consolidation on the stability 
of the financial system. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Japanese government promoted bank 
consolidations using a minimum capital regulation stipulated by the Bank Law. They 
examine the effects of consolidation on bank performance by comparing the changes in 
performance from year T-1 to year T+ 2 and T+3, between the consolidated banks and the 
non-consolidated banks, where T refers to the event year when the consolidation occurred. 
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In order to identify the consolidation effects clearly, they excluded banks that participated 
in multiple consolidations in the period from year T-2 to year T+3. In measuring bank 
performance, they focus on the deposit growth rate and the return on total assets (ROA). 
The deposit growth rate is a performance measure closely related to the stability of the 
financial system. In calculating standard error, the heteroskedasticity-robust standard by 
white (1980) was used. 
ΔXit = ßo +  ß1 CONSit + ß2LN (ASSETit) + ß ΔBRANCHit + ß4URBAN Δit + εit 
Where i refers to the bank and t refers to the event year group. The dependent variable Xit 
is the difference in ROA or the deposit growth rate in the period from year T-1 to year T+2 
or T+3.CONS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank was a merged one, and 0, 
otherwise. The special interest was the coefficient of the variable. If the consolidation had 
a positive effect on bank performance, the coefficient is expected to be positive with 
respect to both dependent variables. The study found that consolidations had a negative 
effect on ROA, which indicates that consolidations led to inefficiencies, and that this 
dominated the effect of increased market power, if any such increase occurred.  
 In White model, recapitalization was not made compulsory for all banks.  Mason et al 
1999 specified his model as stated below to test the relationship between Financial 
Liberalization and Corporate performance.  
    P = f (FL1, FL2, FL3, FL4, FL5, FL6) 
The estimated multiple regression equation use was written as: 
  P =   + ß I FL1+ ß 2 FL2+ ß 3 FL3 + ß 4 FL4 +  ß 5 FL5 +  ß 6 FL6 + μ.  
Where FL = Financial liberalization  
            ß  = Coefficients of independent variables 
            P  = Performance  
            μ   = error term  
The result of their work showed that the financial liberalization programme pre-(SAP) has 
not had a considerable impact on corporate performance of the manufacturing industry and 
has not improve significantly during the Post-SAP period. 
Susmel, Marston, Druck and Basu (2004) in their study of "Bank Consolidation and 
Performance: the Argentine Experience"; used bank performance as dependent variable 
while consolidation was treated as the independent variable. They used several bank 
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performance indicators: return on asset/equity (ROA/ROE), ROE adjusted for return 
variance (Z-ROE), and a variable indicating the degree of banking sector solvency (Z-
ROA. The multiple accounting-based performance variables are meant to compensate for 
the lack of market determined performance measures. The study considered bank 
consolidation as exogenous (macroeconomic) or endogenous (microeconomic). In the 
model the treatment of bank consolidation was considered as exogenous to the return -
generating process and Granger –causality tests show weak evidence for causality between 
the dependent variables and bank consolidation. 
The Econometric Method was represented as follow: 
 rit =  α +  x‘it β  + Uit  
Where: i denotes cross-sections and t denotes time-periods with i = 1, 2, ---- N, and t = 1, 
2, ….. T. The dependent variable, rit , denotes bank returns, α is a scalar, β is K x 1 vector 
of coefficients and x‘it   is the it-th observation on K explanatory variables or risk factors  
or risk factors. A fixed effect model, which specifies the error term as: 
Uit =  ∑ µi Di + εit 
  Where Di is a dummy variable for the  i-th bank, and εit is the error term  
 
The empirical model we employed is that of Naceur Ben Samy (2003). He used the model 
in his research of bank capitalization and performance. The empirical test was   concerned 
with the determinants of interest margin and profitability of the Tunisia deposit banks. 
Capital ratio, overhead, loan and liquidity ratios were proxies for internal indicators. 
Meanwhile macroeconomic measures and financial structure indicators were used as 
external factors. A linear equation relating the performance measures to a variety of factors 
is shown below: 
  Perij, t = f (BCij, t + Mt + FSt) 
Where:  
Perij,t represents two alternative performance measures for the firm j during the period t. 
   BCij, represent bank variables for bank j at time t; Mt are macro economic variables.        
Mt is macro economic variables. 
FSt are measures of financial structure indicators. 
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The relationship between net interest margins and profitability, and bank‘ characteristics 
indicators, the inclusion of macro-economic variables and financial structure indicators 
was to control for cyclical factors that might impact bank profitability Two measures of 
performance used in the study are net interest margin (NIM) and return on assets (ROA). 
The NIM variable is defined as the net interest income divided by assets while ROA is a 
ratio computed by dividing the net income over total assets. The bank‘s characteristics 
indicators used as internal of performance are: 
i. The ratio of operating expenses to total assets (Efficiency of Management) is 
expected to have a negative impact on performance because efficient banks are 
expected to operate at lower costs. 
ii. The ratio of equity capital to total assets (CAP); 
iii. The ratio of bank‘s loans to total assets (BLOAN); 
iv. The ratio of non interest bearing assets to total assets (NIBA) 
v. The log  of bank assets (LNSIZE) 
The macro economic variables used are: inflation (INF), interest (INT) and exchange 
(EXCH) rates. High inflation rates are generally associated with high loan interest rates, 
and therefore, high incomes. High interest rates and exchange rates are expected to have a 
positive impact on bank‘s performance.  The result of the research also examines how the 
performance of the banking sector is related to the development of the banks. Relative size 
(RSIZE) is calculated as the ratio of the stock market capitalization to total assets of 
deposit money banks. The stock market capitalization divided by GDP (MCAP) as a proxy 
of financial market development and as a measure of the size of the equity market. The 
size of the banking sector (SBS) is measured by the ratio of total assets of the deposit 
banks to GDP and is intended to measure the importance of banking financing in the 
economy expected to have a positive impact on bank‘ s performance. 
The empirical findings of the research confirm positive relationship whether we use 
interest margin or return on assets as a dependent variable and in all specifications. This 
may indicate that well-capitalized banks support lower expected bankrupt costs for 
themselves and their customers, which reduce cost of capital. Next is a positive and 
significant coefficient on the overhead to assets ratios variable (OVERHEAD) in the net 
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interest margin and return on assets equations. In all net interest margin equation 
specifications, the coefficient on bank loans (BLOAN) is positive and significant.  
Macro-economic variables (independent variables) that affect bank performance are - 
interest rate, inflation and exchange rates (Ige, 2006). He captured and represented the 
macro economic variables of bank capitalization and performance as follows:  
 
Change in capital base and income.  
 Ige (2006) postulates that capitalization of the banking system will positively affect  the 
growth rate of the economy and therefore states that:  
(1) Y = f ( ΔKb ,i)  
     Where Y    = growth rate of the Gross National Product (GNP); and  
               ΔKb = change in shareholders‘ fund of the commercial banks. 
                i      = interest rate  
        Interest rate  
(2)  Ige (2006) postulates that Individuals and businesses expect capitalization to have a 
significant effect on interest rate. In other words we examine: 
                      i = f ( Y, ΔKb, E,  P)  
 This implies that the rate of growth of the economy y, the change in shareholders fund K, 
exchange rate and the general price level P should affect interest rate i.     
       The exchange rate. 
 Capturing the variation of the exchange rate, Ige (2006) postulates that: 
(3) e = f ( Y, ΔKb  )1 
 
The modification to Naceur Ben Samy (2003) model in this research is by way of 
introduction of LAD (Liquidity), B DEPOSIT, EXPEAN (Expenses Management) and 
(MC) Market Concentration (Internal determinants) and macroeconomics variables: 
interest rate and exchange rate as determinants of bank performance in Nigeria. The ratio 
of bank‘s loans and advance to bank deposit (B DEPOSIT), Liquid asset to deposit (LAD), 
Operating expenses  to total assets (EOM), the ratio of bank‘s loan to total assets (B 
LOAN) and the ratio of Shareholders fund to total assets (CAP),  EXPEAN = Expense 
preference of bank is measured by ratio of total expenses  to total earnings;  and MC = 
 105 
Market Concentration is measured by market share of bank asset, bank deposit and bank 
credit concentration (loans & Advances). This will be captured by Market Share 
Percentage. These variables mentioned above are internal determinants of bank 
performance. Because of the rising prices of goods and services (Inflation), we need to 
determine their effect on bank performance. The same goes for overhead considering the 
increase in expenditure in energy bill of deposit money banks and other sectors of the 
economy due to unstable power supply. The macroeconomic variables in the study are 
interest rate, inflation and exchange rate. While deposit rates have stagnated, interest rate 
on loans and advances has been on the increase over the years in Nigeria and it has 
affected lending to the real sectors of the economy. Since the introduction of SAP in 1986, 
the exchange rate and inflation have been on the increase. However, the rates have been 
stable since the beginning of 2008. 
 In the study of capital requirements and bank behavior (1985-1995) empirical evidence for 
Switzerland, Bertrand (2000), remodeled the equations of Shrieves and Dahl (1992) 
because  observed changes in capital and risk in period t are a function of the target capital 
and risk levels, the lagged capital and risk levels, and any exogenous factors. The model 
built for this purpose is stated as: 
   
∆ CAPj,t  = a0 + a1.REGj,t-1+ a2. ROA j,t  + a3. SIZEj,t + a4. Risk j,t - a5.CAPj,t-1 + e j,t 
   ∆RISKj,t = a0 + a1. REGj,t + a2.LLOSSj,t + a3. SIZEj,t + a4. CAPj,t – a5.RISK j,t -1 + nj,t 
Where: CAP represents capital, REG represents regulatory pressure, ROA represents 
return on assets, RISK represents risk- weighted assets, SIZE represents total assets, 
LLOSS represents current loan losses and e represents dummy. They observe a positive 
and significant relationship between changes in risk and changes in the ratio of capital to 
total assets but no significant relationship between changes in risk and changes in the ratio 
of capital to risk-weighted assets. These findings are consistent in a regime of risk-based 
capital standards, as banks constrained by capital requirements have to increase their 
capital risk-adjusted capital ratio constant. They also found that Swiss banks close to the 
minimum regulatory capital requirements tend to increase their ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets. This means the penalty implied by a breach of the capital requirements, 
has the desired impact on banks‘ behavior. This indicates that an increase in available 
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capital through retained earnings or equity is less costly than a downward adjustment in the 
risk of the portfolio. The editorial comment of Nigerian Banker (2004) on 2004 monetary 
policy implementation observes that in fiscal 2004 and 2005 the CBN expected banks and 
other financial institutions to operate in such a way as to remain liquid at all times and 
avoid the spectre of overdrawn accounts and being sent of clearing. The CBN (2004) 
posited that: 
 
 “the rating of licensed banks using CAMEL parameters shows that 10 banks were 
“sound”, 51 were “satisfactory”, 16 rated “marginal” while 10 were rated unsound as 
at the end of 2004.The report also shows that banks have continued to show 
deteriorating performance with 17 banks (18.89%) rating either marginal and /or 
unsound out of 90 banks in 2001, while 26 banks (29.89%) of the 87 banks in existence 
in 2004 rated either marginal and/or unsound. The marginal and unsound banks are 
considered to have exhibited such weaknesses as under-capitalization, illiquidity, 
weak/poor asset quality, poor rating”, etc. 
 
Nwude (2005) identified the imperatives for bank recapitalization in Nigeria to include too 
many banks with sizes being too small to support any sound banking business; stunted 
growth of the real sector arising from incapability of bank capital ratio and size to fund 
industrial development; high lending rate and shunning of real sector, and unprofessional 
and unethical practices. Others include the need to promote public confidence in the 
banking sector; curtailment of excessive risk taking by banks; reduction in the incidence of 
insolvency and distress and the need to dilute ownership structure giving rise to 
professionalism. Ilo (2006) study sought to establish what factors influenced the capital 
ratio of the Nigerian banks prior to the recapitalization mandate. The study analyzed the 
data as contained in the financial report of 29 commercial banks out of the 87 banks 
operating in Nigeria as at the end of 2003, representing 33% of the commercial banks. The 
model built for this purpose is stated as: 
CAR = f (ROA, RSK, DR, LLP, REG, Z) 
Where: 
CAR = Capital Ratio; measured as the ratio of equity to total asset 
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ROA = Return on Asset; a measured of profitability; measured as the ratio of profit before 
tax to total asset. 
RSK = Lending Risk, measured as the ratio of classified loans to total loans. 
LLR = Loan Loss Reserve Ratio; proxied by the ratio of loan loss provision to total assets; 
DR   = Deposit Ratio, which measures the extent of bank reliance on depositors funds for 
financing bank assets (also an indicator of its liquidity) measured as ratio of customers 
total deposit liabilities to total asset. 
REG = Regulatory Pressures, which evaluate the level of pressure on a bank to strive to 
attain the minimum capital base of N2 million as at the end of 2003 as required. Proxied by 
dummy variable: REG = 1 if bank has met minimum capital base and ‗0‘ if otherwise. 
Z = Bank Size; measure by the natural log of the bank total asset. The ratio of equity 
capital to total asset is used as an inverse measure of leverage in standard banking research 
in part because of the regulatory attention paid to capital ratios (Berger, Wharton Financial 
Institution Centre, & di Patti, 2002). 
The regression result shows that profitability has a positive and significant influence on 
bank capital ratio. The risk assets, deposit ratios and bank size have negat ive and 
significant influence on bank capital ratio. This is because increases in values of these 
variables tend to make Nigerian banks to be highly geared. Regulatory pressure was found 
to improve capital base given its positive influence, though not significant. 
Joh (2003) identified control-ownership disparity as a determinant of firms‘ profitability. 
In a firm with a high control-ownership disparity, a controlling shareholder exercises 
control but owns only a small fraction of the firms‘ cash flow and La Porta et al (2002b) 
find that these firms are widely around the world. Joh argues that, during economic crisis, 
firms having high control-ownership disparity show low performance mainly because 
these firms‘ controlling shareholder have an incentive to expropriate resources since the 
private benefits exceed cost. 
Some studies of the Nigerian banking industry have linked characteristics of individual 
bank companies to profitability. These studies include Nwosu and Nwosu (1998), Uche 
and Ehikwe (2001, Beck et al (2005) and Brownbridge (2005). In the main, their studies 
link capital base (Nwosu and Nwosu, 1998), lending activities (Beck et al., 2005) and 
Brownbridge, 2005), information technology (Uche and Ehikwe, 2001), management 
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quality (Nwosu and Nwosu, 1998) and Brownbridge, 2005) and bank size (Brownbridge, 
2005) to the profitability of banks in Nigeria. However, among all these studies, only Beck 
et al (2005) employed the intricacies of econometrics in deriving their conclusions. The 
majority of studies on bank performance, such as Short (1979), Bourke (1989), Molyneux 
and Thorton (1992), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001), Goddard et al (2004) and 
Athanasoglou et al (2005) use linear models to estimate the impact of various factors that 
may be important in explaining bank performance. 
Aburime (2008) in his study of the determinants of bank profitability: company-level 
evidence from Nigeria; elicited his data from the public financial statement of an 
unbalanced panel (Athanasoglou et al., 2005 and Baltagi, 2001) of 33 commercial and 
merchant banks in 91 observations over the 2000-2004 period. 
He built the model for his study as follows: 
Pit = α0 + δCAP i, t-1 + δDLit + δ CPit + δCCPit + δLPit + δITit + δRit + δSit + δOit + δOCit + 
δ CODit  + δSA + єit 
Where Pit is profit of bank i at time t; CAPi,t-1 is capital size of bank i at time t-1; DLit is 
size of deposit liabilities of bank i at time t; CPit is size of credit portfolio of bank i at time 
t; CCPit is composition of credit portfolio of bank i at time t; Lp it is labour productivity of 
bank i time t; ITit is state of IT of bank i at time t; Rit is risk level of bank i at time t; Sit is 
size of bank i at time t; Oit is ownership of bank i at time t; OCit is ownership concentration 
of bank i at time t; CODit is control-ownership disparity of bank i at time t; SAit  is 
structural affiliation of bank i at time t;   is a constant; is variable coefficient e is an error 
term. 
Three reliable conclusions were drawn from the study. First and foremost, capital sizes, 
size of credit portfolio and ownership concentration are significant company-level 
determinants of bank profitability in Nigeria. Secondly, size of deposit liabilities, labour 
productivity, state of Information technology (IT) ownership, control-ownership disparity 
and structural affiliation do not significantly determine the profitability of banks in 
Nigeria. Finally, the relationship between bank risk and profitability is inconclusive in the 
study. Though the results indicate that capital size is a significant determinant of bank 
profitability in Nigeria, only the size of the reserves component of bank capital has a 
significant relationship with bank profitability. The shares component of bank capital does 
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not have a significant relationship. This finding is consistent with that of Aburime and 
Uche (2006), and indicates that bank share capital regulations in Nigeria have simply been 
altering the form and not the substance of banks operating in the Nigeria banking industry. 
Estimation results also reveal that size of the credit portfolio is a significant determinant of 
bank profitability in Nigeria; however, the relationship is negative. The result jointly 
indicate widespread non-performance of bank loans and advances in Nigeria, and are 
consistent with the findings of Mamman and Oluyemi (1994), who attribute it to low 
management quality. Estimation results reveal that ownership concentration is a significant 
determinant of bank profitability in Nigeria; and the relationship is positive. This finding is 
consistent with that of Mitton (2002) and indicates that owners having large stakes in 
banks characterized by high levels of ownership concentration are more efficient in 
monitoring the management and performance of their respective banks. Besides the need 
for banks to improve their risk return characteristics in their portfolios, Ojo (2006) posited 
that the missing link in Nigerian banks‘ failure to perform their expected role over the 
years goes beyond mere jerking up the capital but ability to lend and willingness to finance 
industrial or productive ventures that can accelerate the country‘s economic development. 
Sangosanya and Posu (2006) posited that a crucial impediment to the efficient functioning 
of the financial system is asymmetric information. It explains a situation in which one 
party to a financial contract has less accurate information than the other party. For 
example, a borrower who takes out a loan usually has better information about the 
potential returns and risk associated with the investment projects that the loan will finance 
than the lender does. 
Osinubi (2006) in his study of the effects of recapitalization on financial performance in 
selected banks 2001-2005, found that the asset quality of the Nigerian banking industry 
does not depend on its capital base. The study calculated the CAMEL ratios for each of the 
selected banks and relates these to their capital base. Data was collected on shareholders‘ 
fund, which constitutes the bank‘s capital base; data was also collected on the total asset, 
classified loans, Earning before interest Taxes (EBIT) and Gross Loans and Advances. 
Using the CAMEL indicators, the study found that the asset quality of the Nigerian 
banking industry does not depend on its capital base. However, the study shows that the 
more the capital base the higher the liquidity and capital adequacy of the banking industry. 
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The return on assets also increases as the firm‘s capital base increases. The performance 
indicator model (CAMEL ratios) was calculated for each bank as follows: 
  
 
C:              Capital Adequacy        =       Equity 
                                                               Total Asset 
A:             Asset Quality                   =   Classified Loans 
                                                                 Equity 
ME:           Management Efficiency =     Earnings before interest and Tax 
                                                                 Total Asset 
Liquidity:                                           =    Gross Loans and Advances 
                                                                   Total Asset 
 
Toby (1999) evaluated the financial performance of public enterprise banks in Nigeria. 
Cost of fund and mismatched of interest sensitivity and duration periods are found to be 
other relative causes of poor financial performance. The study suggests an optimal match 
of sound management and macroeconomic stability to reverse the dwindling fortunes of 
the banks. Finally, the study suggested that surviving banks be recapitalized by privatizing 
them through the NSE. The recent bank recapitalization/consolidation has underscored this 
submission both for state –owned banks and privately-owned banks in Nigeria. Empirical 
evidence from Naceur and Goaied (2001) indicate that the best performing banks are those 
which have maintained a high level of deposit accounts relative to their assets. Increasing 
the ratio of total deposits to total assets means increasing the funds available to be used by 
the bank in different profitable ways such as investments and lending activities.  
In turn, this should increase the banks‘ returns on assets ceteris paribus (Allen and Rai, 
1996 and Holden and El-Bannany, 2006). The interest rate policy can be seen from two 
perspectives, the bank‘s policy regarding the interests it pays on deposits received by it and 
the bank‘s policy regarding the interests it receives on credits given by it. The interest paid 
by a bank on its deposit liabilities is a cost source and tends to contract the bank‘s income, 
ceteris paribus. This is why Fries, Neven and Seabright (2002) argued that the profit 
function of a bank includes the interest it pays on deposits. On the other hand, the interest 
received by a bank on credits given by it is a revenue source and tends to expand the 
bank‘s income ceteris paribus. Hence, Bobakova (2003) argues that the profitability of a 
bank is influenced by its interest rate policy. Here the decisive factor is the bank‘s ability 
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to set such an interest rate for asset deals that meets cost of funds, operating cost, as well as 
the required rate of profitability. 
 
The profit function of a bank includes the size and composition of its credit portfolio 
(Bashir, 2000 and Fries et al., 2002). Ordinarily, loans generate revenue through interest 
and increase bank profits (Rhoades and Rutz, 1982); hence, a large credit portfolio ought to 
imply improve profitability. However, substandard credits are a source of heavy financial 
losses to a bank and have actually been held responsible for numerous bank failures, 
(Olajide, 2006). It follows that a large credit portfolio could also result in reduced bank 
profitability if it mainly comprises substandard credits. Therefore, it is right to conclude 
that the size of a bank‘s credit portfolio affects its profitability either positively or 
negatively, depending on the composition of substandard credits. Koehn and Santomero 
(1980), Kim and Santomero (1988) and Athanasoglou et al (2005) suggest that bank risk 
taking perverse effects on bank profits and safety. Bobakova (2003) asserts that the 
profitability of a bank depends on its ability to foresee, avoid and monitor risks and 
possibly to cover losses incurred in the course of business. Hence, in making decisions on 
the allocation of resources to asset deals, a bank must take into account the level of risk to 
assets. 
 
 Furlong (1992) cited in the  Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (FRBSF) economics 
letter (2004) argued that a firm that produces a higher volume of output can see its unit 
cost of production decline because the cost of some of the inputs are fixed, such as 
administrative and overhead expenses. However, diseconomies of scale are also possible, 
in that average cost of production may start to rise when output exceeds a certain volume 
because it may be more costly to manage a very large firm. For instance, where more 
branches of a bank are opened, some may just become cost centre such that in the long run 
it may not be cost effective.  
The performance of deposit money banks is influenced by a host of factors some of which 
are macroeconomic, institutional, regulatory and legal. Uchendu (1995) posited that in 
attempting to maximize profits; banks must do so under capital adequacy and liquidity 
considerations. He noted that the regulatory influences of monetary authorities include 
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those on interest and exchange rates, bank reserves (indicating credit availability), labour 
costs or productivity. Yudistira (2003) in his study of bank capital requirement in 
Indonesia found that there is a strong positive relationship between bank capital and the 
growth rate of bank deposit. Secondly, the results from the effect of deposits and loans 
showed that poor capitalized operated with low net worth relative to asset. The 
capital/asset ratio was insignificant and reduced in size as a withdrawal of bank deposits 
throughout the post crisis in Indonesia. Altunbas and Marques Ibenez (2004) in their work 
on mergers and acquisition in Europe find that differences on the capitalization and 
investment in technology and financial innovations of merging banks institutions enhanced 
performance while diversity in their capitalization, technology and financial innovation 
strategies are negative from a performance perspective.  
 
The effect of changes on capital levels on performance hinges on the recent theory of the 
banking firm, which is based on the 'specialness" of banks in a setting in which there is 
asymmetries of information. In this setting, commercial bank specializes in lending 
information to problematic borrowers (Berger et al., 1995). Another argument relating 
changes in the bank capital and performance relates to agency problems between 
shareholder and managers. Jensen (1986) suggests that increasing financial leverage could 
reduce the type of agency problems. The reason is that leverage may increase pressure on 
bank managers to become more efficient due to short-term pressures derived from the 
needs of servicing the funds. There is no doubt the various sources of finance are available 
to corporate organizations, this ranges from internally generated funds, interbank loans, 
and the capital market (for debt and equity) yet, bank management faces a lot of problems, 
in deciding whether to finance investment with debt or equity; that is using either internal 
or external sources. At any time the success or otherwise of the firm depends on bank 
management judicious acquisition and commitment of financial resources (debt and 
equity) to the firm‘s investments. Bank management effectiveness in doing this will 
magnify the return of shareholders wealth which has been described as the best objective 
of a firm in finance theory. The leverage of banks also comes in form of deposit liabilities 
which bank service from profit generated. Therefore, least profitable banks will not be able 
to service its deposit liabilities by way of paying interest without affecting the capital 
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structure adversely. In terms of bank profitability and margins, a key international study is 
by Demirguc-kunt and Huizinga (1999) that estimates bank profitability and net interest 
margins over 1988-95 in 80 countries. They find that higher net interest margins and 
higher profitability are associated with stronger capital base, higher inflation, higher real 
interest rates and lower reserve requirements. He stated bank specific variables as:             
     -      Loan-to-asset ratios and the real loan growth which proxy for the credit risk of    
             bank assets. We assume that loans are riskier investment compared to typical  
            assets in the securities portfolio of banks (e.g government bonds). Hence, a  
             higher loan-to-asset ratio implies higher interest margins to compensate for  
             higher credit risk. 
- Capital strength, defined as the unadjusted equity-to-asset ratio. Typically a    
strong capital base implies a lower default probability for the bank and therefore its 
cost of funding is lower (i.e. interest margin is higher). It also gives the bank more 
freedom to take advantage of profitable lending opportunities. On the other hand, 
too-low capital ratios may have opposite impacts on banks‘ lending decisions. 
 
The net interest margin is an indicator of profitability and credit risk involved in bank 
assets. It is hypothesized that an increase in lending rate as well as the spread between the 
lending rate and deposit rate lead to increase in profit, so does increase in black market 
premium. However, an increase in excess liquidity may or may not lead to an increase in 
bank profitability. An increase in capitalization may lead to increase in profit in a condition 
of strong demand for loanable funds. It may lead to a fall in profit in a condition of weak 
demand and hence constrain the ability of banks to make profits. Rising labour costs could 
increase return on capital only if matched with productivity. Generally, increase in labour 
cost should decrease return on capital, as it is a cost to the banking firm. It may also lead to 
an increase return on capital if the increase is matched with productivity, in line with the 
marginal productivity theory. The proposition is testable. Closely related to the issue is the 
level of operating efficiency indicated by the ratio of total operating expense less interest 
paid on deposit to total earnings. It has been argued that part of the problems in banking 
especially the systemic distress witnessed in the past years is as result of absence of good 
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corporate governance coupled with the frivolous indulgence by management in 
ostentatious expenditure that has little or nothing to do with productivity.  
Nyong (1994) opined that globally, regulators attach great importance in the regulation to 
bank capital than the detail of asset portfolio because capital adequacy is the most 
important single indicator of bank‘s soundness, particular with respect to solvency or the 
probability of bank failure. Bank failure has serious adverse effect on economic 
development. There is no doubt that large-scale bank failures limit the ability of banks to 
create money, jeopardize the payment mechanism and disrupt lending activities. Adequate 
capital permits the acquisition of the institutional structure necessary for a bank to perform 
the intermediation function and also to provide related financial services. It provides 
protection in conditions of near economic collapse against unanticipated adversity leading 
to loss in excess of normal expectations.  
From the perspective of Watson (1980) cited in Nyong (2001) a banking industry with 
very few failures inspires public confidence and gives the appearance that the regulator has 
done his job well. In the literature of finance and from historical perspective, capitalization 
is being perceived as a fundamental feature of the banking industry of the 1990s. Most of 
the capitalization that came up through consolidation framework assumed that the primary 
motive for consolidation is the maximization of the shareholder value. However, the 
interest of other stakeholders are consider important if it affects the value of shares through 
the cost of funds, supply of labour or other factors  of production and the demand for 
services. In Boyd et al (1993), it was discovered  that in merger and acquisition (M&A) 
arrangement, a larger, more efficient institution tends to take over smaller, less efficient 
institution, presumably at least in part to spread the expertise or operating policies and 
procedures of the more efficient institution over the one acquired. Peristiani (1993) posited 
that acquiring banks are more profitable and have smaller non-performing loan ratios than 
targets. 
 Simulation evidence also reveals that large efficiency gains are possible, if the best 
practice banks merge and reform the practices of the least efficient banks (Savage 1991, 
Shaffer 1993). In Calomiris and Karceski 1998 and Rhoades 1998), their case studies of 
United States (US) bank M&As support the view that potential efficiency gains act to 
influence some M&A. From the above perspective, they concluded that poorly capitalized 
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banks are more likely to be acquired while banks with a high degree of cost inefficiency 
are, ceteris paribus, less likely to be acquired without government assistance (Wheelock 
and Wilson 1998). Forcarell, Panetta and Salleo (1998) found in their study that profitable 
banks are always willing to be acquirers, while small, unprofitable banks tend to be the 
ones acquired. In the recent Nigeria capitalization of banks in 2005, Soludo (2004) argued 
that consolidation was designed to ensure diversified, strong and reliable banking sector, 
which in turn guarantee the safety of depositors‘ money, effective performance of its 
developmental roles (economic growth and development) and competitive players in 
African regional and global financial system. The main reason behind financial reforms in 
the world is to make banks to become stronger players in a manner that will ensure returns 
to their shareholders over time and greater impacts on their domestic economies. Where 
developing countries fail to take this opportunity, they will be left behind in the global 
train and thus stand to be marginalized in the long run. 
Evidences from the findings of Altunbas, Maunde and Molyneux, (1995) revealed that the 
potential for efficiency gains also motivate consolidation in the financial industry as it 
provides impetus for improvements between the acquirers and targeted banks. Diversifying 
M&A may also improve efficiency in the long term through expanding the skill of the 
management (Milbourn, Boot and Thakor, 1999). According to Talwar (1995) 
consolidation is a good strategy for enhancing efficiency, reducing overlap in operations, 
―right sizing‖ and redeploying surplus staff either by retraining, alternate employment or 
voluntary retirement etc. According to Rose (1989), the response of typical managers of 
banks on the issue of motives for capitalization/consolidation is that it is for risk reduction 
purposes. However, the recent capitalization/consolidation process in the Nigerian banking 
industry and around the world has shown that it helps to produce less risky organization. 
It is important to note that financial stress on bank customers could stem from the 
disruption of historical lending patterns. A lack of short-run substitutes for bank credit 
would imply that a disruption in the supply of bank credit would have negative 
consequences for the affected borrowers and possibly for the macro-economy, as argued in 
the literature by Bernanke (1993). Capitalization/Consolidation shift banking assets to 
larger banking organizations and that larger banking organizations tend to devote a smaller 
fraction of their assets to small business lending. There is a growing feeling that the 
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reduction in small business lending as a result of consolidation could be substantial under 
what they term ―consolidation hypothesis‖. Strahan and Weston (1998) found that the 
decline in the percentage of small business loan-to-assets is greater among banks not 
involved in mergers than among banks involved in mergers. Their findings do not support 
the consolidation hypothesis. 
The banking industry has undergone drastic changes over the past decades as a result of 
advances in information technology, deregulation, and globalization. The recent wave of 
consolidation remains a major issue that characterizes the banking industry restructuring in 
most countries of the world. It is simply an indirect way of preparing the industry for 
possible survival. It is part of natural evolution of industrial revolution aimed at making an 
institution larger, more efficient and better capitalized; among others. With consolidation, 
banks are now becoming highly capitalized for purposes of meeting their day-to-day 
banking obligations. It constitutes a major concern to deposit money banks as it has 
adverse consequences along the path of achieving financial stability. The magnitude of the 
effects of consolidation also depends on the quality of the regulatory framework, 
supervision practices, and financial market sophistication. The various efforts of the 
regulators in designing a comprehensive incentive package that would facilitate the process 
of mergers and acquisitions for resolving financial crisis in the country are wholesome 
development and should be reinforced. The recapitalization process and the need to seek to 
build high quality assets should be accorded utmost priority in any financial system. The 
concept of bank market concentration and bank consolidation are different but related 
concepts in literature. The essence of the reference to them in this work is to show how one 
affects the other in terms of advantage of megabanks in an economy. We shall now 
proceed to examine some conceptual and theoretical underpinning for this study.  
 
  3.4        THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.4.1    Buffer Theory of Capital Adequacy 
As a consequence, banks may prefer to hold a ‗buffer‘ of excess capital to reduce the 
probability of falling under the legal capital requirements, especially if their capital 
adequacy ratio is very volatile. Capital requirements constitute the main banking 
supervisory instrument in Nigeria. The Central Bank of Nigeria intervenes little in banks‘ 
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activities but does directly conduct on-site examination and at times delegating this task to 
external auditors. By contrast, a breach of the capital requirements is considered a major 
infringement of banking legislation and is not tolerated by the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Banks remaining undercapitalized for prolonged periods are closed. The withdrawal of 
some banking license at the expiration of the recent capitalization of banks in Nigeria is a 
pointer to this fact. Banks will require more capital if deposits are not fully mobilize from 
the public. Capital is more reliable, dependable and can be used for long term planning. 
Ability of banks to mobilize enough deposits obviates the capital base from being eroded. 
The buffer theory of Calem and Rob (1996) predicts that a bank approaching the regulatory 
minimum capital ratio may have an incentive to boost capital and reduce risk in order to 
avoid the regulatory costs triggered by a breach of the capital requirements. However, 
poorly capitalized banks may also be tempted to take more risk in the hope that higher 
expected returns will help them to increase their capital. This is one of the ways risks 
relating to lower capital adequacy affects banking operations. In the event of bankruptcy of 
a bank, the risks are absorbed by the bank, customers and Nigeria Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC). At present NDIC pays a maximum of N200,000 to a customer in the 
event of bank failure. Hence, customers are concerned about capital position of banks at all 
time. Banks are expected to insure and pay 15/16 of customers deposit liabilities multiplied 
by 1% to NDIC to enable their customers benefit from the scheme. The above practice of 
NDIC in Nigeria is applicable to other countries but varies in amount.  
 
In model 3 of this study, capital our dependent variable which is represented by 
shareholders fund (SHF) and explained by our buffer theory of capital adequacy helps us 
to test the propositions in hypothesis 3. The higher the shareholders fund the better is bank 
liquidity and capital adequacy. The deposit insurance scheme, which is compulsory in 
Nigeria, also exerts regulatory pressure on banks.  In his study, Vojta (1980) opined that 
adequate capital provision against excess loss permits the bank to continue operations in 
periods of difficulty until a normal level of earning is restored. The benchmark set by 
regulators of bank capital sometimes differs from those of the bankers. These capital 
standards have led to questions on whether or not regulators have been able to bring about 
changes in bank capital when their standards of capital adequacy differed from those of 
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bankers. Aggressive banks may try to extend the frontiers of ―imprudent management 
policy‖ by operating with less capital base, often in violation of the regulatory guidelines. 
But the supervisory agencies usually stand their ground by resisting decline of capital to 
avoid bank failure with the concomitant high cost to the society. 
 
3.4.2     Diversification Theory 
In banking, the greater size implies the potential for improved diversification in 
product/services. Diversification by way of innovation in product/services offers less risk 
and, hence, cost savings in managing risk (Diamond, 1984) and in signaling the bank‘s 
riskiness to outsiders. Diamond further stated that: 
 
 ―if larger banks respond to a reduced marginal cost of risk by taking on and 
managing more risk, they may appear to have constant or even decreasing returns to 
scale because the extra risk is costly. Given a bank‟s scale and in its inherent asset 
quality an increase in financial capital reduces the probability of insolvency and 
provides an incentive for allocating additional resources to manage risk in order to 
protect the larger equity stake. Since financial capital constitutes the bank‟s own bet 
on its management of risk, it conveys a credible signal to depositors of the resources 
allocated to preserving capital and insuring the safety of their deposits”. 
 
 Thus higher levels of capitalization, given observable scale and inherent asset quality, 
inferred from measures such as the level of nonperforming loans, signal greater safety to 
depositors and, thus, reduce the probability of a liquidity crisis. Banks, like other business 
organizations, are constrained to observe at least the three basic decisions of investing, 
financing and dividend policy. When banks promoters are convinced of getting 
satisfactory returns (captured by ROC in model 2) from banking business that is 
investment then they have to think of financing the banking business if banks are to play 
the role of financial intermediaries (channeling funds from deficit to surplus units) they 
must build up an appropriate level of asset base commensurate with their target level of 
operation and profitability. This implies that interest from bank loans and advances (bulk 
of bank profit) affects the return on capital (ROC) and return on asset (ROA). Bank assets 
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should be financed with an appropriate mix of bank core capital, depositors‘  funds and 
other liabilities. Diversification is also key where there is high concentration of firms in 
an industry. This would be discussed in our hypothesis four. 
 
 Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet (1992) found that if 
capital is relative expensive, the forced reduction in leverage diminishes the bank‘s 
expected returns. As a consequence, the bank‘s owners may choose higher return and a 
higher risk position. For instance in model 1, where it is perceived that return on asset will 
be higher, shareholders fund/loans and advances (safety index) that is capital adequacy 
ratio is expected to be higher. In some cases; the increase in the bank‘s risk 
overcompensates the increase in capital and leads to a higher default probability. The 
introduction of risk-based capital standards can be considered as an attempt to eliminate 
the possible perverse effects of capital requirement. Unfortunately, evidence indicates that 
current capital requirements do not reflect banks‘ risk-taking accurately.  
Avery and Berger (1991), for example, find that the Basel Accord risk-weighting 
framework explains only about 5% of banks‘ loan performance. If there are flaws in the 
risk-weightings, risk-based capital standards may have destabilizing effects, as banks 
constrained by the capital requirements can improve their capital ratio by decreasing risk in 
terms of the official standards while business risk is actually increased. According to 
Myers and Majluf (1984), in the absence of periodic adjustments in the capital ratio, banks 
would never hold more capital than required by the regulators or the market. In practice, 
however, adjusting the capital ratio may be costly. Equity issues may, in the case of 
information asymmetries, convey negative information to the market on the bank‘s 
economic value. Moreover, shareholders may be reluctant to contribute new capital if the 
bank is severely undercapitalized, as most of the benefits would accrue to creditors. In the 
absence of these capital adjustments, banks falling under the legal capital requirements will 
not be able to react instantaneously. They may then be subject to repeated regulatory 
penalties, or even worse, closed down. 
3.4.3     Expense Theory 
According to the expense theory of Williamson (1963) cited in Nyong (2001) otherwise 
called the theory of managerial discretion, managers have the option in pursuing policies, 
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which maximize their own utility rather than profit maximization for shareholders. Such 
utility include the satisfaction which mangers derive from certain types of expenditure. 
Managers‘ prestige, power and status are to some extent reflected in the amount of slack 
they receive in the form of expense account, luxurious offices and building, company cars 
and other perquisites of office. Operating efficiency (operating expenses/total assets) 
attempts to capture this aspect of bank behaviour. Operating expenses/total assets captured 
by (EOM) is represented in model 1 as one of our control variables to explain the 
dependent/regressand that is return on assets (ROA). Operating expenses (expenses 
management) is derived from the use of resources and can have positive (if well utilized) 
or negative implication on the dependent variable. 
 
3.4.4   Portfolio Regulation Theory 
We can also use the theory of portfolio regulation to gauge the performance of banking 
firms. The theory opined that the regulation of banks is necessary to maintain safety and 
soundness of the banking system, to the extent, which put them in a position to meet its 
liabilities without difficulty. This made it imperative for the regulatory authorities to 
compel greater solvency and liquidity on individual banks than making it optional. This 
theory is represented in model 1 of this study. It captures LAD that is Liquid Assets (LA)/ 
Bank Deposit (BD) and depicts the liquidity position of the banks. The higher this ratio the 
better liquidity and solvency of the individual banks.  According to Peltzman (1970), if the 
asset portfolio is deemed too risky or capital inadequate, the relevant supervisory agency 
will attempt to compel a change in the bank‘s balance sheet.  
 
3.4.5     Deposit Insurance Theory 
The deposit insurance theory also provides an insight into the behaviour of deposit money 
banks (Flannery, 1989; Cham, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1992). In the context of this theory, 
banks are viewed as portfolio of risky claims. As insured banks increase their risk of 
failure without limit, there is an expected value transfer of wealth from government deposit 
Insurance Corporation to bank owners. Regulators are concerned about bank‘s soundness, 
particular with respect to solvency or the probability of bank failure. Therefore, regulation 
of bank risks exposure is necessary to reduce the expected losses incurred by the deposit 
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insurance corporation. Deposits solicited from customers are not as dependable and 
reliable as the bank capital requirement. It cannot be used for long term planning. 
However, more deposits means banks can grant more loans and will not obviate the need 
for excessive capital. Where bank loans and advances are given out to customers without 
due process it might affect capital and liquidity position of a bank in the long run. In model 
1, B deposit (LAD: liquidity/deposit - LA/BD) that is liquidity is captured as one of our 
independent variable. According to Flannery (1989) the regulatory capital requirements 
means that larger banks are less inclined to take greater risks. Kelly (1990) opined that 
large banks may be less willing to take risks so as to exploit the deposit insurance subsidy. 
An important feature of this theory is that large banks are less likely to fail than small ones 
because of their low inclination to take risks. This implies that although the return on 
capital made by large banks may not be high, they are secured.  
 
An analysis of the Annual and Financial Reports (1985-1989 and 1999-2005) of the three 
big banks in Nigeria First Bank of Nigeria (FBN), United Bank of Africa (UBA) and 
Union Bank of Nigeria (UBN) evidence a yawning gap in the Loan-Deposit interest 
structure. For instance, UBN paid interest on savings amounting to N41,685m, received 
interest on loan amounting to N70,543m, mobilized deposit amounting to N1,04,767m and 
extended loans to customers to the tune of N280,935m for the period 1999-2005. UBA 
paid interest on savings amounting to N29,886m, received interest on loan amounting to 
N58,607m, mobilized deposit amounting to N920,187m and extended loans to customers 
to the tune of N275,002m from 1999-2005. For the period 1984-1988, UBA paid interest 
on savings amounting to N1,191,536m, received interest on loans to customers amounting 
to N1,203,591m. FBN paid interest on savings amounting to N26,403m, received interest 
on loan amounting to N78,437m, mobilized deposit amounting to N1,200,068m and 
extended loans to customers to the tune of N459,977m from 1999-2005. For the period 
1984-1988, FBN paid interest on savings amounting to N1,139,352m, received interest on 
loans to customers amounting to N1,203,865m. The Loan-Deposit interest structure gap is 
a true reflection of a weak economy base that needs to be reflated in order to stimulate 
industrialization‘s. The Loan-Deposit interest rate gap also shows the extent of 
maladministration by the custodian of funds in the Nigerian financial system. Depositors 
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can hardly save because the structure portrays low interest rate on savings while only few 
investors can afford the high interest rate on loans and advances.  
 
3.4.6   Intermediation Theory 
Intermediation theory is the process taken by bank management in mobilizing funds from 
the surplus spending units to the deficits units. A strong capital base implies a lower 
default probability for the bank and therefore its cost of funding is lower. It also gives the 
bank more freedom to take advantage of profitable lending opportunities. Bank 
performance can also be looked at from the modern intermediation theory, which provides 
a new dimension to bank behaviour as seen in Boyd and Prescott (1986), Williamson 
(1986) and Allen (1990). Hence, the use of superior strategies and tactics to generate funds 
from the public is very critical to bank management. The theory predicts an inverse 
relationship between size and probability of failure, and hence the larger the size, the 
greater the potential of expected return on capital that may be realized. Return on capital is 
captured in model 2 of this study as our dependent variable. Where bank management is 
able to mobilize deposits and profitably utilize such funds, return on capital may increase 
all things being equal. Managers‘ prestige, power and status are to some extent reflected in 
the amount of slack they receive in the form of expense account, luxurious offices and 
building, company cars and other perquisites of office. The superior performance of large 
banks is due to consistent return on capital which has enhanced economies of scale in 
production, adoption of advanced technology and diversification.  
 
3.4.7    Capital Structure Theory 
According to Owualah (1998), the debate on capital structure has shifted from whether it 
exists or not to determining the optimal for any particular company as well as 
understanding the underlying influences. Firstly, the static trade-off theory postulates that 
the tax-deductibility of interest payment induces a company to borrow up to the margin 
where the present value of interest tax shield is just offset by the value of loss due to 
agency cost from issuing risky debt as well as the cost of possible liquidation or re-
organization. Secondly, the Pecking order theory postulates that companies prefer internal 
to external financing. However, companies with least profitable investment in an industry 
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will have less internally generated fund for new investment and will ultimately borrow 
more. It further postulates that as a company seeks more external financing, it will follow 
the pecking order of securities, from safe to risky debt, convertibles and other quasi equity 
instruments and finally to equity as a last resort. Although, they would embrace the latter if 
necessary to finance real investment with positive Net Present Values. This explains while 
banks with weak capital base before the 2005 recapitalization had problem in generating 
deposit from their customers. Thirdly, the Organizational theory focuses on internal 
finances because it believes external finances no matter its sources, signals to the market 
that, internal sources are inadequate. The theory suggests that when a company issues debt 
to replace equity a decrease in corporate wealth occurs. This theory further confirms why 
most profitable companies typically borrow least as high earnings result in greater 
retention and less reliance on external financing and consequently a lower debt ratio. 
According to Hart and Moore (1989, 1999) and Booth and ScharfStein (1991) cited in 
Adaramola, Sulaiman and Fapetu (2005) the fourth theory that is the bargaining based 
theory states that a firms capital structure influences potential future negotiations between 
the firm and its investors, and the anticipation of such negotiations, in turn, influences 
financial decisions. 
 
Booth, Aivazian, Demirgruc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) examined capital structure in 
developing countries. The study documents three fundamental theoretical models of capital 
structure, the static trade-off model (STO), the pecking-order hypothesis (POH) and 
agency theoretical framework (ATF). They observed that in each model, the choice 
between debt and equity depends on both firm-specific and institutional factors. The STO 
model suggests that capital structure moves towards a target that reflects tax rates, asset 
type, business risk, profitability and bankruptcy code. While the ATF indicates that 
potential conflict of interest between inside and outside investors determines an optimal 
capital structure that trade off agency costs against other financing cost. The POH 
considers capital imperfections as central. Transaction costs and asymmetric information 
link the firm‘s ability to undertake new investments to its internally generated funds. If 
firms are to rely on external funds, they would prefer debt to equity due to lesser impact of 
information asymmetries. They then emphasized that distinguishing empirically between 
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these hypotheses has proven difficult, thus most recent empirical researches have focused 
on explaining capital structure using cross –sectional tests and a variety of variables that 
can be justified using any or all of the three models. 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2001) examined how active management of bank credit risk 
exposure through the loan sales market affects capital structure, lending, profits and risk 
for US banks from 1988 to 1993. The study found that all assets classes have positive and 
significant influence on capital asset ratio. It also shows that banks that buy and sell loans 
have the lowest capital-to-assets, liquid assets ratio and the highest level of risky loan. 
Also Demsetz and Strahan (1997) report that larger banks hold less capital and are able to 
pursue higher risk activities. Larger banks, consequent upon merger, tend to decrease their 
capital and increase their lending (Akhavein, Berger & Humphrey, 1997). Berger, Wharton 
Financial Institution, Centre, and Di Patti (2002) examined capital structure and firms 
performance from an agency theory perspective on 697 US banks from 1990-1995.  
“They showed that the mean capital ratio was 9.4% of the total assets of banks and 
about 72% of the banks had a gross total asset of less than $100 million. The mean 
return on equity is about 10.6%, while board members and their relatives hold barely 
0.9% equity of an average bank. The study shows that a change in profit efficiency with 
respect to changes in equity capital ratio is negative for all values of equity capital 
ratio below 0.16”.  
 
Profit efficiency is measured as the ratio of profit earned by a firm to the profit earned by 
the best performing firm in the industry. Kleff and Weber (2003) investigated the relevance 
of potential determinants of banks capital ratio in German banks from 1992 through 2001. 
The study showed that portfolio risk had a positive and significant effect on the capital 
ratio for the savings banks as regulations were more likely to be binding for these weaker 
capitalized banks. Profitability had positive and significant short-term and long-term 
impacts on the capital ratio for savings banks, as they tended to depend on retained 
earnings because they had limited access to capital market to increase their capital ratio 
like other banks. They found that deposit ratio as a determinant of capital ratio showed no 
consistent result across the class of bank. Also the ratio of provision to total assets showed 
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a negative effect on capital ratio for the savings banks while a positive effect was found in 
case of other banks group. This effect was attributed to highly profitable banks retaining 
their earnings in sound financial health. Regulatory pressure had a positive effect on capital 
ratio. Accordingly, banks with a capital ratio close to the regulatory minimum increased 
their capital ratio to a greater extent than other banks. Finance is the artery of any 
economic organization. Financing which is also referred to as capital structure that is the 
proportionate mix of debt and equity. Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) examined corporate 
capital structure, agency cost and ownership control for all-equity firms in the US from 
1979-1983. 
 An all-equity firm is defined as one with no long-term debt over a continuous five-year 
period, while a levered firm is one that maintains a ratio of book value of long-term debt to 
firm value. Their findings indicate that all-equity firms tend to be relatively small in terms 
of sales value. All equity firms are adverse to debt of any kind. Their mean short-term debt 
to total asset is 0.0%, while for levered firms it is 2.77%.They have lower current liabilities 
relative to current assets and maintain a larger custom of liquid assets than levered firms. 
They also found that managers of all-equity firms have significantly larger stockholdings 
than managers of similar levered firms in their industry. There is significantly greater 
family involvement in the corporate operations of equity firms; managerial ownership in 
all-equity firms related to the extent of family involvement. All equity firms are 
characterized by greater liquidity positions than levered firms. Bank use a mix of debt but 
more of equity in their financing. The later shall also be used to explain our model 3.  
 
3.4.8   Structure-Conduct-Performance and Relative Efficiency theories 
 
If the relative size of a firm expands, its market power and profits increases. This is the 
Market-Power (MP) hypothesis. The hypothesis is also referred to as the Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis (Athansoglou et al (2005). The early empirical 
literature focused on the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis (SCP), and the relative 
efficiency (RE) hypotheses. SCP says a change in the market structure of banking firms 
affects the way banks behave and perform. The more concentrated the market, the more 
market power banks have, which means they can be inefficient (i.e avoid minimizing 
costs) without being forced out of the market.SCP predicts that the more concentrated the 
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market, the more profitable the banks, earned from higher loans rates and lower deposit 
rates. RE posits that some firms earn supernormal profits because they are more efficient 
than others. The above analogy shall be explored in discussing our proposition in 
hypothesis 4 of this study. 
Greater efficiency may well be reflected in greater output. Like SCP, the relative efficiency 
hypothesis predicts a positive profits concentration relationship. Under the market-power 
hypothesis, firms in a concentrated market with a large share and well-differentiated 
products may exercise market power pricing and earn supernormal profit. The efficient-
structure hypothesis posits low cost of production of relative efficient firms enable them to 
compete aggressively, capture a bigger market share and earn high profit. The same may 
be true in respect of the Nigerian banking industry, which has been dominated for many 
years by First Bank Plc, UBA, UBN and Afrique bank.  Heffernan and Xiaoqing (2005) 
for the period 1985-2002,incorporated measures of concentration, market share, X-
efficiency, scale efficiency, and an ownership dummy directly into estimating equation to 
test both the market –power and efficient-structure hypotheses in China‘s banking sector. 
The findings of the study suggest that future policy should be directed at encouraging the 
development of the joint stocks (which are shown to be more efficient) so that they can 
increase their market share and further improve competition. 
 
3.4.9        Concentration Theory 
Concentration refers to the degree of control of economic activity by large firms, Sathye 
(2002). Concentration theory is captured by our model 4 and hypothesis 4 in this study. 
The increase and magnitude of concentration levels could be due to considerable size 
enlargement of the dominant firm(s) and/ or considerable size reduction of the non-
dominant firm (s). Similarly, curtailment of the concentration levels could be attributed to 
considerable size reduction of the dominant firm (s) and/ or considerable size enlargement 
of non-dominant firm (s) Athanasoglou e tal (2005). Bank concentration theories and pro-
deconcentration theories exist in the literature and Nigerian banks 
capitalization/consolidation exercise takes it roots from these theories. Protagonists of 
banking sector concentration posited that economies of scale stimulate bank mergers and 
acquisitions (increasing concentration), so that increased concentration goes hand-in-hand 
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with efficiency improvements, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001).In his study, Boyd and 
Runkle (1993) examined 122 US bank holding companies and found an inverse 
relationship between size and the volatility of asset returns. In the US situation 
consolidation was voluntary while in the Nigerian case the consolidation exercise was by 
compulsion. In Allen and Gale (2000); Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004) their 
theoretical arguments suggests that concentrated banking sector with many small banks is 
more prone to financial crises than a concentrated banking sector with  a few large banks. 
The reason is that reduced concentration in a banking market results in increased 
competition among banks and vice-versa. Concentrated banking systems contribute to 
enhanced performance of the banks profit and also lower bank fragility. Enhanced profits 
provide a bulwark against adverse shocks and increase the franchise value of the bank, 
reducing incentives for bankers to take excessive risk. In addition, a few large banks are 
easier to monitor than many small banks, so that regulatory control of banks will be more 
effective and the risks of contagion less pronounced in a concentrated banking system, 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003).  
The protagonists of this ‗concentration- stability‘ view opined that larger banks can 
diversify better so that banking systems characterized by a few large banks will tend to be 
less fragile than banking systems with many small banks, (Allen and Gale, 2003). The 
present structure of Nigerian banking industry (deposit money banks) is a clear 
demonstration of their strength when compared to the situation before 2005 bank 
capitalization. Therefore, we can say that there is a linkage between adequate capital and 
market share. Capital has a big role to play in helping bank to compete effectively. Our 
hypothesis 4 proposition describes how adequate capital has enabled banks to control 
market share such as deposit and loans and advances etc in the Nigerian banking industry.  
The Pro-Deconcentration theories such as Chong (1991) in his finding indicate that bank 
consolidation tends to increase the risk of bank portfolios. The proponents of banking 
sector deconcentration argue that concentration will intensify market power and political 
influence of financial conglomerates, stymie competition and access to financial services, 
reduce efficiency, and destabilize financial system as banks become too big to discipline 
and use their influence to shape banking regulations and policies (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine: 2000); Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004) and Bank for International 
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Settlements (2001). On the one hand excessive competition may create an unstable 
banking environment, insufficient competition and contestability in the banking sector may 
breed inefficiencies. In concentrated banking systems, bigger, politically connected banks 
may become more leveraged and take on greater risk since they can rely on policymakers 
to help when adverse shocks hurt their solvency or profitability. Similarly, large, polit ically 
influential banks may help shape the policies and regulations influencing banks activities 
in ways that help banks, but not necessarily in ways that help the overall economy.  
 
For instance, powerful banks may argue against granting generous deposit insurance since 
that levels the playing field for smaller banks that do not enjoy the too-big-to-fail policy of 
most governments in economies where concentration levels are high. But it can also reduce 
the number of banks.  To boost the profitability of large clients, powerful banks may also 
seek to control ‗unruly‘ markets by weakening anti-trust laws and other policies designed 
to promote competition. According to Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000), if concentrated 
powerful banks unduly influence the formation of policies and regulations, this may hinder 
political integrity and reduce tax compliance. Advocates of concentrated banking structure 
noted that larger banks frequently receive subsidies through implicit ‗too big-to-fail‘ 
policies that small banks do not enjoy. According to Boyd and Runkle (1993), this occurs 
when regulators fear potential macroeconomic consequences of large bank failures.  
 
3.4.10     Basel Accord and Risk Management in Nigerian Banks 
Basel 11 Accord is the outcome of about five years of work by banking regulators and 
financial industry working groups. It was published in 2004 to replace the Basel 1 Accord, 
which came into existence in 1988. Basel 11 Accord tries to set standards for many aspects 
of bank risk management over the next decade. The Basel Committee and the different 
local regulators have however continued to fine-tune the new rules and to determine the 
implementation procedures. Basel 11 Accord aims at making individual banks regulatory 
minimum capital requirement much more responsive to the economic risk that the bank is 
actually incurring. As a matter of fact, the new capital accord tries to give banks a strong 
incentive to employ the most advanced risk measurement techniques in an attempt to 
replicate the best practice standards for risk management in the global banking industry. 
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Nigerian banks post-consolidation ought to be Basel 11 complaint as a step towards 
sustaining the gains of bank consolidation. 
Basel 11 Accord focuses primarily on the promotion of the safety and soundness of the 
financial system. New automated technologies, more complex products, e-banking 
acquisitions and trading catastrophes have rapidly increased the need for more rigorous 
operational controls in financial institutions. To meet business and regulatory challenges, a 
comprehensive solution is required to collate, analyze, report on, as well as mitigate risks.  
Basel 11 requires a holistic view of a bank‘s risk tolerance level coupled with a view into 
risks that one can act on proactively, and strategically maximize capital allocation and 
pricing as well as minimize an institution‘s exposure to sub-optimal portfolio performance. 
Basel 11, among other things, stresses the need for: 
i. More emphasis on a bank‘s own internal methodologies, supervisory review 
and more market discipline; 
ii. Flexibility, a menu of approaches and incentive for better risk management; 
iii. Increased risk sensitivity and  
iv. Inclusion of explicit capital requirement for operational risk. 
The risk bank faces can be categorized into two: Exogenous and Endogenous risks. The 
Endogenous risks among others, include credit risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, 
reputational risk, system failure, fraud and forgeries etc. The Exogenous risks include: 
interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, environmental risk, regulatory risk, political risk 
etc. The Basel 11 Accord provides a new and improved way of thinking about risk 
management and capital adequacy for banks. It is globally accepted and applied in most 
free economies. The three pillars of Basel 11 on which the safety and soundness of the 
financial system rest are: 
Pillar 1: The minimum capital requirement for this class are- 
i. Increased risk sensitivity through more refined credit; 
ii. Risk weights and internal ratings based approaches; 
iii. Explicit capital charge for operational risks; 
iv. Growing requirements with the sophistication of the approaches. 
A bank will determine the proportion of its capital, which it must keep in reserve based on 
a given calculation. 
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Pillar  11:  This section hinges on Supervisory Review. It emphasizes the following: 
i. Encouraging financial institutions to develop better risk management technique, 
transparency and accountability; 
ii. More active role for supervisors; 
iii. Creation of a mechanism for regulators to require greater capital adequacy 
status for banks. 
 
Pillar 111 
This section dwells on Market Discipline. It requires banks to disclose their capital risk 
measurement and management, risk levels and processes and increased frequency and 
volume of reporting.  In Nigeria, banks face numerous risk management constraints. These 
include data paucity, poor quality of data when available, measurements being typically 
inadequate and sub optimal human capital. Consequently, many banks tend to manage risk 
based on mere assumptions and there is usually a real danger that risks are inadequately 
being factored into the business strategy and capital allocation decisions. Risk management 
has been heightened by the banking sector of recent because of the:  
i. Bank capitalization/consolidation 
ii. Increased capital base of banks; and  
iii. The adoption of risk-based supervision 
 
From the analysis of Basel Accord 1,11 and 111 above sound capital is the key to bank 
continued existence as it helps to absorb operational risks of banks and risk-based 
supervision of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and Nigerian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC). Hence capital which is the key of Basel Accord is represented by 
shareholders fund (SHF) in model 3 of this study as the dependent variable. The 
bottom line of the basel accord is that banks‘ should maintain capital that will 
adequately reflect the kind of risks they carry. According to Adewunmi (1992) in 
assessing the capital of a bank, the directors must consider the bank‘s growth 
experience, its plans and prospects and the quality of management which will impact 
on the quality of assets. Adequacy of bank capital is required to absorb losses that may 
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result from the acquisition and holding of risk assets. It was stated in Adewunmi 
(1992):  
“that the success of a bank depends on the composition of its assets but more 
importantly on the quality of the assets. The more high yielding/high risk assets a 
bank carries in relation to low yielding/low risk asset, the more profitable the bank 
will be. For instance, banks that are able to recover loans and advances (high 
risk/high yielding assets) granted to customers are likely to earn more profit”. 
 
The more loans and advances that is the high risk assets a bank holds, the greater the 
perceived contribution to the development effort of its socio-economic environment. 
Bank directors must pay great attention to the evaluation of the management of their 
bank. The performance of a system is a function of the quality inputs. This important 
factor (management) is unfortunately, the most difficult to evaluate in banking. The 
theory above explains only the aspect of capital adequacy (riskiness) in our model 1 
(return on Asset) which is aptly captured by our hypothesis 3  
                                   
3.5    SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
            REVIEW 
 This section will try to summarize the relevance of major theories and literatures reviewed 
to my work, method employed; approaches and model formulation. The buffer theory of 
capital adequacy Calem and Rob (1996) form the basis bank capitalization. It predicts that 
a bank approaching the regulatory minimum capital ratio may have an incentive to boost 
capital and reduce risk in order in order to avoid the regulatory costs triggered by a breach 
of the capital requirement. In model 3 of this study, capital our dependent variable is 
represented by shareholders fund (SHF) and explains by our buffer theory of capital 
adequacy help us to test the propositions in hypothesis. The higher the shareholders fund 
the better is bank liquidity and capital adequacy all things being equal. The expense theory 
of Williamson (1963) cited in Nyong (2001) otherwise called the theory of managerial 
discretion, which states that managers have the option in pursuing policies, which 
maximize their own utility rather than profit maximization for shareholders is represented 
in our model 1. Basel 11 Accord aims at making individual banks regulatory minimum 
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capital requirement much more responsive to the economic risk that the bank is actually 
incurring. The Basel 11 explain only the aspect of capital adequacy (riskiness) in our 
model 1 (return on Asset) which is aptly captured by our hypothesis 3. 
The Portfolio regulation theory propounded by Peltzman (1970) which emphasizes safety 
and soundness of the banking system is represented in model 1 of this study. It captures 
LAD that is Liquid Assets (LA)/ Bank Deposit (BD) and depicts the liquidity position of 
the banks. 
The deposit insurance theory also provides an insight into the behaviour of deposit money 
banks (Flannery, 1989; Cham, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1992). Deposits solicited from 
customers are not as dependable and reliable as the bank capital requirement. In model 1, 
B deposit (LAD: liquidity/deposit - LA/BD) that is liquidity is captured as one of our 
independent variable. According to Flannery (1989), the regulatory capital requirement 
means that larger banks are less inclined to take greater risks. The Intermediation theory 
predicts an inverse relationship between size and probability of failure, and hence the 
larger the size, the greater the potential of expected return on capital that may be realized. 
Return on capital is captured in model 2 of this study as our dependent variable. The theory 
of capital structure explains that all equity firms are characterized by greater liquidity 
positions than levered firms. Bank use a mix of debt but more of equity in their financing. 
The later shall also be used to explain our model 3.  
 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (Athansoglou et al (2005) says a change in the market 
structure of banking firms affects the way banks behave and perform. The more 
concentrated the market, the more market power banks have, which means they can be 
inefficient (i.e avoid minimizing costs) without being forced out of the market. RE posits 
that some firms earn supernormal profits because they are more efficient than others. The 
above analogy shall be explored in discussing our proposition in hypothesis 4 of this study. 
The protagonists of this ‗concentration- stability‘ view opined that larger banks with strong 
capital base can diversify better so that banking systems characterized by a few large banks 
will tend to be less fragile than banking systems with many small banks, Allen and Gale 
(2003). Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003), Studart, 2004).Capital has a big role to 
play in helping bank to compete effectively. Our hypothesis 4 proposition describes how 
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adequate capital has enabled banks to control market share such as deposit and loans and 
advances in the Nigerian banking industry. Several literatures and empirical studies were 
reviewed as it applies to this study but the most significant are those of Ige (2006), Al-
Haschimi (2007), Osunubi (2006), Ilo (2006), Yudistira (2003), Okazaki and Sawada 
(2006), Naceur and Goiaed (2001). There are those by (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 
1999); Shih (2003); Studart (2001, 2003), Yacaman (2001). For instance, Studart (2001, 
2003) found that four Latin American countries‘ effort towards instituting an efficient and 
competitive banking pushed for a policy of concentration in the period (1997-1998). 
Finally, Naceur Ben Samy (2003) empirical model on bank capitalization and performance 
provided inspiration for this study. The empirical test was concerned with the determinants 
of interest margin and profitability of the Tunisia deposit banks. The modification to 
Naceur Ben Samy (2003) model in this research is by way of introduction of LAD 
(Liquidity), B DEPOSIT, EXPEAN (Efficiency of Management) and (MC) Market 
Concentration (Internal determinants) and macroeconomics variables-- interest rate and 
exchange rate as determinants of bank performance in Nigeria. The study of Goddards, 
Molyneux and Wilson (2004) provided the direction for the use of panel and cross-
sectional data. They used regressions to estimate growth and profit equations for a sample 
of banks for five European countries over the 1990s. 
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                                               CHAPTER FOUR 
 
                                     RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
 4.1    Introduction 
This section tries to capture empirically the relationship between bank capitalization, 
management and performance. Capitalization in this study refers to a concept and not a 
variable for measurement per se. Rather; it refers to a number of variables of interest which 
are produced from the existence of funds for use in the process of intermediation. From 
capitalization, obviously concepts such as rate of Return on Assets (ROA), Return on 
Capital (ROC) and Shareholders Fund (SHF) are derivatives from the use of funds. From 
available funds, assets are created, returns/profit produced, operating expenses are 
facilitated. Therefore, when we talk about capitalization, we are referring at the same time 
to variables that derive their substance from capitalization and in this study; we employed 
variables such as Return on Capital, Return on Asset and Shareholders fund. Therefore, 
Shareholders fund (paid-up capital plus reserve) is the actual capital while Return on 
Capital and Return on Asset represent the outcome of the use of capital. 
 
Therefore, our equations look at the extent to which these variables are brought into light 
or the realization is facilitated by the existence of what we generally referred to as 
adequate capitalization. Availability of funds enhances ROC, ROA, buoys up SHF. Thus 
the kernel of our study is to examine how performance of Nigerian banks has enhanced the 
outcomes of the use of bank capital. Further, the crux of this study is to see how bank 
capitalization/consolidation in Nigeria makes funds available for the realization of 
adequacy of capitalization, management and performance. Obviously, we can only look at 
a number of years, given the fact that bank consolidation took place only four years ago. 
This is what makes it impossible to make use of time series analysis because we have only 
two years to seriously discuss issues. This is why the use of panel data is preferred in this 
exercise to time series analysis. Also, we have not used cross sectional data analysis in this 
study because it is not possible to complete set of data on any bank for any particular year 
if only because merger has taken place randomly and banks have also come into existence 
randomly. The panel data methodology provides a useful answer to all these, hence, the 
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choice. This study uses the econometric approach in estimating the effect, and to be 
specific it uses the e-view software employing panel of data.  
 
4.2     OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE VARIABLES 
In this study, bank capitalization and outcomes from the use of funds are the dependent or 
explained variables represented by the following indicators: firstly, actual capital 
represented by Shareholders fund (SHF) and outcome from the use of bank capital 
represented by Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on Capital (ROC). Bank performance 
and Management are the explanatory or independent variables represented by their 
absolute and capital ratios (Liquidity, Efficiency and Capital adequacy). The indicators of 
the independent variables are regressed against the actual capital and outcomes from the 
use of bank capital (SHF, ROA and ROC). 
 
4.3    POPULATION AND SAMPLE SIZE 
The population of this research is drawn from the Nigerian banking industry (Deposit 
Money banks) referred to as the conventional banks because they are deposit-taking 
institutions. This is because they dominate the financial sector in terms of number and 
coverage. Despite the involvement of other financial institutions such as non-bank 
financial institutions - insurance companies, development banks, finance houses, etc in the 
intermediation process, deposit money banks still control the major proportion of the 
nation‘s deposits and savings. There were eighty-nine deposit money banks in Nigeria 
before the 2005 bank recapitalization exercise and the number  has been reduced to twenty-
five banks after consolidation and to 24 (after merger of IBTC & Stanbic bank to Stanbic-
IBTC) in 2008.  
Of the twenty –four banks, four of them that is: Unity bank, Sterling bank, Spring and 
Skye banks are new creation of mega banks. The sample size of fourteen out of the twenty 
four deposit money banks (See table 4 below) was employed in the study. The sample (of 
fourteen deposit money banks) was drawn from both the old and new generation banks 
using the Stratified sampling technique based on simple random sampling supported by 
Judgment Sampling. The selection process is restricted to banks quoted in the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange. The banks not listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange Daily official List 
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(SEDOL) are Nigerian International Bank, Standard Chartered bank and Equatorial Trust 
bank. 
TABLE 4:   BANKS IN THE SAMPLE 
Serial 
No. 
Name of Bank Listing Date of 
Incorporation/Registration 
Date of 
Commencement 
of Operations 
1 Union Bank Plc Yes 1917 June 1917 
2 United Bank 
Africa Plc 
Yes 1961 May 1961 
3 First Bank Plc Yes 1969 March 1894 
4 Afribank Plc Yes 1959 Jan.1960 
5 Wema Bank Plc Yes May, 1945. May 1945 
6 Oceanic Bank Plc Yes April 1990 June 1990 
7 Diamond Bank 
Plc 
Yes December, 20 1990 March 1991 
8 Guaranty Trust 
Bank Plc 
Yes July 1990 Feb. 1991 
9 IBTC Yes 1989 1989 
10 Intercontinental 
Bank Plc 
Yes Feb. 1989 April 1989 
11 Access Bank Plc Yes Feb. 1989 May 1989 
12 Zenith Bank Plc Yes 30, May 1990 1990 
13 First Inland Bank 
Plc 
Yes May 1988 Oct.1988 
14 Fidelity Bank Plc Yes Nov. 1987 June 1988 
Source: Nigerian Banking Annual, Lagos (I989/90 Edition) 
 
The sample drawn from the population was grouped into categories based on the size of 
their capital as at the 2006. (See table 1 in Chapter One). The sample units consists of 
both old generation and new generation banks. Banks that commenced operation before  
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1988 are old generation banks while those that commenced operation from 1989 are new 
generation banks. Amongst others, new generation banks started aggressive marketing a 
departure from armchair banking which old generation banks were noted. New generation 
banks also introduced new technology for efficient service delivery change. There is a 
modified sample size for banks in this study. Since this study is between 1986-2006, banks 
that are not quoted are eliminated because their data are not readily available. During the 
field work, it was observed that these banks had no data bank for their Annual financial 
statements. Hence, such banks are not considered.  Thus, in our sample size, banks such as 
Nigerian International Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Equatorial Trust bank that are not 
(listed) quoted were eliminated and this reduced our population of study to  twenty-one. 
This represents 14/21 (67%) of the quoted banks in Nigeria. 
The study analyses the data as contained in the financial reports of 14 deposit money banks 
out of the 24 banks operating in Nigeria as at the end of 2006, representing about 60% of 
the deposit money banks and about 67% of the quoted banks. The bank data were obtained 
from the CBN Banking Supervision and Annual Reports, (2006-2007) and Annual 
financial Statements from various years of the selected banks for the years 1986 -2006 are 
used for the analysis. The end of the cut-off date represents just one year after the bank 
consolidation mandate of 2004 by the Central Bank of Nigeria which took effect on 31st 
December, 2005. The study of bank capitalization, management and performance thus 
covers the period from the structural adjustment program of 1986 to 2006. The period of 
1986 was the beginning of bank deregulation and liberalization (more banks were licensed) 
while we projected from 2005 the commencement year of the study to a cut-off date of 
2006 (one year after bank consolidation) when financial statements of banks are expected 
to be available. Audited bank financial statements most time fall in arrears. As stated in 
Section 1.7, this study employed the Stratified Sampling Technique. In stratified sampling, 
the population is categorized into groups that are distinctly different from each other on 
relevant variables. Each group is called stratum (plural strata). In applying stratified 
sampling, we categorized the population and stratified using bank capital (shareholders 
fund), See table 4-1 below showing population of the study and bank stratification. On this 
basis, the simple random sampling method was applied. 
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TABLE 
4-1 
 
POPULATION OF THE 
STUDY  AND BANK 
STRATIFICATION  OF 
Deposit Money Bank 
(DMB) 
    
S/N Name of Banks Frequency of bank Capital 
Bank Capital 
'billion Remark 
1 Access 
 
Between 25 - 
34.9 billion 
  
28.8 
  2 Bank PHB 
 
" 
  
28 
  3 Fidelity 
 
" 
  
25.6 
  4 FCMB 
 
" 
  
25.2 
  5 ETB 
 
" 
  
28.4    
 
N.Q.B 
6 First Inland " 
  
29.4 
  7 Standard Chartered " 
  
26 
 
N.Q.B 
8 Spring 
 
" 
  
25 
  9 Afribank 
 
" 
  
26 
  10 Wema 
 
" 
  
34.8 
  11 Diamond 
 
" 
  
34.7                                             
 
12 GTB 
 
"      Between  
N35 billion and 
above 
  
36.4 
 
   
   13 Sterling 
 
" 
 
35 
  14 NIB 
    
35.2 
 
N.Q.B 
15 Oceanic 
 
" 
  
37.1 
  16 Ecobank 
 
" 
  
35.3 
  17 Skye 
 
" 
  
37.7 
  18 Unity 
 
" 
  
35 
  19 Intercontinental 
   
53 
  20 FBN 
 
" 
  
58.9 
  21 Zenith 
 
" 
  
93 
  22 UBA 
 
" 
  
47 
  23 UBN 
 
" 
  
95.6 
  24 IBTC/Stanbic " 
  
60 
  
 
Source:  
CBN Banking Supervision Annual 
Report 2006  
And 2007 
   
 
N.O.B = Non-Quoted Banks, Deposit Money Banks: 
(DMB) 
      
In this study, the elements in a particular stratum are the same with respect to the relevant 
parameter (bank capital). The banks are grouped into stratum and were selected using 
simple random sampling supported by judgment sampling (non-probability) methods. The 
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banks were grouped into two strata. The first set of banks have capital between N25 billion 
< N34.9 billion and the others between N35 billion and above. At the of end of the 
selection process, 67% that is six (6) out of the nine (9) of the banks fall into the frequency 
of between N25 billon < N34.9 billion while  67% that is eight (8) out of the twelve banks 
(12) fall into the frequency of between N35 billion and above. Quoted banks were 
specifically selected.  Our table below shows that 11 banks (9 banks excluding non-quoted 
banks) fall into the frequency of bank capital between N25 < N34.9. This means that 2/3 
multiplied 9 gives approximately 6 which were selected from the first stratum. In applying 
the probability sampling technique, particularly the simple random sampling in the context 
of stratified random sampling, the names of nine banks were written on a piece of paper, 
wrapped and put in a tray from where they were picked. The six out of the nine banks 
picked are Access bank, Fidelity bank, First Inland bank, Wema bank, Spring bank and 
Diamond bank. However, Spring bank was dropped because the data is only for one year 
(that is 2006) and would not be very useful. In applying the Judgment sampling an 
additional bank that is Afribank was selected to complete our simple random sampling of 
2/3 x 9 = 6 in the first stratum of N25 < N34.9 billion frequency.  
 
For the second stratum, in applying the probability sampling technique, particularly the 
simple random sampling in the context of stratified random sampling, the remaining eight 
(8) out of the twelve banks (12) were also selected by writing the names of the banks on a 
piece of paper, wrapped and put in a tray from where they were picked. Our table 4-1 
above shows that of the 13 banks (12 banks excluding non-quoted banks) fall into the 
frequency of bank capital between N35 billion and above that is 2/3 multiplied 12 gives 8. 
The following banks were picked Oceanic bank, Guaranty Trust bank, Intercontinental 
bank, First bank of Nigeria, Union Bank of Nigeria, United Bank, Zenith and 
IBTC/Stanbic bank. At the of end of the selection process, 67% that is six (6) out of the 
nine  (9) banks fall into the frequency of between N25 billon < N34.9 billion while 67% 
that is eight (8) banks out of  the twelve (12) banks fall into the frequency of between N35 
billion and above. The selection process picked 50% (seven) of the old generation banks 
and 50% (seven) of new generation banks (See table 4, p.136 above). The study analyses 
the data as contained in the financial report of 14 deposit money banks out of the 24 banks 
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operating in Nigeria as at the end of 2006, representing about 60% of the deposit money 
banks and about 67% of the quoted banks. The bank data were obtained from Central Bank 
of Nigeria specifically the CBN Statistical Bulletin, CBN Banking Supervision and Annual 
Reports, (2000-2006), Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact Book (1986-2005) and Annual 
financial Statements from various years of the selected deposit money banks for the years 
1986 -2006 are used for the analysis.  
 
4.4      RESTATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES  
From the theoretical perspective, literature review and research questions the following 
hypotheses are postulated to justify our statement of problem and objectives of study. The 
study will be carried out in three consistent groups of equation and are specified below: 
A. Return on Assets and bank capital ratios (Efficiency of Management, Liquidity and 
Capital Adequacy). 
B. Return on Capital (indicator of efficiency of use of capital), Management and 
Performance variables. 
C. Shareholders‘ funds and Performance variables.      
       
1.   H0:     Bank capital ratios (Capital adequacy, Liquidity and Efficiency/Quality of  
                  Management) has no significant impact on Return on Assets. 
       H1:     Bank capital ratios (Capital adequacy, Liquidity and Efficiency/Quality of   
                  Management) has significant impact on Return on Assets. 
 2.    H0:    Operating Expenses has no significant impact on return on capital.    
        H1:    Operating Expenses has significant impact on return on capital. 
 3.    H0:    Banks‘ liquidity, bank loans and growth of bank deposits has no significant  
                  impact on Shareholders fund. 
         H1:   Banks‘ liquidity, bank loans and growth of bank deposits has significant  
                  impact on Shareholders fund.      
4.    H0:     Shareholders fund has not significant relationship to banks control of market  
                  share (total deposit: TD, loans and advances: LA, total assets: TA ) 
        H1:     Shareholders fund has significant relationship to banks control of market share  
                  (total deposit: TD, loans and advances: LA, total assets: TA).            
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4.5    DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
PROF   =     Profitability of bank is measured by return on capital (ROC). 
ROA    =      Return on Asset is a measure of the profitable use of all resources of the bank. 
SHF      =     Shareholders fund is an explanatory variable of bank capitalization. 
EOM     =    Efficiency of Management/Quality of Management is measured by ratio of  
                    Operating expenses to Total assets. 
SIZE      =   Bank‘s size is measured by total assets;  
CAP       =   Capital Stock in banking represents change in the bank capital measured by  
                    ratio of shareholders fund to total assets;  
LAD        = Liquid asset to deposit; 
B deposit = Expected rate of growth of the bank deposit proxied by previous year‘s  
                    deposit growth rate and also measured by the ratio of bank‘s loans and  
                    advance to bank deposit;  
EXPENSES = Expense preference of bank is measured by ratio of total expenses   
                    to total earnings. 
MC       =    Market Concentration is measured by market share of bank asset, bank  
                   deposit and bank credit concentration. 
 
4.6       DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION  
The bank data were obtained from Central Bank of Nigeria specifically the CBN statistical 
bulletin, CBN Banking supervision and Annual Reports, (various issues) and Annual 
financial statements from various years. The samples are unbalanced panel data extracted 
from 14 banks during 1986-2006. Indeed, late eighties and early nineties was the period 
that many banks were detected to have problems in Nigeria especially with the 
introduction Prudential Guidelines in 1990.We have ended the study in December, 2006 to 
avoid distortions from lapses in submission of rendering annual reports to regulatory 
authorities which sometimes fall in arrears for some banks. Another reason to end the 
study in December, 2006 is that the banks have different accounting year end dates. 
The sample of banks‘ scrutinized in this task include all deposit money banks supervised 
by the Central Bank of Nigeria. The liquidated banks before the end of 2006 were 
eliminated from the sample because the inclusion would bias the results towards 
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summarizing the connections between bank capital, management and performance. The 
definition of assets as suggested by the Bank of International Settlements may complicate 
testing the capital. We then focus on total assets (inclusive of loans and advances) rather 
than test all different definitions of assets. This approach works effectively as the 
shareholder funds to total assets is the proxy of risk-weighted Capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR). 
 
4.7   THE PANEL DATA METHOD 
Instead of using time series data or a cross section of banks, this study looks at a panel data 
specification for individual banks. In Cross section analysis, data are collected across units 
of observation at a given point in time. For cross section unit, we observe the same 
attribute on different people, geographical units, etc using same year.  For example, one 
can collect data on total deposits of banks in say 2006. Here the variation is across the 
units, that is different banks and not for different years. In time series, data span across a 
time horizon usually on quarterly or yearly basis. An example is the total deposits of First 
Bank from 1986-2006 as could have been used in this study. In this case the variation is 
over time. Panel data or data set is a technique that combines the features of both time 
series and cross section methods. For example, total deposits of banks (one of our 
explanatory variables) in Nigeria from 1986-2006 as used in this study. Thus, panel data 
has the features of time series and cross section. For example, we can illustrate a Panel 
Data Model with this: 
Yit  = Xit + ßit Xit +µit 
Where: Y  = Dependent or Response variable or Regressand; 
           X  = Independent or covariate or control variables;  
           i    = the units (the respective bank); 
           t    = time unit (1986-2000); 
           µ   = disturbance term. 
This is an example of a linear panel data model. It is a static model because all explanatory 
variables are dated contemporaneously with Yit. Several benefits of panel data are shown 
by Baltagi (1995). Firstly, our panel data controls for banks heterogeneity within certain 
dynamic duration which cannot be found in times series or cross section studies. Secondly, 
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as panel data is usually assembled on micro units, such as banks in our case, most variables 
can then be more accurately measured at the micro bank level and biases resulting from 
aggregation over banks are eliminated. We try to minimize the limitations that may come 
up in panel data by carefully designing and collecting the sample data. Thirdly, it gives 
more informative data, more variability, less co-linearity among variables, more degree of 
freedom, and more efficiency. This is because it combines times series of cross section 
observation. Fourthly, it is better suited when a study is dealing with the dynamics of 
change such as turnover because it involves the repeated cross section of observations. 
However it has estimation and inference problem. For instance, error in t1 (where t = time) 
affects t2 or t3 (autocorrelation) and problem of one bank affect the other (cross-
correlation). 
 As indicated by Greene (2000), the fundamental advantage of a panel set over a cross 
section or time-series is that it gives the researcher far greater flexibility in allowing for 
differences in behavior across individuals and/or time periods. However, the data set rules 
out use of fixed effects because of a degree of freedom problem: it is not possible to 
introduce bank dummies. Also, the ownership dummy is time invariant, so a fixed effects 
estimator cannot be computed. For purposes of comparison, the equations are estimated for 
the pooled sample using OLS.  Banks are not expected to fall below the minimum capital 
requirements; rather it is anticipated to adjust capital or assets to satisfy the regulator. 
Thus, a bank with poor capitalization is expected to have a sluggish growth in deposits or 
liabilities than better capitalized institutions. Thus, banks with capital to assets ratio below 
the required minimum would need to mobilize deposit to shore up the capital base. This 
study hypothesized that bank capitalization and the outcome from the use of fund has not 
enhanced bank management and performance of the Nigeria banking industry. The 
multiple regression analysis of ordinary least square (OLS) will be used to examine the 
relationship between capitalization measures and the corporate performance indices of the 
Nigerian banking industry.  
 
4.8       A PRORI EXPECTATION 
Bank capitalization is expected to have a positive relationship with bank management and 
performance indicators. For instance, an increase Shareholder fund could translate to an 
 144 
improvement in bank performance if increased funds are utilized for productive activities 
especially in the real sector of the economy. Shareholders fund is expected to have a 
positive relationship with bank performance. This is because increase in the total 
shareholders' fund (equity plus reserves) will boost the performance of banks by end of the 
recapitalization. A bank will always seek avenue to increase its permanent capital and 
reserves to boost performance. This has a great implication on the Return on Assets and 
Return on Capital (Profit). Shareholders' fund is also used to represent efficiency of capital 
in this study.     
                                                            
Paid-up Capital  
Paid-up Capital is expected to have a positive relationship with bank performance. This 
means that increase in paid-up Capital will lead to improvement in bank performance   
 
 Shareholders Fund 
This variable is expected to have a positive relationship with bank performance. This is 
because increase in the total shareholders fund (equity plus reserves) will boost the 
performance of banks. A bank will always seek avenue to increase his permanent capital 
and reserves to boost performance. This has a great implication on Returns on Assets and 
Return on Capital. Shareholders fund was used as the benchmark for 2005 minimum 
capitalization of banks in Nigeria.    
 
 Error Term 
The error term is actually related to the political factor that affects negatively bank 
performance through various unstable policies and unhealthy bureaucracies in government. 
This variable is ―error term‖ because it cannot be actually valued numerically. Nyong 
(2001) in his findings identified that endogenous and exogenous variables are the critical 
factors affecting deposit money banks performance. The model will be specified in 
endogenous and exogenous form. 
 
4.9    THE MODELS 
We postulate that the return on assets of banks will be affected positively by bank 
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performance and management indicators. Therefore, we can represent the functional 
relationship in model forms as follows:  
 
(i) ROA = f (B Loan, B Deposit, EOM, LAD, CAP, µ) ……………………..Equation 1 
 
Where BLoan =  the ratio of bank‘s loan (L) to total assets (TA) that is L/TA. Bank loan  
                               depicts Efficiency/Quality of management 
          B deposit =   the ratio of bank‘s loans and advance (LA) to bank deposit (D) that is  
                                LA/D. This depicts liquidity position of banks 
                EOM =   The ratio of operating expenses (OE) to total assets (TA) that is  
                                OE/TA. This depicts efficiency of management. 
                 LAD =   Liquid asset (LA) to deposit (BD) that is LA/D. This depicts the  
                                liquidity position of banks. 
              CAP   =    the ratio of shareholders fund (SHF) to total assets (TA) that is  
                                SHF/TA.This depicts the capital adequacy of   banks. 
 
Restating the variables in equation 1 in explicit form, we can represent them as follows: 
ROA = a0 + a1 Bloan + a2B deposit + a3 EOM +  a4 Lad  + a5 Cap + Uit ……Equation  2                                                                                                            
           Where the  a prori expectation is stated as   a1 >   0   a2    >    0   a3      <     0 a4    >   0   a5   >    0         
                     uit    ≈  U (0,1)  
ROA measures the profit earned per naira of assets and reflect how well bank management 
use the bank investments resources to generate profits. We postulate that the Return on 
Assets (ROA) of the banks will be affected positively by the bank management and 
performance; captured by capital ratios e.g. the ratio of bank‘s loan (L) to total assets (TA) 
L/TA that is (B Loan),  the ratio of bank‘s loans and advance (LA) to bank deposit (D)   
LA/D that is (B Deposit) depicts the liquidity position of banks, Efficiency of Management 
that is OE/TA (EOM), Shareholders fund (SHF)/Total Assets (TA) that is risk of default 
(CAP) and  Liquid Assets (LA)/Bank deposit (BD) represented by (LAD). 
                  δROA/ δBPM > 0. 
All the explanatory variables with the exception of expenses are expected to have positive 
signs with respect to the return on assets. 
 146 
 
(ii) We postulate that the return on capital of banks will be affected positively by the 
indicators of bank variables (performance and management). The functional relationship 
would be represented in   model forms as follows: 
ROC = f (Bank deposit, Bank assets, Bank loans, Inflation rate, Interest rate, Expenses,  
                    Exchange rate, liquid assets,µ)                                    …………. Equation 3                                                                                                              
 Restating the variables in equation 3 in explicit form, we can represent the model as 
follows: 
  ROC =   a0 + a1 BD + a2 BA + a3 BL + a4 Infl + Δ5Intr  + a6  Expean + a7 Exch  
                 + a8LA    + Uit                                                      ……………… Equation  4                                                                                                                 
Where:  B D = Bank Deposits 
              BA  = Bank Assets 
              BL  =  Bank Loans 
              Infla  = Inflation rate 
              Intr   = interest rate on investment 
               Exch = Exchange rate 
              LA     = Liquid assets   
                              
        EXPEAN   = Expense preference of bank i.e operating expense (OE) /total earnings  
                                 (TE). This represents the efficiency of management.    
Where the   a prori expectation is stated as a1 >   0   a2    >    0   a3    <   0  a4    >   0   a5   > 0    a6 < >   0        
 
                     uit    ≈ U (0,1)  
 
We postulate that bank expenses which reflect the efficiency of bank management is 
expected to be negatively related to the return on capital. Where the  a prori  expectation is 
stated as:                               δROC/ δEOM < 0 
 
Return on bank capital is expected to be affected positively by interest, inflation and 
exchange rate ceteris paribus. The coefficient of default risk of bank portfolios, which 
reflects efficiency of bank, is expected to be negative. The more losses sustained on its 
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loan portfolio, the less profit the bank makes, ceteris paribus. Both inflation and interest 
rate are expected to have positive and negative effects on the returns on capital depending 
if there is an increase or decrease. The coefficient on Efficiency of Management is 
expected to be negative in line with the expense preference theory postulated by 
Williamson (1963). The coefficient on bank shareholders‘ funds/ loan and advances ratio is 
expected to be either negative or positive and also impact on return on capital. It is 
expected to be negative if the bank holds large excess reserves and less in loans and 
advances to the various sectors of the economy for growth. Where it is the policy to keep 
large capital fund in preference to extending such as loanable funds that may be negative to 
the growth of capital. Similarly, in situations where banks are not too consciously involved 
in its traditional role of directing and mobilizing resources from less essential uses to 
exchange of local currency for foreign currencies in the money market to maximize profit, 
a positive may be  expected. 
 
(iii) We postulate that the capital investment in banking captured by Shareholders fund will 
be affected positively by bank management and performance indicators and the functional 
relationship would be represented in model forms as follows:  
 
 
SHF =  f (Bank  Deposit, Bank assets, Bank loans,  Infl,  Intr,  Expeans, Exch, LA, µ)  
                                                                      ………..                                  Equation 5 
                                                                             
   Restating the variables in equation 5 in explicit form, we can represent the model as 
follows:  
SHF =   a0 + a1 BD + a2 BA + a3 BL + a4 Infl + Δ5Intr  + a6  Expean + a7 Exch  
                 + a8LA    + Uit            ………………                                         Equation 6 
                                                                                                                  
Where:  BD  =  Expected growth of bank deposits 
              BA  = Bank Assets 
              BL  =  Bank Loans 
             Infla  = Inflation rate 
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              Intr   = interest rate on investment 
               Exch = Exchange rate 
              LA     = Liquid assets   
 
Bank Capitalization (SHF) is expected to be positively related to bank loan. Bank 
management and performance indices such as bank assets, bank deposits, liquid assets and 
bank loan (BA, BD, LA, and BL) should have a positive relationship with Shareholders 
Fund.  This is represented in equation form as:  δSHF/ δBPM > 0                             
  
iv. Market Concentration (Mc) is measured by market share of bank assets, bank credit and 
bank deposit. We postulate that there should be a strong relationship between bank deposit 
and shareholders fund and bank total assets on the one hand and loan and advances and 
shareholders fund and total assets. The functional relationship in implicit form will be 
represented as:       
 Bank deposit (BD) = f (Shareholders fund, Bank total Assets, µ) ………Equation 7 
When presented in explicit form, we have it as: 
Bank deposit = a0 + a1SHF + a2TA + µ           ………………………         Equation 8 
         Where the a priori expectation is stated as:  a1, a2 > 0 
 
The second measure of market share can also be stated in equation. The functional 
relationship in implicit form is represented below as follows: 
Loan and advances (LA) = f (shareholders fund, total assets, µ) ………      Equation 9 
 When presented in explicit form, we have it as: 
  LA =  a0 + a1SHF + a2TA + µ……………………………                         Equation 10 
        Where the a priori expectation is stated as:  a1, a2 > 0      
        
The market power by way of control of bank credit, bank asset and bank deposit 
determines the market share control by the banks. Before the N25 billion bank 
recapitalization in 2006 the big four (UBN, UBA, FBN and Afribank) controlled a larger 
proportion of the banking industry in terms of assets, capital, profit, loans & Advances and 
deposit. To what extent has this changed market power since the last capitalization on 31st 
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December, 2005.This is expected to have changed after recapitalization. We therefore 
expect market concentration to be positively related to capital investment in the banking 
industry. Market concentration can also influence market power of banks. The size of bank 
capital reflects the concentration theory in this case. A small and positive value for the 
capital will be consistent with deposit insurance theory while a large and positive value 
will be consistent with financial intermediation theory. Theoretically, either a positive or 
negative sign may be expected, depending on the perception of the bank‘s management. 
Where management considers its capital base capable of wooing depositors and other 
customers to the bank for various transactions, a positive sign is expected.  Moreso, when 
the regulatory authorities expect banks to always have strong capital base for soundness 
and safety. If management pursues profitability as the dominant and overriding objective 
and all other things are secondary, then aggressive pursuit of profit will mean operating on 
a very thin capital base. In such case, we expect bank capital to constrain manager‘s 
decision to make more profitable investment. A negative sign will be expected in this case. 
An important determinant of capital investment in banking is the expected profitability of 
investment, which is proxied by the current rate of return on capital. The coefficient on this 
variable is expected to be positive. The coefficient on capital-deposit ratio is expected to be 
positive. The larger the capital-deposit ratio, the more banks tend to increase their capital 
investment in line with the volume of their deposit base. The lending rate will affect 
shareholders fund positively or negatively depending on the state of the economy.   
 
According to Ige (2006) an increase in the capital base of the banks all things being equal 
should lead to an appreciation of the naira if utilized in funding the real sectors while an 
increase in the growth rate of GNP may also lead to an appreciation of the naira. In 
Nigeria, the naira is more noted for its depreciation than appreciation because the banks are 
not playing the expected role of funding the real sectors. Banks also contribute negatively 
to the permanent phenomenon of depreciating exchange rate of the naira. Better bank 
supervision by the CBN can arrest this trend. It is also expected that an increase in the 
capital base of banks will positively impact on the rate of interest that is rate of interest is 
expected to fall in the long run. For the purpose of this study, the dependent variable is 
bank capitalization while the independent variable is management and performance 
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measures. Bank capitalization refers to a number of variables of interest which are 
produced from the existence of funds for use in the process of intermediation. From this 
funds, concepts such as Return on Capital (ROC), Return on Assets (ROA) and 
Shareholders fund (SHF) are derivatives from the use of funds, while the proxies for 
management and performance are reported by Bloan, B deposit, Expenses, CAP and LAD, 
Efficiency of Management, Expense preference of bank, capital-deposit ratio, interest rate, 
inflation and exchange rate.  
 
4.10   CRITERIA FOR DECISION MAKING 
There are tests that will be performed in order to verify the theoretical and statistical 
validity of the parameter estimates derived from the regression result. For this cause, the 
following econometrics and statistical techniques shall be adopted. 
1. Expected signs and magnitude of the independent variables: it helps to know 
whether our parameter estimates conforms to theory. 
2. Goodness on fit test, using R² and adjusted R²: it measures the percentage of 
systematic variations in the dependent variable that can be explained to changes in 
the independent variables. 
3. T- test: it measures the individual significance of the explanatory variables  
4. F-statistics: it measures the overall significance of the model 
5. The Durbin Waston statistic: it helps as a test for the presence of serial correlation 
6. The standard error of estimates: it is used to measure the standard error of the 
stochastic term.  
 
Co-efficient of determination (R²) and Adjusted R² 
This shows the percentage of the total variation of the dependent variable that can be 
explained by the independent variable(s). The higher the R², the greater the percentage of 
variation of the dependent variable that is explained by variations in the explanatory 
variables and vice versa. Also, the adjusted R², measures the same thing as the R² but 
adjusted for the changes in degree of freedom. This is because it gives a better measure of 
goodness of fit having been adjusted for the loss in degree of freedom as more explanatory 
variables are added.  
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The sign expectation 
This refers to what theory says about a particular economic relation. The sign either 
positive or negative and size of the parameter estimate is usually captured by it. Parameters 
in the model are expected to have sign and size that conform to economic theory, if they 
do, they are accepted. On the other hand, if they do not conform to a priori specification we 
either reject them and we therefore have a reason to believe that the principles of economic 
theory do not hold, (Koutsoyannis, 1977).  
 
The F-statistics 
This is used to test the overall significance of a model. The regression equation is adequate 
if the F-statistic gives a value higher than the appropriate table F-statistic, but if the 
calculated F-statistic is less than the appropriate table figure (at a chosen level of 
significance) found from the F-table with k-1 and n-k degree of freedom, then the 
regression will be significant. 
 
 T-test 
The T-test will be used to determine the statistical significance of the parameter estimates. 
The T-statistics will be given in parenthesis under the associated parameter estimates. A 
two-tailed test will also be carried out at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. We 
then compare the computed t-statistic with the given tabulated t-statistics to establish 
significance. When the calculated t-value is less than the tabulated t-value, then the 
parameter is not statistically significant and vice-versa.  
 
Durbin-Watson Test 
This is used to test for the presence of auto correlation in the variable. However, this test is 
appropriate only for the first order auto regressive scheme. The decision rule for the DW 
statistics is if there is no auto correlation, then d =2. Likewise if d= 0, we have a perfect 
auto correlation. However, if 0 < d > 2, then there is some degree of positive auto 
correlation (which is stronger if d is closer to zero). Also, if d = 4 there exist perfect 
negative auto correlation. And if d lies between 2 and 4, i.e. 2 < d < 4, there is some degree 
of negative auto correlation. 
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Standard Error   
The standard Error of estimates will also be used to measure the standard error of the 
stochastic term. If the standard error of the estimates is small relative to the mean values of 
the dependent variable, the model equation is preferred and vice versa. In summary, the 
standard error regression helps to minimize error that is estimation error. The smaller the 
error the better the result. The positive and negative sign measures the significant of the 
variables while the size of the result captured by t-value, probability, F-statistics, Durbin 
Watson, R2 and R2 adjusted also attest to the significance of our result. Durbin Waston 
measures auto-correlation (or serial correlation whether errors in past period affects current 
period or not).        
                                               
4.11   ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
The ordinary least square method and multiple regression analysis will be used in 
estimating the effect of bank capitalization, management and performance of the Nigerian 
banking industry. To test for the significance, reliability and validity of the result, F- 
statistic T-statistics, and their related probabilities, Coefficient of determination ( R2) , R 
bar, Durbin Waston (DW), Sum Square Residual (SSE), Standard Error (SE) of the 
explanatory variables  and coefficient of determination R2 are employed.  The model will 
be estimated using annual data and the study will involve the use of multiple regression 
technique (Ordinary Least Square: OLS) using E-View package will be used in 
presentation of the result.  
  
4.12   DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION 
Secondary data was used for the entire work. In order to carry out this study, data from 
(1986-2006) was  collected from  various issues of the Annual Reports of deposit money 
banks, Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin and the Nigerian Stock Exchange  Fact 
Book. The data include time series data, cross section data and panel data on variables 
adopted. Secondary data will be needed for the regression analysis on variables such as 
bank‘s capital (shareholders fund) and data on bank management and performance. For 
instance, the ratio of bank‘s loans and advance to bank deposit (B DEPOSIT), Liquid asset 
to deposit (LAD), Expenses to total Earnings, the ratio of bank‘s loan to total assets 
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(BLOAN) and the ratio of shareholders fund to total assets (CAP).  Operating efficiency of 
bank (EOM) is measured by ratio of operating expenses (OE) to total assets (TA) ;  
Expense preference (EXPEAN) of bank is measured by ratio of total expenses (TE) to total 
earnings (TE); and  Market Concentration (MC) is measured by market share of bank 
asset, bank deposit and bank credit concentration.  
Market concentration will be captured by computing the market share percentage (MSP). 
The variables mentioned above are internal determinants of bank performance. Because of 
the rising prices of goods and services (inflation), we need to determine the effect on bank 
performance. The increase in overhead on bank products and services is also pertinent 
considering the increase in expenditure on energy bill in deposit money banks and other 
sectors of the economy because of the unstable power supply. The macroeconomic 
variables in the study are interest rate, inflation and exchange rate. Interest rate on loans 
and advances has been on the increase over the years and has affected lending by the 
deposit money banks in Nigeria. Since the introduction of SAP in 1986, the exchange rate 
and inflation have been on the increase. The banks‘ capital account data used in this 
research is captured by shareholders fund. Data are reasonably available on inflation rate, 
exchange rate, interest rate and bank internal determinants of performance. In an enabling 
environment, we expect inflow of foreign investment to the banking industry in the 
foreseeable future. Bank capitalization/consolidation and good management are expected 
to improve the banking environment, attract foreign investors and enhance bank 
performance. The size of bank capital reflects the deposit insurance and modern 
intermediation theories. A small and positive value for the coefficient will be consistent 
with deposit insurance theory while a large and positive value will be consistent with 
financial intermediation theory. 
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Table  
4-2 
 
 
 
DATA SOURCES 
 
 
(1986-2006) 
  
        
   
Names of Variables 
   
SOURCES 
  
int' 
rate Exch'rate Inflation Bank Variables 
        
Bank Annual Report 
Appendix 1     
No No  No No 1986-2006 
Nigerian Stock Exchange  No No No 1986-2005 
Fact 
Book 
       
CBN  Statistical Bulletin 
1986-2006 1986-2006 1986-
2006 No 
 CBN Banking Supervision  No No No 2006 
 Annual Report 
      Return on Asset (ROA) Computed from Appendix 1 
  Market Concentration Variables              Computed from Appendix 1 
 Concentration Ratio 
 
Computed from Appendix 111 
  The Four Big Banks 
 
Computed from Appendix V 
  Four Firm Concentration Ratio Computed from Appendix V 
  Ten Firm Concentration Ratio Computed from Appendix 
  Source: Compiled By the  Researcher 
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                                      CHAPTER   FIVE 
         DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
5.1    Introduction 
 
The study of bank capitalization, management and performance enables us provide answer 
to questions of macroeconomic variables such as (interest rate, exchange rate and 
inflation); if inadequate capital affects the Nigerian banks to compete effectively in the 
international market and play their major role of financing economic activities. It also 
provides answer to the soundness, safety, profitability, quality of loan portfolio, asset, and 
deposit in the Nigerian banking industry. The selection of bank management has not been 
taken seriously and the performance is a function of the inputs. The study also provides 
answer to the impact of cost of operation on bank capital.  
 
5.2          DATA PRESENTATION  
The results of the study on bank capitalization, management and performance are 
presented below in tables 5, 5-1, 5-2. Tables 5, 5-1, 5-2 precisely are results of the models: 
(Portfolio Regulation theory, Intermediation theory and Buffer theory of capital adequacy) 
as generated by the computer. Tables 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7 and 5-8 are results of the 
models on market concentration explained by the concentration theory. 
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TABLE 5:  Return on Asset (ROA) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Included observations: 225 
Excluded observations: 64 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
BL_BA01 0.090600 0.024388 3.714970 0.0003 
BL_BD01 0.024091 0.022290 1.080807 0.2810 
CAP_SF_TA01 -0.004666 0.025794 -0.180900 0.8566 
EOM_OE_TA01 0.092903 0.030697 3.026444 0.0028 
LAD_LA_BD01 0.9504 0.009414 2.071941 0.0395 
SHF_BD01 -0.050925 0.024804 -2.053062 0.0413 
SHF_BL01 0.036365 0.014697 2.474369 0.0141 
C -0.009340 0.016474 -0.566949 0.5713 
AR(1) 0.595940 0.052842 11.27786 0.0000 
 
R-squared 
0.372843     Mean dependent var 0.056176 
Adjusted R-squared 0.349615     S.D. dependent var 0.064093 
S.E. of regression 0.051688     Akaike info criterion -3.047988 
Sum squared resid 0.577085     Schwarz criterion -2.911344 
Log likelihood 351.8987     F-statistic 16.05140 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.040680     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Inverted AR Roots        .60 
Source:  E-View Software Package: Computer Print Out 
TABLE 5-1:   Return on Capital (ROC)  
 
Dependent Variable :PT 
Included observations: 238 
Excluded observations: 51 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
BA 0.023594 0.003308 7.133410 0.0000 
BD -0.023017 0.003185 -7.226430 0.0000 
BL 0.032228 0.003467 9.295387 0.0000 
EXCH -66.20895 69.96019 -0.946380 0.3450 
INFL -163.0124 158.2960 -1.029795 0.3042 
INTR -761.4167 778.1650 -0.978477 0.3289 
LA 0.066479 0.003096 21.47500 0.0000 
OE 0.508664 0.370432 1.373165 0.1710 
C 31328.88 20141.62 1.555430 0.1212 
R-squared 0.997883     Mean dependent var 157309.1 
Adjusted R-squared 0.997809     S.D. dependent var 916476.3 
S.E. of regression 42899.94     Akaike info criterion 24.20821 
Sum squared resid 4.21E+11     Schwarz criterion 24.33951 
Log likelihood -2871.777     F-statistic 13491.71 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.973462     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Source:  E-View Software Package: Computer Print Out 
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TABLE 5-2:  SHAREHOLDERS’ FUND (SHF) 
 
Dependent Variable: SHF 
Included observations: 238 
Excluded observations: 51 after adjusting endpoints 
 
 
Variable 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
BA 0.192667 0.040763 4.726561 0.0000 
BD -0.156447 0.039253 -3.985617 0.0001 
BL 0.253775 0.042728 5.939253 0.0000 
EXCH -527.0022 862.1977 -0.611231 0.5417 
INFL 1011.074 1950.858 0.518271 0.6048 
INTR 1953.035 9590.197 0.203649 0.8388 
LA -0.160024 0.038151 -4.194481 0.0000 
OE -3.379571 4.565248 -0.740282 0.4599 
C -79658.81 248227.7 -0.320910 0.7486 
R-squared 0.975007     Mean dependent var 477140.4 
Adjusted R-squared 0.974134     S.D. dependent var 3287385. 
S.E. of regression 528704.0     Akaike info criterion 29.23133 
Sum squared resid 6.40E+13     Schwarz criterion 29.36263 
Log likelihood -3469.528     F-statistic 1116.715 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.465165     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Source:  E-View Software Package: Computer Print Out 
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Table 5-3: Dependent Variable: TBD (Market Share 10 banks 
Method: Least Squares 
  Sample: 1986 -2006 
  
    
   Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     SHF 0.2168 0.0839 2.5811 0.0188 
TA 0.9637 0.1090 8.8382 0.0000 
C -0.3021 0.2742 -1.1015  0.2852 
     
R-squared 0.9378 
Mean 
dependent 
var       
         
4.1943    
Adjusted R-
squared 0.9309 S.D. dependent var 0.4301 
S.E. of 
regression 0.1130 Akaike info criterion -1.3908 
Sum squared 
resid 0.2299  Schwarz criterion -1.2416 
Log likelihood 17.6030  F-statistic 135.7926  
  
 Prob (F- 
 statistic)                 
0.0000 
    Source:  E-View Software Package: Computer Print Out 
Where: SHF: Shareholders Fund, TA: Total Assets; TBD: Total bank deposits 
    
Table 5-4:  Diagnostic Tests/Confirmatory (Market share of 10 banks) 
                                  Dependent Variables: 
                                                Dlogbd 
   Variables 
  
F-Statistic                Prob.                
 Jargue-Bera 
 
0.1889                 0.9098 0.9098 
 B-G Serial 
 
1.4237                 0.2697 0.2697 
 Correlation 
    White Heteroskadasticity 0.8969                 0.4886 0.4886 
 Ramsey's RESET 
    Chow Breakpoint 
 
5.516                   0.7012 0.7012 
 Arch 
  
0.3311                 0.5721 0.5721 
  
      Source:  E-View Software Package: Computer Print Out 
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Table 5-5: Dependent Variable: TLA 
(Market Share) 
  Method: Least Squares 
  Sample: 1986 2006 
  
    
   
Variable Coefficient 
Std.    
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
SHF 0.0439 0.1089 0.4032 0.6916 
TA 0.7204 0.1414 5.0954 0.0001 
C 0.6099 0.3556 1.7154 0.1034 
R-squared 0.7874 Mean dependent var 3.4963 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.7638  S.D. dependent var 0.3015 
S.E. of 
regression 0.1466 
 Akaike info 
criterion -0.8713 
Sum squared 
resid 0.3866  Schwarz criterion -0.7221 
Log likelihood 12.1491 
  F-      
statistic 
 
33.3332 
  
 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
 
   
Source:  E-View Software Package: Computer Print Out 
Where: TLA: Total loans and Advances; SHF: Shareholders 
Funds; TA: Total Assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
0.0000 
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Table 5-6 
Dependent Variable: TBD 
(Market Share)   
  Method: Least Square 
  Sample: 1986 -2006 
  
    
   
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     SHF 0.0783 0.0781 1.0023 0.3295 
TA 1.1959 0.1229 9.732695    0.0000 
C -0.5521 0.2849 
-
1.937404 0.0685 
     R-squared 0.9378    Mean dependent var 4.0123 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.9309     S.D. dependent var 0.3969 
S.E. of 
regression 0.1043     Akaike info criterion -1.5509 
Sum squared 
resid 0.1959     Schwarz criterion -1.4017 
Log likelihood 19.2844     F-statistic 
 
135.7149 
Durbin-Watson 
stat 1.1759     Prob (F-statistic)  0.0000 
 
Source: E-View Software Package: Computer Print Out 
Where: TBD: Total Bank Deposits; SHF: Shareholders Funds; TA: Total Assets 
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Table 5-7 
Diagnostic 
Tests/Confirmatory (Market share of 4 banks) 
 
Dependent Variables: 
Dlogbd 
  Variables 
  
F-Statistic                            Prob.               
 Jargue-Bera 
 
3.001  0.2229 
 B-G Serial 
 
1.3742 0.2813 
 Correlation 
    White Heteroskadasticity 1.0234 0.4249 
 Ramsey's RESET 
 
0.188  0.6700 
 Chow Breakpoint 
 
0.416 0.8865 
 Arch 
  
1.5033 0.2359 
  
Source:  E-View Software Package: Computer Print Out 
 
Table 5-8 : Dependent Variable 
Variable: TLA 
Method: Least Squares 
  Sample: 1986 2006 
  
    
   
     
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     SHF 0.2895 0.1474 1.9643 0.0651 
TA 0.2911 0.2318 1.2558 0.2252 
C 1.0798 0.5376 2.0086 0.0598 
     R-squared 0.5569 Mean dependent var 3.2017 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.5077   S.D. dependent var 0.2805 
S.E. of 
regression 0.1968 
  Akaike info  
criterion -0.2814 
Sum squared 
resid 0.6973  Schwarz criterion -0.1322 
Log likelihood 5.9550 
 F-  
statistic 
 
11.3136 
  
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.0007 
Source: E-View Software Package: Computer Print Out 
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Where: TLA: Total loans and Advances; SHF: Shareholders Funds; TA: Total Assets     
The result presented below gives us some clue to objectives and hypothesis of this study. 
Model 1: Portfolio Regulation theory 
ROA = a0 + a1 Bloan + a2B deposit + a3 EOM + a4 Lad + a5 Cap + Uit ……Equation 2                                                                                                            
            Where the  a prori expectation is stated as  a1 >   0   a2    >    0   a3      <     0 a4    >   0   a5   >    0         
                    uit    ≈  U (0,1)  
The actual result of model 1 stated in table 5 is presented below: 
ROA   = -0.0093 + 0.0906 + 0.0241+ 0.0929 + 0.9504 + -0.0047      …. Coefficient 
               (-0.5669)   (3.715)  (1.0808) (3.0264) (2.0720)   (-0.1801)   ….t-statistics 
               (0.5713)    (0.003)   (0.2810) (0.0028) (0.0395)   (0.8566)    … Probability 
 
Model 2:  Intermediation theory 
 ROC =   a0 + a1 BD + a2 BA + a3 BL + a4 Infl + ΔIntr  + a6  Expean + a7 Exch  
                 + a8LA    + Uit                                                      ……………… Equation 4 
 The actual result of model 2 stated in table 5-1 is presented below:  
ROC= 31328 + -0.023+ 0.024 + 0.032+ -163.0+ -761.41+ 0.509 + -66.20 + 0.066 
               ….Coefficient   
          
            (1.555)  (-7.226) (7.1334) (9.295) (-1.029) (-0.978) + (1.373) + -0.946 + 21.475     
              ….   t-statistics    
            (0.121)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.304) (0.328) + (0.170) + 0.345 + 0.000                           
              ….  Probability 
                                                                                                        
Model 3: Buffer theory of Capital Adequacy 
SHF =   a0 + a1 BD + a2 BA + a3 BL + a4 Infl + ΔIntr  + a6  Expean + a7 Exch  
                 + a8LA    + Uit            ………………                                              Equation 6                                                                                                                 
The actual result of model 3 stated in table 5-2 is presented below: 
SHF = -79658.8 + - 0.156 + 0.193 + 0.254 + 1011.1 + 1953.0 + -3.379 + -527.0 + -0.160  
                    …. Coefficient 
    (-3.201) (-3986) (4.7265) (5.939) (0.5182) (0.2036) + (-0.7402) + (-6112) + (-4.1944)     
                  ….. t- statistics 
      (0.7486) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6048) (0.8388) + (0.4599) + (0.5417) + (0.000)    
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                    …. . Probability  
 
Model 4: Concentration theory 
Results of Model 4 are shown in six different tables (5-3 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7 and 5-8). Only 
four of the results: 5-3, 5-5, 5-6 and 5-8 will be presented because tables 5-4 and 5-7 are 
diagnostics test which shall be explained in our discussion of results. Equation 8 is 
explained by our tables 5-3 and 5-6 while equation 10 is explained by our tables 5-5 and 5-
8. Equation 8 and 10 explained the extent to which shareholders fund and total assets have 
significantly influenced bank deposit and loans and advances of the ten and four big 
deposit money banks in Nigeria.  
 
Bank deposit = a0 + a1SHF + a2TA + µ       …………            Table 5-3 (Equation 8) 
 The actual result of table 5-3 (market share of 10 banks) is presented below: 
      BD =   -0.3021 + 0.2168 + 0.9637              ….. Coefficient 
                   -1.1015 + 2.5811 + 8.8382              ….. t- Statistics 
                    0.2852 + 0.0188 + 00000               …… Probability 
 
       LA = a0 + a1SHF + a2TA + µ          …………..                 Table 5-5 (Equation 10) 
The actual result of table 5-5 is presented below: 
      LA =   -0.6099    +     0.0439    +   0.7204                ….. Coefficient 
                     1.7154   +    0.4032   +   5.0954                ….. t- Statistics 
                     0.1034   +     0.6916   +    00001               …… Probability 
 
Bank deposit = a0 + a1SHF + a2TA + µ       ………                  Table   5-6 (Equation 8)    
The actual result of   table 5-6    is presented below: 
      BD =  -0.5521    +  0.0783   +   1.1959                 ….. Coefficient 
                   -1.937   + 1.0023    +   9.7326                 ….. t -statistics 
                    0.0685  +   0.3295   +    00000                …… Probability 
 
  LA = a0 + a1SHF + a2TA + µ          ……………                    Table 5-8 (Equation 10) 
The actual result of   table 5-8  is presented below: 
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      LA =    1.0798   +    0.2895    +   0.2911                   ….. Coefficient 
                   2.0086   +   1.9643   +   1.2558                    ….. t -statistics 
                    0.0598  +   0.0651  +   0.2252                    …… Probability 
 
Table 5 above depicts return on asset and is explained by the portfolio regulation theory. 
In short, the theory simply state that where asset portfolio is deemed too risky or capital 
inadequate, the relevant supervisory agency will attempt to compel a change in the bank‘s 
balance sheet. Our  model 1 above tries to explain the proposition showing the relationship 
between the dependent variable of return on Asset (ROA) and our independent variables: 
bank loan/bank asset  (BL/BA), bank loan/bank deposit (BL/BD), Shareholders Fund/Total 
Asset (SHF/TA), Operating Expenses/Total Asset (OE/TA), Liquid Asset/Bank Deposit 
(LA/BD), Shareholders Fund/Bank Deposit (SHF/BD) and Shareholders Fund/Bank Loan 
(SHF/BL). 
Table 5-1 above depicts return on capital and is explained by the intermediation theory.  
The theory simply state that a strong capital base through funds mobilization, implies a 
lower default probability for the bank and therefore its cost of funding is lower. The theory 
predicts that the larger the size, the greater the potential of expected return on capital that 
may be realized. It also gives the bank more freedom to take advantage of profitable 
lending opportunities. The model 2 above explains the proposition showing the 
relationship between the dependent variable of return on capital (ROC) and the 
independent variables: bank asset (BA), bank  deposit (BD), bank loan (BL), Operating 
Expenses (OE), Liquidity (LA), Exchange Rate (Exch), Interest rate (Intr) and Inflation 
(Infl).   
Table 5-2 above depicts shareholders‘ fund and is explained by the buffer theory of capital 
adequacy. The theory simply states that banks may prefer to hold ―buffer‘ of excess capital 
to reduce the probability of falling under the legal capital requirements, especially if their 
capital adequacy is very volatile. It also helps to reduce risk in order to avoid the 
regulatory costs triggered by a breach of the capital requirements. Our model 3  above 
explains the proposition showing the relationship between the dependent variable 
Shareholders Funds (SHF) and the independent variables: bank asset (BA), bank loan 
(BL), bank deposit (BD), Operating Expenses (OE), Liquidity (LA) Exchange Rate (Exch), 
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Interest rate (Intr) and Inflation (Infl). 
 
5.3       DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The results from the panel regression carried out in the study are reported in tables 5, 5-1, 
and 5-2 above (pp.156-157). The discussion of our results will take the following steps: 
explanation of result in terms of R2 (coefficient of determination), R2 adjusted and Durbin-
Watson test (R2 and DW), the signs, significance of variables and results of hypothesis.  
  
The result of Model 1 (Portfolio regulation theory) was presented in table 5 (p.156) above 
that is: 
 ROA = a0 + a1 B loan + a2B deposit + a3 EOM + a4 Lad + a5 Cap + Uit ……Equation 2                                                                                                            
         Where the a priori expectation is stated as    a1 >   0   a2    >    0   a3      <     0 a4    >   0   a5   >    0         
          
Model 1 explains our hypothesis 1 (one) and has coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.373 
and adjusted (R2) of 0.350. This shows that the regression has low explanatory power. 
However, the values (i.e R2 and adjusted R2) indicate that over 37 percent of the variations 
in the dependent variables (return on assets) is attributable to the explanatory variables 
selected by the model and include Liquidity ratios (LAD = LA/BD), Bank Loan/Bank 
Deposit (BL/BD), Efficiency/Quality of management ratio (Operating Expenses = 
OE/TA), Bloan = (BL/BA) and Capital Adequacy ratio (CAP = SHF/BL). Though the R2 
and R2 adjusted appear low, it is significant judging from the significant F-statistics, which 
is equally high. The implication of this is that the model is well specified and does not 
suffer mis-specification bias. In other words, the result from the model can be relied upon 
in making useful deductions with respect to return on assets. The S.E regression and 
Durbin-Watson statistics equally lend credence to the fact that there is no auto correlation. 
The financial implications of this regression will be further explained in 5.3.1 that is result 
of hypotheses. 
 
The result of Model 2 explained by our intermediation theory and buffer capital adequacy 
theory dwells on our hypothesis two (two) and is captured in table 5-2 that is: 
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ROC = a0 + a1 BD + a2 BA + a3 BL + a4 Infl + ΔIntr5   + a6 Expenses + a7 Exch + a8 LA + Uit    
                 …………..     Equation 4           
      
Model 2 (Intermediation theory) has coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.9978 and 
adjusted (R2) of 0.9978. This shows that the regression has high explanatory power. The 
values (i.e R2 and adjusted R2) indicate that over 99 percent of the variations in the 
dependent variables (return on capital) is attributable to the explanatory variables selected 
by the model and include Bank Deposit (BD), bank asset (BA), bank Loan (BL), Inflation 
(Infl), Interest (Intr), exchange rate, (Exch), Expenses (OE) and Liquidity (LA).  This high 
goodness of fit is further supported by the significant F-statistics, which is equally high. 
The implication of this is that the model is well specified and does not suffer mis-
specification bias. In other words, the result from the model can be relied upon in making 
useful deductions with respect to return on assets. The S.E regression and Durbin-Watson 
statistics equally lend credence to the fact that there is no auto correlation. The financial 
implications of this regression will be further explained in 5.3.1 that is result of 
hypotheses. 
 
The result of Model 3 explained by our table 5-2 dwells on our hypothesis three that is: 
 
SHF = a0 +   a1 Bank Asset + a2 Bank Deposit + a3 Bank Loan +   a4Exch + a5Infl + a6LA   +  
                 OEa7 + Uit…………………     Equation  6.                                      
                 
                     Where the   a prori expectation is stated as  δSHF/ δBPM > 0 
  
Model 3 has coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.975 and adjusted (R2) of 0.974. This 
shows that the regression has high explanatory power. The values (i.e R2 and adjusted R2) 
indicate that over 97 percent of the variations in the dependent variables (shareholders 
fund) is attributable to the explanatory variables selected by the model and include Bank 
Deposit (BD), bank asset (BA), bank Loan (BL), Inflation (Infl), Interest (Intr), exchange 
rate, (Exch), Expenses (OE) and Liquidity (LA).  This high goodness of fit is further 
supported by the significant F-statistics, which is equally high. The implication of this is 
 167 
that the model is well specified and does not suffer mis-specification bias. In other words, 
the result from the model can be relied upon in making useful deductions with respect to 
return on assets. The S.E regression and Durbin-Watson statistics equally lend credence to 
the fact that there is no auto correlation. The financial implication of this regression will be 
further explained in 5.3.1 that is result of hypotheses. 
   
Our macroeconomic variables of interest rate, inflation and exchange rates have had no 
significant effect on Return on Capital (ROC).This is represented in model 2 of this study. 
Thus, it means that macro economic variables that is interest rate, inflation and exchange 
rates have not led to significant change on Return on Capital (ROC) one of the indicators 
of bank  capitalization (See table 5-1). Inflation rate, interest rate and exchange rate have 
negative association with return on capital. This implies that return on capital and inflation 
rate, interest rate and exchange rate move in opposite direction. The coefficient points to 
the fact a percentage increase of these macroeconomic variables (inflation rate, interest 
rate, exchange rate) will lead to about 66.2 in exchange rate, 163. 0 inflation rate and 761.4 
interest rate decrease in return on capital. As reported by Ige (2006) recent studies 
incorporating these variables indicated they could be statistically significant since they are 
more often than not at the mercy of the free market and not by government fiat. This does 
not conform to our a priori expectation that capitalization will be affected positively by 
interest rate, inflation and exchange rate.  
 
Foreign exchange (forex) pricing mechanism (s) over the years has been an important 
macroeconomic variable in an open economy such as Nigeria. In an open economy, we 
expect a flourishing banking sector that was deceptively awash with capital fund to affect 
the external sector. The recent bank audit of Nigerian deposit money banks in August, 
2009 showed that only some of them passed the CBN audit test. Borrowing for the 
purchase of machines and raw materials from abroad should be expected as banks make 
more demand for forex at the periodic bidding using the Dutch Auction System (DAS). 
This will only drive up the exchange rate, causing the Naira to depreciate, posing an 
inverse relationship, and very little or no statistical significance. Interest rate and return on 
capital share a negative relationship, thus as interest rate rises, return on capital decreased 
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during the period covered by this study. However, historically, we know that even when 
prime interest rate was falling it made no significant impact on the economy. Banks have 
not made concerted effort to transmit to the economy the benefit of lower interest rate. In 
the past, excess money balances will normally go for purchase of foreign exchange from 
the CBN auction market for a premium in the foreign exchange parallel market. In this new 
era of mega banks, we expect bank management to have another look at their interest rate 
policy such that it will re-engineer and stimulate the growth of the economy. Inflation rate 
possesses an inverse relationship to return on capital, thus as inflation rises, return on 
capital during the period covered by the study falls. This conforms to a priori expectation. 
Where the economy is resting at a sub-optimal level, it requires government‘s fiscal policy 
or perhaps any external shock, a change in expectation (output) etc to boost aggregate 
demand and subsequently aggregate supply. An important tool to stem the tide of rising 
inflation in Nigeria is massive expenditure in infrastructure development. 
 
Appendices 111-V111 explains the relationship between capitalization and control of 
market share. This study adopted the N-firm absolute concentration ratio, which is an 
indication of the percentage of total deposits, total assets, total capital & reserve and loan 
& advances controlled by the largest N firms in the banking industry. N is a large absolute 
number relative to the total number of firms in the industry. The four-firm Concentration 
ratio employed is therefore a measure of the market power (market share) enjoyed by these 
firms in the banking industry specifically deposit money banks. Save for 1998, 2004, 2005 
and 2006 where Zenith bank broke into the big four, First Bank (FBN), United Bank for 
Africa (UBA), Union Bank of Nigeria (UBN) and Afribank banks have the largest total 
assets, total capital and reserve, total deposits and loans and advances from 1987-2006. 
First, on size, measurement, the study adopted the firm‘s assets, deposits, total capital and 
reserve and loans and advances because it is more reliable than other parameters.  
However, with increased capitalization over the years culminating in N25 billion 
capitalization for banks which took effect from 31st December, 2005 the market power 
(market share) of the big four dropped to 33.52 percent for total assets,30.28 percent for 
total capital and reserve, 49.03 percent for total deposits and 22.29 percent for loans and 
advances. Market power rests with firms that have captured a good proportion of the whole 
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market as evidence by their statistics on Appendices 111-V111.  Secondly, the study 
ranked firms in the Banking Industry (BI) specifically, deposit money banks from the 
largest to the smallest of the sample. Using the index of total assets, deposits, loans and 
advances and total capital and reserves, FBN, UBA, UBN and Afribank bank came top 
followed by the other firms. The share of the total industry deposit held by these firms 
accounted for the BI concentration from 1987-2006. 
 
Results from Appendix V shows the banking industry as a highly concentrated industry 
from 1987 to 2006.The banking industry was a pure monopoly for 11 years (1986-1996)  
until 1997 when the market power was deconcentrated following the emergence of the new 
generation banks which brought new innovations such as aggressive marketing, new 
technology into the industry. This supports the view of pro concentration theorist such as 
Sathye (2002) that the degree of control of economic activity is influenced by large firms. 
The increase and magnitude of concentration levels could be due also to considerable size 
enlargement of the dominant firm (s) and/ or considerable size reduction of the non-
dominant firms. Allen and Gale (2000); Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004) 
suggested that concentrated banking sector with many small banks is more prone to 
financial crises than a concentrated banking sector with a few large banks. This explains 
the position of the Nigerian banking industry where a few large banks have been in control 
of the market share. The protagonists of concentration theory opined that larger banks can 
diversify better so that banking systems characterized by few large banks will tend to be 
less fragile than banking systems with small banks, Allen and Gale (2003). This can also 
be explained by the Structure-Conduct –Performance theory which predicts that the more 
concentrated the market, the more profitable the banks earned from higher loan rates and 
lower deposits (due to low interest rate) which is true of the Nigerian banking industry. 
The more concentrated the market,  the more market power banks have, which means they 
can be inefficient without being forced out of the market 
Even when the total number of banks increased from 29 in 1986 to 65 in 1991, decreased 
to 64 in 1996, increased to 90 in 2001 and 25 in 2006, the four giants banking firms more 
or less maintained their market power of 33.52 percent of total assets, 30.28 percent for 
total capital and reserve, 49.03 percent for total deposits and 22.29 for loans and advances. 
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There is thus a substantial amount of Banking Industry (BI) market power with FBN, 
UBA, UBN and Zenith banks as at 2006. From this high ―top-level‘ concentration can be 
inferred an even higher concentration say for 10 banks ratio (See Appendix 1V).  There is 
also the possibility of price leadership and barriers to entry arising from the scale of 
economies and product differentiation. This could be explain by the diversification theory 
which states that in banking the greater size implies the potential for improved 
diversification of product/services. Diversification by way of innovation in 
product/services offers less risk and hence, cost savings in managing risk (Diamond, 
1984). He further stated that larger banks respond to a reduced marginal cost of risk by 
taking on and managing more risk, they appear to have constant or even decreasing returns 
to scale because extra risk is costly.  
Given a bank‘s scale and its inherent asset quality, an increase in financial capital reduces 
the probability of insolvency and provides an incentive for allocating additional resources 
to managing risk in order to protect the larger equity stake. This follows from the firm‘s 
long experience in banking business and the corresponding acceptance of their product by 
customers, reflected by the companies‘ relative maintenance of their market shares in the 
whole period (1986-2006) of banking industry‘s history. The BI‘s high concentration ratio 
may lead to an undesirable performance in the crucial matter of price-cost relations such as 
in lending and deposit rates. However, according to Bain (1956), where the sellers that is 
banks concentration in the banking industry is greater than that in which ‗the largest six 
sellers (banks) supply two-thirds to three quarters of the output of the industry, there is 
strong disposition towards monopolistic price-raising and excessive profit. In the case of 
the banking industry (BI) where it has been found that entry barriers exist as a result of 
increased capitalization, high concentration would seem to suggest a poorer performance  
 ( in areas of service delivery) than in highly concentrated industries in which entry barriers 
are non-existent. Apart from the very high concentration, which this study has found to 
characterize the banking industry in Nigeria, the industry has also exhibited increasing 
return to scale (profit). Bain (1956) posited that the implication of structural traits 
combination of high seller (bank) concentration and high entry barriers (as a result of 
increased capitalization) remain high in an industry, then seller (bank) concentration is 
likely to rise further through the institution of effective and extensive product 
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differentiation. As a corollary, higher seller (bank) concentration is not likely to persist for 
periods of time after high barriers to entry are pulled down.   
 
5.3.1                            Discussion of Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis one 
This hypothesis is captured by model 1 (Portfolio regulation theory). Table 5 above 
presents the return on asset as dependent variable and the indicators of bank performance 
and management. The result shows that the indicators of bank performance and 
management are significant at 10% in explaining the dependent variable. Our explanatory 
variables are represented by liquidity ratio:  Liquid Asset/ Bank deposits (LAD = LA/BD) 
and Bank loan/ Bank Assets (BL/BA), Efficiency of Management represented by 
Operating expenses/Total Assets (EOM = OE/TA), Capital Adequacy indices represented 
by Shareholders Fund /Bank deposits (SHF/BD) and Shareholders fund/Bank loan 
(SHF/BL) are statistically significant in their influence on return on asset. However, while 
others are positive in their influence, the result further shows that Capital adequacy ratio 
represented by Shareholders fund/Total Assets (CAP = SHF/TA) and Shareholders fund/ 
Bank deposit (SHF/BD) have negative association with ROA. Bank Loan/Bank deposit 
(BL/BD), Liquid Asset/ Bank deposit (LA/BD) measures liquidity. Shareholders Fund/ 
Bank deposit (SHF/BD) and Shareholders fund/Bank Loan (SHF/BL) measures capital 
adequacy, Operating expenses/ Total Assets (OE/TA) and Bank Loan/Bank Asset (BL/BA) 
measures efficiency and quality of management. The overall liquidity position for the 
banks as computed and regressed by the panel data shows that bank liquidity is statistically 
significant. The result shows that bank performance indices  (Capital adequacy ratios) such 
as Shareholders Fund/Total Assets (SHF/TA), Shareholders fund/bank deposits (SHF/BD) 
have negative association with Return on Asset (ROA). This implies that return on assets 
(ROA) and capital adequacy ratios move in opposite direction. 
  
The coefficient points to the fact that a percentage increase of capital adequacy ratio will 
lead to about 0.05 Shareholders Fund/Bank deposit (SHF/BD) and 0.0047 Shareholders 
Fund/ Total Assets (SHF/TA) decrease in return on asset (ROA). This could be attributed 
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to the sterility/volatility of deposits and reserves which do not stay long in banks vault. 
Deposits in bank vaults can be volatile and vulnerable that is subject to withdrawal without 
notice e.g saving and current account of governments, customers (individuals), corporate 
bodies and permanent deposits that stay with banks for some time e.g (fixed deposit). As a 
result capital base may be eroded and could make the return on asset susceptible to 
fluctuation. The reserve ratio may also affect the ability of banks to comply with regulatory 
directive as it has not been consistent. The efficiency and quality of management captured 
by Operating Expenses/Total Assets (OE/TA), Bank Loan/Bank Assets (BL/BA) shows 
that a percentage increase in operating expenses will lead to little increase of 0.0929 and 
0.0906 increases in ROA. 
 
Hypothesis two 
The relevant results containing hypothesis 2 (two) are in table 5-1 above in which return 
on capital (ROC) as reflected by profitability is stated as the dependent variable. This is 
represented in model 2 of the study. The result shows that the null hypothesis of no 
significant relationship between operational efficiency (operating expenses) and return of 
capital cannot be rejected at 10 percent level of significance. This is because the 
probability value of 0.171 is greater than 0.10. Thus, the operating efficiency, though it is 
positively related to return on capital, its impact is not significant in its influence. This 
does not conform to a priori expectation that operating expenses is expected to be 
negatively related to ROC.  
Wrong signs and/or significance or non-significance of the parameters does not necessarily 
imply that violation of   a  priori expectations is tantamount to poor empirical result. Rather 
one is led to ask the ultimate question whether in a posterior and   a  priori expectations 
Nigerian deposit money banks can be expected to utilize bank capital to the ends required 
by the shareholders and the economy. The real issue in Nigeria case has been that of 
mismanagement of funds which is aptly explained by our expense theory. A good 
explanation may be found with management expertise, which presupposes that high capital 
requirement as stipulated by the buffer theory of capital adequacy may not curtail reckless 
spending by managers who may indulge in reckless spending of bank capital. In other 
words a bank without good management may worsen the position it was before the 
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injection of new funds. In the Pre and Post consolidation era in Nigerian banking industry, 
what we have seen is bank management establishing more bogus bank branches 
everywhere rather using bank capital for worthwhile projects that will enhance 
shareholders‘ wealth and the economy. 
 
Hypothesis three 
Going to specifics and testing the stated hypothesis three (three) in model 3 which captures 
the buffer theory of capital adequacy, the result in the table 5-2 above indicate that 
hypothesis 3 with null that there is no significant relationship between shareholders‘ fund 
and bank‘s liquidity is rejected at 1 percent level of significance. This is because the 
probability value is far less than 0.01. Thus, the alternative hypothesis that there is a 
significant relationship between shareholders‘ fund and banks‘ liquidity is substantiated. 
This implies that banks capitalization (shareholders fund) and banks‘ liquidity move in 
opposite direction as reflected by the negative sign. This conforms to a priori expectation 
that bank shareholders‘ fund is affected positively by bank liquidity. This implies that bank 
capitalization requirement is very significant to bank health. In capital structure theory all 
equity firms are characterized by greater liquidity positions than levered firms and would 
embrace equity to finance real investment with positive net present value. However, banks 
use a mix of debt but more of equity in their equity financing to avoid seizure of the assets 
by creditors in the event of bankruptcy. 
However, the nature of the results may not precisely explain the situation in the Nigeria 
context because there are other real issues that needs to be explained. A good explanation 
may be found with management expertise, which presupposes that high capital 
requirement may not make significant impact to bank‘s liquidity and by extension 
profitability, if qualitative management is not in place to ensure effective and rewarding 
utilization of additional capital introduced. In other words a bank without good 
management, accountability and good governance culture may worsen the position it was 
before the injection of new funds. Hence, the use of regulatory tools by CBN to check 
illiquidity in the Nigerian banking industry. The period of 1990‘s and earlier 2000 in the 
Nigerian Banking Industry witnessed high rate of bank distress due to banks having 
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reduction of the  capital base which  affected their liquidity ratio – ability to meet short 
term obligations of customers as they became due.  
 
 Another sub hypothesis 3 (three) can be tested using the result in (table 5-2). From the 
result, the null hypothesis of no significant relationship between shareholders fund (SHF) 
and bank loans (Bank Loan) is rejected, which means that the alternative hypothesis that 
states a significant relationship between shareholders‘ fund (SHF) and bank loan (BL) is 
accepted. The result equally shows a positive relationship between shareholders fund and 
bank loans. In other words, a unit increase in bank loans will create about 0.254 increase in 
the level of shareholders‘ fund. This conforms to theory that loans and advances represent 
the highest incomes item for banks. This also conforms to literature, that is, the higher the 
loans and advances portfolio the higher the shareholders‘ fund. However, this is subject to 
recovery of the loans and advances. The core business of banking which is credit involves 
financial intermediation manifested in the mobilization of deposit from the surpluses units 
and the passing on the funds sourced to the deficits (needed) units accordingly. The deposit 
is mobilized at a cost to the bank and this cost is often called interest. On the other hand, it 
is passed to the users who also pay interest though at a higher rates than the deposit rate. 
This presupposes that a bank must ensure proper management of its asset and liabilities, 
both in composition and utilization. Against the backdrop of the present competitive 
banking environment, the intermediation theory therefore requires that banks need to 
mobilize funds from the customers by engaging in aggressive marketing of financial 
services. This is very crucial for sustainability of banking business in this era of keen 
competition. 
Another sub hypothesis 3 (three) was also tested using the result in (table 5-2) and help to 
reject the null hypothesis of no significant relationship between bank capitalization based 
on the use of shareholders fund  and bank deposit in favour of the alternative hypothesis. In 
addition, the negative sign indicates that they move in opposite direct. The coefficient 
points to the fact that a unit increase of bank‘s deposit will lead to about 0.156 decrease in 
shareholders‘ fund. This is contrary to our   a priori expectation that capitalization based on 
the use of shareholders fund will positively influence bank deposit. According to the 
expense theory, Nyong (2001) opined that managers have the option in pursuing policies, 
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which maximize their own utility rather than profit maximization for shareholders. Where 
managers prefer prestige, wrong loan application, power and status, it would be reflected in 
the amount of slack they receive in form of expense account, luxurious offices and 
building, company cars and other perquisites of office. This was the situation that led to the 
spate of bank distress in Nigerian banking Industry in the late 1980‘s, mid-1990 and early 
2000. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
Model 4a below will test to the extent to which shareholders fund of the (10) ten big banks 
have significantly influenced market share specifically bank deposit of deposit money 
banks in Nigeria (See Appendix IV). The model 4a has the proposition which state in null 
hypothesis that shareholders fund and total assets have not significantly influenced the ten 
big banks to compete effectively by way of control of market share (bank deposit) between 
1986-2006. The times series data for the banks are consolidated. In explicit form, we have 
it as: 
Bank deposit = a0 + a1SHF + a2TA + µ           ……………………………  Equation 8 
Where the a priori expectation is stated as:  a1, a2 > 0 
The equation above relates total deposits with factors that influenced it, which are 
shareholders fund (SHF) and total assets (TA). The variables (See appendix 6) were 
regressed using log transformation due to the fact; logathmic relations bring variables to a 
more comparable manner because it examines their rate of change. It equally helps to 
minimize the problem of heteroskedasticity. The result in Table 5-3 above explained by 
equation 8 shows that the shareholders fund and total assets of the banks had positive and 
significant impact in influencing the level of total deposit of the ten big deposit money 
banks. The coefficients, which denote elasticity of financial performance with respect to 
the individual explanatory variables, imply that a unit increase in shareholders fund and 
total assets will lead to about 0.22 and 0.96 units increase in total deposit respectively. 
Besides, both variables are positive and are significant at 5% for shareholders fund while 
total assets is at 1%.This conform to theory that an increase in shareholders fund (capital 
and reserve) will heighten confidence of bank customers, hence, increase in bank deposit. 
With regards to the model; the result in table 5-3 shows that R2 (Coefficient of 
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determination) is 94% and R2 adjusted shows that about 93% variations in total deposit is 
explained by both shareholders fund and total assets. The F-statistics, which is significant 
at 1% implies that the model had good fit and as such the result from the test can be relied 
in making useful inference. To further validate the reliability of the model, the study 
carried out diagnostic and confirmatory test. To examine the efficiency of the model 
statistically, some standard diagnostic tests were carried out as reported in table 16. From 
table 5-4, the Jargue-Bera test points out that the stochastic term in the model were 
randomly distributed. It could be observed that Jargue-Bera (J-B) test that normality 
assumption cannot be rejected, meaning that asymptotically; the error terms are identically 
independently distributed. This is supported by the Breuch-Godfrey (B-G) serial 
correlation test, which indicates that the results are free from first order auto correlation. In 
addition, the white‘s heteroskedaticity test reveals that the regression results do not suffer 
from this problem i.e the ordinary least square (OLS)  assumption of homoskedasticity is 
not violated. The Ramsey‘s regression specification error test (RESET) test also elucidates 
that our null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternate hypothesis. 
 
 Table 5-5 above explained by equation 10 also shows that shareholders fund and total 
assets of the bank had a positive and significant impact in influencing the level of loans 
and advances for the ten big deposit money banks. The coefficients, which denote 
elasticity of financial performance with respect to the individual explanatory variables, 
implies that a unit increase in shareholders fund and total assets will lead to about 0. 5units 
and 0.72 units increase in total loans and advances. Total assets had significant impact on 
loans and advances. This conforms to theory that increase in the level of deposit will 
impact on the magnitude of loans and advances extended to customers provided capital is 
not eroded. We therefore accept the alternate hypothesis that total assets have influenced 
the market share of the ten big banks between 1986-2006. 
 
Our model 4b below will test to what extent shareholders fund and total assets of the (4) 
four big banks have significantly influenced bank deposit (See Appendix V). The time 
series data for the banks are consolidated. Our model 4b has the proposition which state in 
null hypothesis that shareholders fund and total assets have not significantly influenced the 
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four big banks to compete effectively by way of control of market share (bank deposit) 
between 1986-2006.  In explicit form, we have it as: 
 
Bank deposit = a0 + a1SHF + a2TA + µ           ……………………………  Equation 8 
Where the a priori expectation is stated as:  a1, a2 > 0 
   
Table 5-6 above relates total deposits with factors that influenced it, which are 
shareholders fund (SHF) and total assets (TA). The variables (See appendix V) were 
regressed using log transformation due to the fact, logathmic relations bring variables to a 
more comparable manner because it examines their rate of change. It equally helps to 
minimize the problem of heteoskedasticity. The result in table 5-6 above shows that the 
shareholders fund and total asset of the banks had positive and significant impact in 
influencing the level of total deposit (See equation 8). The coefficients, which denote 
elasticity of financial performance with respect to the individual explanatory variables,  
implies that a unit increase in shareholders fund and total assets will lead to about 0.08 and 
0.20 units increase in total deposit respectively. Though, shareholders‘ fund is not 
significant, total assets is positive and significant at 1%. This conform to theory that a 
decrease in shareholders fund (capital and reserve) will dampen the confidence of bank 
customers, hence, lower the growth of bank deposit.  
 
With regards to the model, the result in table 5-6 shows that R2 (Coefficient of 
determination) is 94% and  R2 adjusted shows that about 93% variations in total deposit is  
explained by both shareholders fund and total assets. The F-statistics, which is significant 
at 1% for total assets, implies that the model had good fit and as such result from the test 
can be relied in making useful inference. To further validate the reliability of the model, 
the study carried out some diagnostic and confirmatory test. This was validated by serial 
correlation LM test; which shows that there was no problem of autocorrelation while the 
white test shows that there is no problem of heteroskedastic. From the table 5-7 below, the 
Jargue-Bera test points out that the stochastic term in the model were randomly distributed. 
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Table 5-8 above explained by equation 10 also shows that shareholders fund and total 
assets of the bank had a positive and significant impact in influencing the level of loans 
and advances of the four big deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
 
In explicit form, we have it as: 
 LA = a0 + a1SHF + a2TA + µ           ……………………………  Equation 10 
 Where the a priori expectation is stated as:  a1, a2 > 0 
 
 The coefficients, which denote elasticity of financial performance with respect to the 
individual explanatory variables, implies that a unit increase in shareholders fund will lead 
to about 0.29 units increase in total loans and advances. Though, total asset is not 
significant, our shareholders fund had considerable impact on loans and advances at 10%. 
This conforms to theory that increase in the level of deposit will impact on the magnitude 
of loans and advances extended to customers provided capital is not eroded. We therefore 
accept the alternate hypothesis that shareholders fund has influenced the market share of 
the four big banks between 1986-2006. 
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                                          CHAPTER   SIX                          
                  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1                INTRODUCTION 
 The problem of the Nigerian banking industry especially the deposit money banks and 
most economies today has been how to resolve the problem of unsound bank, inadequate 
capital, poor management and supervision, reduce non-performing loans and advances, 
increase profitability, reduce risk, ensure quality asset management in order to enhance 
performance and to put the banks in a strong liquid position to meet customers obligation 
at all times. The recent audit of Nigerian deposit money banks (July-August, 2009) shows 
that about seven banks (Union bank, Finbank, Ocean bank, Afribank bank, 
Intercontinental, Bank PHB and Spring bank) have impaired capital and liquidity problem. 
The global financial crisis and the on-going credit crunch being experienced in the 
Nigerian banking industry have affected the Nigerian deposit money banks. This study has 
addressed some of these issues and we shall now summarize the findings and 
recommendations in this chapter.  
The extent of growth of bank deposits, bank loans and liquidity and their influence on bank 
capitalization, influence of bank capital, asset and liquidity ratios on return on capital, 
impact of management control of operating expenses on return capital (profitability), 
extent of macroeconomic variable effect (such as interest, inflation and exchange rates) on 
bank capital and the relationship between bank capitalization and market concentration 
(market share) have been tested in the models specified in Chapter four. The findings are 
stated under 6.2. 
 
6.2       SUMMARY OF FINDING 
 This study has attempted to find the relationship between bank capitalization, management 
and performance in the Nigerian banking industry specifically deposit money banks. 
Capitalization in this study refers to a number of variables of interest which are produced 
from the existence of funds for use in the process of intermediation. From these funds, 
obvious concepts such as rate of Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Capital (ROC) and 
Shareholders Fund (SHF) are derivatives from the use of funds. In this research, SHF, 
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ROA and ROC represent our dependent variables whereas our controlled independent 
variables are: Liquidity ratios, efficiency ratios and capital adequacy ratios, 
macroeconomic variables such interest rate, exchange rate and inflation. Availability of 
funds facilitates return on capital and return on assets.  Further, the crux of this study is to 
see how bank capitalization/consolidation in Nigeria makes fund available for realization 
of adequacy of capitalization, management and performance. The panel data methodology 
provides a useful answer to all these. The following are the findings: 
 
(i) The analyses on table 5 show that shareholders fund/bank deposits and shareholders 
fund/total assets indices of bank management and performance has negative relationship 
with ROA. The overall capital adequacy ratios of the study shows that Shareholders 
Fund/Total Assets (SHF/TA), which measures capital adequacy of banks (risk of default) 
have negative impact on ROA. This is one of the tests for capital adequacy and it shows 
that both move in opposite direction and also the negative signs indicate that capital 
adequacy has been impaired.  
 
(ii) Also from table 5 the overall liquidity position for the banks as computed and 
regressed by the panel data shows that bank liquidity is statistically significant at 10%.This 
is explained by the fact that liquidity does not mean adequacy of capital. A bank can be 
liquid that is meeting obligations as they fall due but may be technically experiencing 
inadequate capital because of losses in its balance sheet. The ten (10) banks taken over 
recently by Central Bank of Nigeria in 2009 is a case in point (See Chapter one for the 
banks).  
 
(iii) The efficiency of management measured by operating expenses indice positively 
related to return on assets (tables 5 and 5-1). Management control of Operational expenses 
is affected by absence of electricity, access roads and other overheads has affected banking 
performance e.g overall profitability. However, the impact is not too significant. The 
positive and insignificant coefficient in our operating expenses, instead, suggests that 
banks are able to pass on most of the high overhead costs to customers through higher 
spreads in order to keep profits unaffected. This may also explain the large gap between 
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lending and saving rates in banks (See Chapter 3, p. 120-121). To the extent that banks‘ 
ability to overcharge is a function of their market power, this outcome presents evidence of 
market power incidence in the banking sector. Because of the rising cost of doing business 
the tendency is that interest rate on lending might continue to rise except it is controlled by 
government.  
 
(iv)  We also find that there is significant relationship between shareholders‘ fund and 
banks‘ liquidity, bank deposits, and bank loans. This also conforms to a  priori expectation 
that bank capitalization will be affected positively by bank liquidity, bank deposits and 
bank loans.  
 
(v) Inflation rate, interest rate and exchange rate have negative association with return on 
capital (Table 5-1). This implies that return on capital and inflation rate, interest rate and 
exchange rate move in opposite direction. Macroeconomic policies are important. Inflation 
reduces credit expansion by contributing to higher interest margins.  
 
(vi). As shown in Appendices 111-V11, we find evidence in support of a significant 
impact of bank capital on market power (market share) as a proxy of market concentration. 
There is also a strong relationship between bank capital funds and bank deposits, loans and 
advances (proxies for market concentration). Prior to the recent bank capitalization, many 
Nigerian banks were passive players in the financial markets (See Appendices 111-VIII).  
 
(vii) The result in Tables 5-3, 5-5, 5-6 and 5-8 shows that shareholders‘ fund and total 
assets of the banks have positive and significant impact in influencing the level of total 
deposits. In the same vein, shareholder fund and total assets of the bank had a positive and 
significant impact in influencing the level of loans and advances. The diagnostic tests also 
lend credence to the results (See tables 5-4 and 5-7, Chapter 5). 
 
(viii) Our results from Appendix V, shows banking industry (deposit money banks) as a 
highly concentrated industry from 1987 to 2006. Save for 1998, 2004, 2005 and 2006 
where Zenith bank broke into the big four, First Bank (FBN), United Bank for Africa 
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(UBA), Union Bank of Nigeria (UBN) and  Afribank bank had the largest total assets, total 
capital and reserve (shareholders fund), total deposits and loans and advances from 1987-
2006. Even when the total number of banks increased from 29 in 1986 to 65 in 1991, 
decreased to 64 in 1996, increased to 90 in 2001 and 25 in 2006, the four giants banking 
firms more less maintained their market power of 33.52 percent of total assets, 30.28 
percent for total capital and reserve, 49.03 percent for total deposits and 22.29 for loans 
and advances. 
 
(ix) The result of the study when compared to the phases of banking, for instance, the 
periods 1891-1928, 1929-1951, 1952-1958, 1959-1968, 1969-1976, 1977-1985,1986-
1998,1999-2003,and 2004-2008 witnessed mismanagement in the banking industry and 
this led to the collapse of most banks with the rapidity in which they came on board (See 
Chapter two).This is a major theoretical findings of our study. The former state 
governments‘ banks are case in point. The period 1929-1951, witnessed the failure of the 
indigenous banks due to poor asset quality, under capitalization, illiquidity, overtrading 
and complete absence of regulation and supervision. The period 1977-1985, witnessed 25 
distressed banks as result of undercapitalization.  
 
6.3   CONCLUSION 
When bank loans are profitably employed it will definitely lead to increase in profit and 
consequently shareholders fund. When banks are able to influence the other sectors in the 
economy through extension of loans, it would lead to multiplier effect in the long run, 
reduce inflation and appreciate the naira. Bank management owes it a duty to keep watch 
and constantly monitor the quality of assets, especially the risk assets must be improved 
upon. If the existing ratio falls below the benchmark of 20%, excessive and unnecessary 
growth of the loan portfolio volume must be minimized. Bank capital cannot on its own 
influence bank deposit as depicted by our result. There is no doubt that the days of 
armchair banking are over and intense competition in the Nigerian banking industry has 
come to stay. Besides these lapses of unfavorable enabling environment (excessive 
operational expenses, shareholders fund/total assets that is risk of default), mismanagement 
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of assets, there is the issue of bad governance on the part of bank management which has 
failed in all respect to provide positive leadership.  
In this study, we have specified an empirical framework to investigate bank 
capitalization/consolidation, management and performance. Based on the results of the 
theoretical and empirical analysis, bank loan, bank deposit, bank asset, bank liquidity, 
operating expenses, loan interest-deposit interest rates gap, inflation rate, interest rate, 
exchange rate, market share, unfavourable environment affects the performance of bank 
management. Capital adequacy ratios, efficiency/Quality of management and Liquidity 
ratios are also very crucial factors affecting bank capitalization and performance. 
Therefore, in order to improve performance, management of banks should focus on 
maintaining sizeable amounts of reserves which can be ploughed back into the business, 
improving the quality of their credit portfolios, diversifying product and services, beefing 
up the capital in line with regulatory authorities and best practices. This cannot be possible 
without employing skillful, experience and efficient team of management that are visionary 
and focus. To forestall future credit crunch and bank distress in the Nigerian banking 
industry, the CBN should tailor its policies and regulations toward ensuring that banks do 
not falter in their performance. 
 
6.4   RECOMMENDATIONS. 
On the basis of the theoretical and empirical findings of this study, and considering the fact 
that the days of armchair banking has been overtaken with the intense competition in the 
Nigerian banking industry, we recommend the following: 
 
(i)      A bank without good management (input) may worsen the position it was before 
the injection of new funds. Where managers prefer prestige, power and status, it 
would be reflected in the amount they receive in form of expense account and 
luxury. Management capability should be better supported, for the best of assets 
can be overturned in short period by poor management. It is a known fact that 
CBN plays an important role in the selection of bank executives at the 
directorate level. The policy for the selection of this class of bank workers 
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should emphasize strict consideration of good track records and sequential 
growth phase through the ranks as some of the imperatives. 
 
(ii)        Shareholders‘ fund and total assets of the bank should be periodically 
evaluated. The regulatory authorities will need to put in place appropriate 
machinery or tool that will address issues of bank liquidity and shore assets 
quality in the industry. Bank management in conjunction with the regulatory 
authorities should at all times address causes of illiquidity rather than the 
systems.  In this way, lost confidence can once again be restored in the Nigerian 
banking industry. It is important to carry routine checks, periodic examinations 
on bank returns. 
 
(iii)     We strongly suggest that apart from capital, technology, customer care, 
aggressive marketing and efficient service delivery are tools that can be used to 
attract more customers to shore up bank deposit. This will also help to reduce 
market concentration and also break the monopoly power of the big banks. 
 
(iv)     Where there exists a viable financial infrastructure, bank management should 
lobby governments for the provision of an enabling environment (such as 
security, access roads, uninterrupted power supply etc.) for banks to strive. This 
will help to minimize the operation expenses (OE) of the banks. 
 
(v)       Bank returns are affected by macroeconomic variables, suggesting that 
macroeconomic policies that promote low inflation rate, stable exchange rate, 
low interest rate and output growth will boost credit expansion. Government 
should provide an enabling environment and also control interest rate on credit 
in the short term to enable customers such as corporate bodies, manufacturers, 
and industrialists obtain loan and also to save in order to stimulate economic 
growth. In summary, policies aimed at controlling inflation should be given 
priority in fostering financial intermediation.  Fiscal and monetary policies 
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designed to promote output stability and sustainable growth is good for 
financial intermediation. 
 
(vi)      The study identified a positive relationship between shareholders fund and bank 
loan. The higher the loans and advances, the higher the bank income; provided 
the credit facilities are recovered. In order to sustain this relationship, bank 
management should strengthen their supervisory units in credit administration, 
that is, from loan application to drawdown of such facilities so as to avoid bad 
loans in its financial statement. 
 
(vii) The study found that there is a significant relationship between shareholders 
fund and liquidity; and a positive relationship between shareholders fund and 
bank loans. Therefore, the gap between deposit and lending structure which has 
been very wide need to be closed. Regulatory authorities need to take another 
look at the disparities between deposit and lending structure. 
 
(viii)  The overall capital adequacy ratios  shows that Shareholders Fund/Total Assets 
(SHF/TA) which measures capital adequacy of banks (risk of default) have 
negative impact on Return on Asset (ROA). This implies that the regulatory 
authorities should put in place measures to raise the level of this ratio to avoid 
future bank collapse. 
 
(ix)     With respect to bank capital and market power (market share), for Nigerian 
banks to be major players in domestic and international financial market, its 
capital must be kept above the minimum regulatory requirement at all times. 
 
(x)      When new assets are to be created, the credit appraisal process must be thorough 
and devoid of sentiments so as to prevent delinquency and deterioration in the 
course of time. The bank should review regularly its loans and advances 
portfolio once a quarter in order to detect early danger signal and take 
immediate and appropriate remedial/preventive action. Top managers must be 
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competent, experienced and be all-round managers who will not only manage 
their desks but be capable of managing overall organizational resources. 
 
(xi)     The study established a negative relationship between shareholders fund and 
deposit, shareholders‘ fund and total assets (capital adequacy ratios). In this 
light, the regulatory authorities, that is Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) should 
continually review the capital requirements of banks to keep with rising 
inflation and global best practices (global trend) as prescribed by Basel Accord. 
In the past, the CBN has not pragmatically addressed this issue. This has not 
been regular, systematic but arbitrarily done. This precipitated the drastic 
increase in the capital base of banks in December, 2005 and we hope this trend 
of periodic review of bank capital will be sustained for the survival of the 
Nigerian banking industry.  
 
(xii) Central Bank of Nigeria should ensure that bank management/managers apply 
customers‘ deposit for worthwhile projects instead of using such for prestige, 
wrong loan application, power and status, luxurious offices and building, 
company cars and other perquisites of office.  
 
6.5     CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
It is true that the lip services paid to assets and liabilities management in the banking 
industry may have accounted for the banking distress of the 1980‘s, mid-1990 and earlier 
2000. It is important for bank management to work hard in order to avoid the pitfalls of the 
past and restore confidence in the industry. The framework and emerging studies of bank 
capitalization has become very crucial amongst nations since it is the hub around which 
other economic activities revolve.  
The study has made contribution to knowledge in the following aspects:  the study will 
contribute towards assets and liabilities management in the Nigerian banking industry in 
the following aspects. For instance, capital adequacy ratios of the study showed that 
shareholders fund/bank deposits and shareholders fund/total assets indices which measures 
capital adequacy (risk of default) have negative relationship with Return on Asset. 
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Secondly, the study showed that management control of expenses has affected banking 
performance even though the impact is not too significant. Thirdly, the study showed that 
bank capital and total assets of banks have positive and significant impact in influencing 
the level of total deposits.  
This study will no doubt help in the resolution of the spate of distress in the Nigerian 
banking industry, inconsistent regulatory policies and supervision in the recent years has 
put doubt in the minds of stakeholders. This study will contribute to literature on bank 
capitalization that will enhance performance of bank management. A bank without good 
management (input) may worsen the position it was before the injection of new funds. 
Good performance by bank management will help raise the confidence level of 
stakeholders (personal customers, corporate customers and governments). The study will 
assists government regulators in the management of the Nigerian financial system 
especially the Nigerian deposit money banks and also to keep aligning with global best 
practices.  
      
6.6     LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
   This study is limited to deposit money banks in Nigeria whereas in the financial 
intermediation process, we have a gamut of non-bank financial institutions such as 
insurance companies, finance houses, investment companies, mutual trust fund/unit trust, 
development and specialized  banks etc  that are involved in funds mobilization. Secondly, 
in the course of the field work we observed that many banks do not have data bank for 
their annual financial statements and made it cumbersome to obtain data for this study. We 
also observed some inconsistency in annual financial statements of banks and that of the 
regulatory authority (Central Bank of Nigeria).      
        
   6.7     RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Several studies about bank capitalization exist in United Kingdom (UK), United States 
(US) and Asia, Africa, South Africa and Tunisia. The extent to which such studies have 
addressed the issues of bank capitalization, management and performance in Nigerian 
deposit money banks is yet to be answered. This is one of such studies put together to 
address some specific issues in the Nigerian deposit money banks as indicated earlier in 
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chapter one. However, the study of bank capitalization, management and performance for 
the entire Nigerian banking industry should be investigated to strengthen and confirm the 
results of our study. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: ECONOMETRICS VARIABLES FOR THE STUDY 
                     
    ZENITH BANK N‘  M    
YEAR BA BL BD LA SHF P OE infl Exch Int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987        10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988        56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989        50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990        7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991 419 46 307 297 34 68 -20 12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 773 54 429 459 67 162 -41 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 1,481 292 647 966 128 356 -100 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 3,064 656 2,014 2,049 251 655 -198 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 5,096 652 2,205 3,775 412 816 -360 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 9,780 1,895 3,012 7,164 669 1,351 -596 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 16,016 4,317 7,138 10,710 1544 2,330 -926 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 21,735 6,267 11,867 14,189 2,350 3,777 -1,803 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 34,023 9,886 19,375 22,490 5,113 1,529 -2,135 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 40,756 11,939 25,035 26,334 5,130 1,863 -3,312 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 60,190 13,029 30,688 44,038 6,725 2,802 -4,047 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 92,563 20,665 50,134 67,428 9,306 3,990 -5,454 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 112,535 27,895 61,574 77,140 12,665 5,440 -10,049 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 193,321 54,420 131,095 121,891 15,674 6,405 -13,797 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 329,717 125,531 233,413 180,407 37,790 9,165 -18,164 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 608,505 204,057 392,864 360,291 93,799 15,154 -31,298 15.00 127 19.00 
           
           
           
           
   OCEANIC BANK   N‘m      
YEAR BA BL BD LA SHF P OE infl Exch Int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987        10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988        56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989        50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990        7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991        12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992        44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993        57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994        57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995        72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 14991 422 1168 462 -526 -205 -450 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
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1997 3245 1102 2787 1586 -593 263 -234 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 5594 1555 4006 2924 70 675 -407 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 8932 2148 5900 5143 564 289 -844 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 21525 3788 15143 16007 1501 1375 -1,312 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 32320 7574 23388 20929 3564 2474 -4,172 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 53294 11272 40028 34298 5565 3121 -4,595 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 64978 13600 49366 43893 7073 3287 -7,767 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 86884 24827 68954 51404 10360 3445 -9,178 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 329717 125531 233413 62488 37790 9165 -17,044 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 608505 204057 392864 46489 37670 15154 -13,111 15.00 127 19.00 
           
           
           
           
    UBA N‘m      
YEAR BA BL BD LA SHF P OE Inf Exch Int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987 5,656 1,798 4,766 2,828 286 106 -463 10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988 7,061 2,008 5,875 3,820 328 84 -557 56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989 9,205 3,004 8,159 4,428 417 101 -719 50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990 11,350 2,505 9,694 6,144 472 116 -1,030 7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991 12,864 2,435 11,894 6,293 484 17 -1,443 12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 18,610 3,650 17,356 10,362 504 15 -2,065 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 22,975 5,428 18,627 10,129 739 368 -2,563 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 24,281 4,317 18,353 12,064 1,577 213 -3,430 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 44,200 6,220 33,161 28,539 3,611 490 -4,169 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 52,016 4,240 37,019 33,720 4,287 1,246 -6,082 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 57,782 4,894 39,521 36,121 5,290 903 -6,807 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 73,751 10,872 48,858 42,523 5,036 225 -7,939 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 99,978 10,850 73,207 60,568 5,011 1,766 -8,991 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 119,978 9,595 82,518 88,418 6,782 3,804 -15,022 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 183,248 31,041 133,135 135,535 8,427 1,585 -17,705 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 198,680 41,150 131,866 133,582 9,782 2,238 -20,049 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 200,995 50,178 142,427 123,105 13,767 4,816 -19,066 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 208,806 58,885 151,929 130,317 18,059 5,608 -18,500 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 248,928 70,086 205,110 168,160 17,702 6,239 -19,569 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 851,248 116,960 757,404 666097 47,621 12,514 -21,410 15.00 127 19.00 
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Intercontinental Bank 
 
 
N‘m 
YEAR BA BL BD LA SHF P OE Inf Exch Int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987        10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988        56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989        50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990        7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991 71 81 -526 785 71 45 -183 12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 1,599 347 -581 1034 157 137 -361 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 4,247 879 -2287 1,695 413 593 -1,222 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 4,993 932 -2794 2,912 593 740 -770 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 5,613 2,455 -3295 2,386 850 520 -808 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 4,376 3,634 -4626 3,654 1,248 559 -1,179 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 10751 5482 6646 3,569 1,662 869 -1,446 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 12,575 6386 8486 4,494 1,905 1,068 -2,401 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 16,150 5,363 11700 7,819 2,176 1,271 2,996 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 23,503 7,913 15271 11,164 2,775 1,927 -3,577 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 35,779 12,080 23509 19,933 3,456 1,523 -4,098 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 47,797 14,556 35584 25,370 7,484 2,380 -4,862 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 71,412 23,187 50245 41,551 8,611 3,414 -6,557 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 87,006 30,514 63508 43,224 9,988 2,712 -8,358 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 164,348 55,306 110014 98,062 32,576 6,706 -14,244 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 360,903 170,035 252281 150,249 53,911 11,030 -22,484 15.00 127 19.00 
           
           
           
           
    IBTC 
CHARTERED 
BANK N‘m    
YEAR BA BL BD LA SHF P OE Infla Exch Int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987        10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988        56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989 214 33 90 160 15 11 -6 50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990 441 69 297 320 34 25 -11 7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991 487 94 287 339 61 43 -28 12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 915 87 167 744 121 121 -75 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 2634 179 1007 2326 379 557 -121 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 3591 990 1283 2456 704 1039 -197 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 4861 710 314 3581 1255 1071 -255 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 5713 2007 1821 3095 1512 1320 -370 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 5260 2406 1275 2244 1988 864 -438 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
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1998 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 9970 3801 3345 5350 2208 912 -687 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 9404 3449 2774 4721 5348 823 -449 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 13894 6932 6475 3958 3779 1208 -463 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 20578 10210 8910 8921 3936 1503 -608 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 23947 9604 8182 9601 5881 1688 -713 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 26872 9618 10886 15009 5794 1711 -648 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 34568 13670 10886 19721 14275 3013 -1,238 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 110782 58132 57073 11365 59687 5418 -2746 15.00 127 19.00 
           
           
           
           
    FIDELI
TY 
BANK N’m     
YEAR BA BL BD LA SHF P OE Infl Exch Int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987        10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988         56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989 328 23 213 294 9 17 -81 50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990 351 25 231 181 24 19 -70 7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991 621 68 476 443 40 23 -95 12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 699 57 453 518 76 46 -116 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 872 100 579 619 95 47 -196 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 1053 280 644 242 164 63 -271 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 1673 311 746 1013 201 84 -197 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 2772 681 1011 1611 275 127 -267 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 4152 1397 2075 1913 674 195 -409 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 4788 1900 2578 1893 779 208 -680 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 6213 2154 3833 2671 832 213 -1,036 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 10012 3428 7040 3164 922 267 -1,277 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 12715 2882 9323 5918 1300 442 -2,155 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 15637 5927 12281 5171 1915 634 -2,609 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 22517 7881 16888 10284 2515 1085 -3,301 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 27552 11014 19340 15780 3520 1079 -4,394 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 34953 15676 20572 20000 9125 1564 -4833 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 119986 46398 78648 23141 25597 3587 -5316 15.00 127 19.00 
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    DIAMOND BANK N‘m    
YEAR BA BL BD LA SHF P OE infl Exch Int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987        10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988        56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989        50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990        7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991        12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 227 36 80 127 50 82 -23 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 13,051 141 671 1,001 96 51 -129 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 2,886 328 2,157 2,212 208 161 -333 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 7,040 1,022 4,576 5,234 401 303 -448 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 10,162 1,734 6,491 7,545 825 530 -739 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 13,273 3,636 9,544 8,353 1,134 485 -1,253 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 17,357 5,212 11,676 10,451 1,680 569 -1,918 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 26,035 6,106 19,048 18,353 2,238 919 -1,960 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 30,473 8,689 22,464 18,516 2,815 987 -2,551 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 47,372 15,798 32,398 27,394 4,086 2,225 -3482 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 53,199 16,255 33,556 28,877 5,320 2,142 -4806 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 59,287 15,932 42,147 35,778 4,993 3,090 -6225 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 69,062 19,500 43,391 38,853 6,520 7,004 -6207 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 125,675 41,805 75,166 61,385 20,710 3,522 -8371 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 223,048 81,306 144,570 50,119 34,970 5,292 -7289 15.00 127 19.00 
           
           
           
           
    AFRIBANK million    
YEAR BA BL BD LA SHF P OE infl Exch int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987        10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988 2,714 1,052 1,734 931 210 91 -304 56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989 2,360 1065 1,654 798 276 123 -359 50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990 3,387 1,073 2,478 1,556 288 66 -590 7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991 4,490 1,400 3,257 2,136 312 57 -642 12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 6,386 1,968 4,756 2,898 391 149 -1,106 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 12,770 2,024 10,977 3,593 893 426 -2,187 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 16,413 2,658 18,087 4,664 1,041 379 -2,659 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 26,041 6,143 21,215 9,219 2,269 838 -3,718 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 26,763 9,450 18,446 5,722 1,529 159 -5,080 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 34,366 12,700 26,342 10,807 1,626 321 -5,012 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 N/A N/A N/A N/A N.A N/A N/A 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 41,400 14,400 33,877 18,903 1,726 403 -8,410 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 63,250 12,867 54,881 27,915 2,040 -780 -10,506 6.90 102.105 21.55 
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2001 71,839 21,122 58,287 32,259 2,823 1,090 -9,367 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 73,088 31,138 56,955 31,148 4,332 2,231 -14,651 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 83,144 33,845 61,195 44,381 6,546 2,471 -14,795 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 70,578 26,482 57,989 30,790 5,317 1,566 -12,867 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 95,754 30,543 61,601 40,649 21,387 231 -13,941 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 131270 48,224 94,816 42,501 27,059 3,695 -14,523 15.00 127 19.00 
           
           
    GUARANTY TRUST million    
YEAR BA BL BD LA SHF P OE infl Exch int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987        10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988        56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989        50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990        7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991        12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 1125 105 849 920 66 52 -101 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 2323 436 1650 1645 152 215 -327 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 4868 1109 3161 3456 291 601 -678 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 10942 2256 7689 8178 542 553 -588 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 11790 3290 7532 7911 1018 1010 -1,107 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 16170 5754 9753 4543 1539 1041 -1,623 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 19132 7006 10808 6512 1984 873 -1,804 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 20625 7957 10369 4745 2563 933 -2,405 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 35597 8087 15446 8402 3117 1361 -4,599 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 40819 12667 24139 16683 4124 2050 -1,561 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 59292 18217 31373 23223 7950 2657 -7,993 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 83311 31556 51068 31256 9661 3802 -12,454 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 119698 45198 74222 31999 11618 4633 -13,941 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 167898 67179 95564 47471 30895 7004 -18,678 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 305081 86958 212834 74501 36446 10025 -23,126 15.00 127 19.00 
           
           
           
           
    FIRST INLAND BANK N‘m    
YEAR BA BL BD LA SHF P OE infl Exch int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987        10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988        56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989 132 20 46 106 14 2 -9 50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990 371 48 314 271 28 7 -30 7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991 234 51 165 140 34 7 -53 12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 509 128 369 315 74 17 -77 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
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1993 1,013 267 734 374 98 28 -219 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 1,053 325 704 310 129 1 -192 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 1,125 533 751 298 133 7 -232 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 2,252 802 1,477 380 362 51 -338 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 4,700 1,403 3,624 1,754 638 161 -476 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 7,911 2,880 5,691 3,136 775 265 -1,367 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 9,869 3,414 6,349 3,396 2,017 128 -1,621 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 13,834 5,228 8,956 6,234 2,258 283 -1,860 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 16,646 6,950 10,099 6,334 2,299 598 -2,838 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 24,580 9,991 15,101 8,955 2,444 478 -3,608 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 26,403 11,138 16,158 7,918 3,631 527 -3,604 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 31,684 13,365 19,390 9,502 4,358 632 -4,325 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 63,367 26,038 23,268 11,403 29100 949 -5,190 15.00 127 19.00 
           
           
           
           
    ACCESS BANK N‘m     
 YEAR BA BL BD LA SHF P OE infl Exch int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987        10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988        56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989        50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990 197 4 153 171 15 2 -11 7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991 219 25 82 115 18 5 -16 12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 543 69 271 336 26 6 -43 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 961 123 365 103 57 21 -120 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 1,371 245 624 920 76 30 -241 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 2,351 241 852 1,734 97 41 -259 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 1,176 328 667 501 151 28 -257 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 1,777 719 1,195 813 184 41 -246 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 1,714 685 952 703 213 18 -344 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 4,878 1,259 2,733 3,049 801 167 -433 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 8,434 3,127 4,401 3,750 842 167 -1,029 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 8,001 2,794 4,832 3,666 917 116 -1,326 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 11,343 4,980 6,475 5,464 1,944 -18 -2,586 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 22,582 7,135 9,309 9,543 2,365 811 -3,357 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 31,342 12,341 22,724 6,305 2702 952 -4,563 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 66,918 17,942 32,608 19,802 14,072 751 -6,744 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 174,554 60,941 110,879 84,255 28,844 1,119 -12,241 15.00 127 19.00 
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UNION BANK 
  
  
 
 
 N‘m 
    
Year BA BL BD LA SHF P OE infl Exch int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987 5747 1872 4073 1191 348 83 -527 10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988 6335 2228 4876 2061 412 112 -661 56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989 7986 2380 5782 4172 533 152 -907 50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990 9241 2650 6379 4525 652 127 -1294 7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991 13166 1736 9739 7588 668 14 -1809 12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 23869 3773 15712 17150 989 109 -2590 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 32008 4218 20114 22832 1448 614 -3323 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 43274 7105 24914 5331 1318 606 -5189 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 76432 11255 51607 7154 1734 839 -7054 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 80055 16704 56914 10363 2449 1257 -9953 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 85850 23364 63654 5963 3289 1615 -9364 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 109586 26148 83093 5742 6053 2318 -12655 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 138342 28662 102775 9500 11159 4046 -17116 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 188326 34147 146190 107667 13137 7943 -32781 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 238311 39631 189605 119480 15191 7058 -28336 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 275194 45486 204347 166452 30302 7490 -24356 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 329583 54560 224347 176285 32730 10154 -24558    15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 367798 78338 241585 203372 35985 10210 -28975 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 398271 78684 200511 274903 39129 11935 -32838 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 517564 134864 275457 263392 95685 12350 -36424 15.00 127 19.00 
           
           
   FIRST BANK  Million     
Year BA BL BD LA SHF P OE infl Exch int 
1986 5995 1869 4412 2645 311 145 -426 5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987 6776 2047 5010 3248 373 106 -586 10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988 7071 2253 5646 3286 434 124 -736 56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989 8492 2402 5785 3954 534 163 -988 50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990 8281 1651 6585 4550 300 -205 -1433 7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991 11319 1635 8287 7114 457 -31 -1575 12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 16686 2379 11965 11316 955 366 -2323 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 23552 3073 16439 16949 1494 1196 -3374 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 36552 6164 25022 25002 2219 1179 -4735 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 63872 12666 43464 40897 6264 1238 -7742 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 77269 17108 58214 50042 7018 1385 -9610 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 141052 22764 64455 52609 8740 2110 -11147 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
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1998 102418 28430 70697 55176 10462 2835 -12683 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 137869 34235 89868 76242 12509 4288 -15674 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 194744 38360 138003 135472 16016 5767 -23990 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 224000 50170 155598 151648 18932 6715 -25576 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 290593 66384 178603 203513 20202 5087 -40096 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 409083 60439 264245 312978 27800 13393 -36177 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 384211 83500 255491 247537 42311 14106 -36465 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 407839 123739 332196 267761 49805 15145 -40647 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 538145 190004 391169 272300 58996 19831 -44600 15.00 127 19.00 
           
   
 
 
        
 WEMA  BANK        N‘m     
Year BA BL BD LA SHF P OE infl Exch int 
1986        5.40 2.0206 12.00 
1987 365 140 335 191 29 3 -30 10.20 4.0179 19.20 
1988 638 167 588 428 49 2.5 -48 56.00 4.5367 17.60 
1989 890 198 822 604 67 21 -95 50.50 7.3916 24.60 
1990 1006 254 927 654 78 28 -105 7.50 8.0378 27.70 
1991 1402 315 1296 844 105 38 -181 12.70 9.9095 20.80 
1992 1704 631 1561 930 142 44 -224 44.80 17.2934 31.20 
1993 3145 1016 2842 1038 303 142 -385 57.20 22.0511 18.32 
1994 6006 1022 4399 4451 474 375 -629 57.00 21.8891 21.00 
1995 10019 1490 6242 7530 627 303 -837 72.90 21.8891 20.79 
1996 10734 2928 7785 6064 821 251 -1266 29.30 21.8891 20.86 
1997 13441 4734 9321 6388 1264 264 -1480 8.50 21.8891 23.32 
1998 17268 7470 12679 7630 1438 351 -1737 10.00 21.8891 21.34 
1999 17924 8620 13497 6958 1727 489 -2469 6.60 92.6934 27.19 
2000 22751 7250 17585 8900 2314 303 -3759 6.90 102.105 21.55 
2001 38813 14799 29631 22070 2596 800 -3857 18.90 111.943 21.34 
2002 44101 17093 32775 22475 3768 2294 -5626 12.90 120.97 29.70 
2003 61323 23508 43762 31451 7215 2286 -7430 15.00 129.357 22.47 
2004 71423 36071 55071 27065 8040 1420 -11436 19.00 133.5 20.62 
2005 329717 125531 233413 54493 37790 9165 -9433 18.00 130 20.10 
2006 608505 204057 392864 36771 34800    15154 -10434 15.00 127 19.00 
 
 
Source : 
Annual 
Financial 
Reports of 
Banks/Nigeria 
Fact Book 
(Various 
Issues) 
Annual Financial Report of 
Banks 
and Nigeria Fact Book 
(Various Issues) Issues) 
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 Where:                 BA= Bank Assets     
  BL= Bank Loans     
  BD= Bank Deposits     
  LA= Liquid Assets     
  SHF= Shareholders Funds     
  P= Profit (ROC)     
  O/E= Operating Expenses     
  Inf= Inflation     
  Exr= Exchange Rate     
  Int= Interest     
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APPENDIX II :  ECONOMETRIC VARIABLE OF COMPUTED RATIOS 
 
         
   ACCESS BANK      
    Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986           
1987           
1988           
1989           
1990 0.0204 0.026 0.0766 1.116 0.055 3.758 0.0984 0.01   
1991 0.1127 0.2999 0.0842 1.3969 0.0776 0.7467 0.223 0.0275   
1992 0.1264 0.2536 0.0473 1.2406 0.0791 0.3737 0.0851 0.0114   
1993 0.1282 0.3371 0.0598 0.2808 0.1248 0.4662 0.1589 0.0219   
1994 0.1783 0.3915 0.0553 1.4726 0.1757 0.3102 0.1217 0.0219   
1995 0.1024 0.2825 0.041 2.0359 0.1097 0.4011 0.1127 0.0174   
1996 0.2785 0.4911 0.1287 0.7509 0.2185 0.4623 0.2279 0.0239   
1997 0.4047 0.6019 0.1036 0.6802 0.1384 0.2561 0.1539 0.0105   
1998 0.3994 0.7191 1 0.7383 0.2007 2.4949 1.7855 0.0104   
1999 0.2582 0.4609 1 1.116 0.0889 3.8737 1.9136 0.0221   
2000 0.3707 0.7105 0.0997 0.8523 0.1233 0.2689 0.1897 0.0147   
2001 0.3493 0.5783 0.1146 0.7587 0.1657 0.3282 0.3002 0.0144   
2002 0.439 0.7691 0.1714 0.8438 0.2279 0.3904 0.2541 -1E-04   
2003 0.3159 0.7664 0.1047 1.0251 0.1486 0.3314 0.0871 0.0359   
2004 0.3491 0.5496 0.1655 0.0568 0.1456 0.2357 0.5501 0.0304   
2005 0.2681 0.5502 0.2102 0.6073 0.1008 0.7843 0.4315 0.4315   
2006 0.3491 0.5496 0.1655 0.7599 0.0701 0.4741 0.2605 0.2605   
           
           
     Year   AFRIBANK      
1986           
1987           
1988 0.3875 0.6065 0.0775 0.5369 0.1124 0.1998 0.1212 0.0335   
1989 0.4514 0.643 0.1172 0.4817 0.1522 0.2591 0.1672 0.0478   
1990 0.3169 0.4332 0.0851 0.6279 0.1742 0.2684 0.1162 0.0195   
1991 0.3116 0.4299 0.0694 0.6558 0.1429 0.2228 0.0957 0.0126   
1992 0.3081 0.4136 0.0612 0.6094 0.1732 0.1986 0.0822 0.0233   
1993 0.1584 0.1843 0.0699 0.3273 0.1713 0.4397 0.0813 0.0334   
1994 0.1619 0.1469 0.0634 0.2579 0.162 0.3916 0.0575 0.0231   
1995 0.2358 0.2895 0.0871 0.4346 0.1428 0.3693 0.1069 0.0322   
1996 0.3531 0.5123 0.0571 0.3102 0.1898 0.1617 0.0826 0.0006   
1997 0.3695 0.4821 0.0473 0.4103 0.1458 0.128 0.0617 0.0009   
1998 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   
1999 0.3478 0.4251 0.0416 0.5587 0.2031 0.1198 0.0509 0.0009   
2000 0.2034 0.2345 0.0323 0.5086 0.1662 0.1585 0.0372 -0.012   
2001 0.294 0.3624 0.0392 0.5534 0.1303 0.1336 0.0484 0.0152   
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 2002 0.426 0.5467 0.0593 0.5468 0.2005 0.1388 0.076 0.0305   
2003 0.407 0.5531 0.0787 0.7252 0.1779 0.1934 0.1069 0.0297   
2004 0.3752 0.4628 0.0753 0.5309 0.1823 0.2007 0.0916 0.0222   
2005 0.3189 0.4958 0.2234 0.6598 0.1455 0.7002 0.3471 0.0002   
2006 0.3674 0.5086 0.2061 0.4482 0.1106 0.5611 0.2854 0.0281   
           
           
   DIAMOND BANK      
     Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986           
1987           
1988           
1989           
1990           
1991           
1992 0.1594 0.452 0.221 1.5792 0.0969 1.4166 0.625 0.0359   
1993 0.1076 0.2092 0.0734 1.4894 0.0988 0.6857 0.1428 0.0387   
1994 0.1139 0.1524 0.0719 1.0254 0.115 0.631 0.0963 0.0556   
1995 0.1452 0.2233 0.0569 1.1437 0.0634 0.3923 0.0876 0.043   
1996 0.1706 0.2671 -0.808 1.1625 0.0727 0.4754 0.1269 0.0522   
1997 0.2738 0.3809 -0.0854 0.8753 0.0943 0.3119 0.1188 0.0365   
1998 0.3003 0.4463 0.0967 0.8952 0.1105 0.3221 0.1437 0.0327   
1999 0.2293 0.3205 0.084 0.9635 0.07344 0.3665 0.1174 0.0345   
2000 0.2851 0.3867 0.094 0.8243 0.0837 0.3297 0.1275 0.0324   
2001 0.3335 0.4876 0.0862 0.8455 0.0735 0.2587 0.1261 0.0469   
2002 0.3056 0.4844 0.1 0.8605 0.0903 0.3272 0.1585 0.0402   
2003 0.2687 0.378 0.0842 0.8483 0.1049 0.3133 0.1184 0.0005   
2004 0.2823 0.4494 0.0944 0.8954 0.089 0.3343 0.1502 0.1014   
2005 0.332 0.5562 0.1647 0.8166 0.0666 0.4953 0.2755 0.028   
2006 0.3645 0.5624 0.1568 0.3467 0.0327 0.4301 0.2419 0.0237   
           
           
   FIRST  BANK        
     Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986 0.312 0.424 0.052 0.599 0.071 0.1663 0.0705 0.0244   
1987 0.302 0.409 0.055 0.648 0.087 0.1822 0.0745 0.0156   
1988 0.319 0.4 0.061 0.582 0.104 0.1926 0.0769 0.0176   
1989 0.282 0.415 0.0628 0.683 0.116 0.2223 0.0923 0.0192   
1990 0.195 0.251 0.035 0.69 0.168 0.1817 0.0456 -0.024   
1991 0.144 0.197 0.04 0.858 0.1391 0.2795 0.0551 -0.003   
1992 0.14 0.199 0.056 0.946 0.139 0.4014 0.0798 0.0219   
1993 0.091 0.187 0.063 1.036 0.143 0.4862 0.0908 0.0508   
1994 0.167 0.246 0.098 0.999 0.13 0.3599 0.0887 0.0322   
1995 0.198 0.291 0.091 0.941 0.121 0.4946 0.1441 0.0194   
1996 0.221 0.294 0.097 0.86 0.124 0.4102 0.1205 0.0179   
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1997 0.25 0.348 0.102 0.82 0.124 0.3839 0.1355 0.0235   
1998 0.278 0.402 0.0907 0.78 0.124 0.3679 0.1479 0.0277   
1999 0.248 0.381 0.0822 0.848 0.114 0.3653 0.1392 0.0311   
2000 0.197 0.278 0.0845 0.982 0.123 0.4175 0.1161 0.0296   
2001 0.223 0.322 0.0695 0.975 0.114 0.3773 0.1217 0.0299   
2002 0.228 0.372 0.0695 1.139 0.138 0.3043 0.1131 0.0175   
2003 0.148 0.228 0.0679 1.184 0.088 0.4599 0.1052 0.0327   
2004 0.217 0.327 0.11 0.969 0.095 0.5067 0.1656 0.0367   
2005 0.263 0.327 0.11 0.966 0.15 0.4025 0.0705 0.0322   
2006 0.263 0.316 0.1096 0.98 0.083 0.3104 0.0745 0.0368   
           
           
    
FIDELITY 
BANK     
  
    Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986           
1987           
1988           
1989 0.0688 0.1056 0.0268 1.3791 0.2477 0.3913 0.0424 0.052   
1990 0.0704 0.1069 0.0668 0.7826 0.1994 0.92 0.1039 0.0541   
1991 0.1088 0.1422 0.0636 0.9313 0.1527 0.5882 0.0821 0.0368   
1992 0.0821 0.1266 0.1093 1.1426 0.1661 1.333 0.1677 0.0652   
1993 0.1147 0.1729 0.1093 1.0695 0.2254 0.955 0.1643 0.054   
1994 0.2657 0.4342 0.1559 0.3749 0.2576 0.5878 0.2546 0.06   
1995 0.0188 0.4178 0.1204 1.3583 0.1184 0.646 0.2694 0.0499   
1996 0.2456 0.6731 0.09908 1.5924 0.0963 0.4029 0.271 0.0457   
1997 0.3367 0.6738 0.1622 0.9223 0.0985 0.4817 0.3244 0.0469   
1998 0.3968 0.737 0.1628 0.7345 0.1418 0.41 0.3022 0.0434   
1999 0.3467 0.5619 0.1339 0.6965 0.1667 0.3857 0.2164 0.0342   
2000 0.3424 0.4868 0.092 0.4493 0.1275 0.269 0.1309 0.0266   
2001 0.2267 0.3091 0.1022 0.6346 0.1695 0.4511 0.1394 0.0347   
2002 0.379 0.4826 0.1224 0.421 0.1668 0.323 0.1559 0.0405   
2003 0.35 0.4666 0.1116 0.6089 0.1466 0.3191 0.1489 0.0481   
2004 0.3997 0.5694 0.1278 0.8158 0.1545 0.3195 0.182 0.0391   
2005 0.4484 0.762 0.2611 0.9721 0.0447 0.5821 0.4435 0.0447   
2006 0.3867 0.5899 0.2133 0.2942 0.0298 0.5516 0.3255 0.0298   
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FIRST INLAND BANK 
    Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986           
1987           
1988           
1989 0.1514 0.4364 0.1023 2.295 0.0681 0.7 0.3043 0.0152   
1990 0.1297 0.1526 0.0752 0.8591 0.0835 0.5833 0.0888 0.0197   
1991 0.2197 0.3082 0.1451 0.8394 0.2274 0.6666 0.2048 0.0296   
1992 0.2519 0.3478 0.1459 0.8536 0.1532 0.5781 0.201 0.0347   
1993 0.2636 0.3636 0.0968 0.5096 0.0217 0.3684 0.1336 0.0275   
1994 0.3083 0.4615 0.1223 0.4411 0.1823 0.395 0.1706 0.0009   
1995 0.4733 0.7085 0.1185 0.396 0.206 0.25 0.177 0.0006   
1996 0.3562 0.543 0.1606 0.257 0.1436 0.4501 0.2444 0.0224   
1997 0.2985 0.3871 0.1357 0.5692 0.1013 0.4547 0.176 0.0342   
1998 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   
1999 0.3641 0.5062 0.098 0.5511 0.1727 0.269 0.1362 0.0335   
2000 0.3641 0.5377 0.2044 0.5347 0.1642 0.5908 0.3176 0.0129   
2001 0.3779 0.5838 0.1632 0.6961 0.1344 0.4319 0.2521 0.0204   
2002 0.4175 0.6882 0.1381 0.6276 0.1705 0.3307 0.2276 0.0359   
2003 0.4065 0.6616 0.9944 0.5929 0.1468 0.2446 0.1619 0.0194   
2004 0.4218 0.6893 0.1376 0.49 0.1364 0.326 0.2247 0.0199   
2005 0.4218 0.6893 0.1375 0.1375 0.49 0.326 0.2247 0.0199   
2006 0.2531 0.6892 0.4126 0.4126 0.49 0.7738 0.8659 0.0149   
           
           
    
GUARANTY 
TRUST BANK     
  
     Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986           
1987           
1988           
1989           
1990           
1991           
1992 0.0931 0.1236 0.0584 1.085 0.0897 0.6285 0.0779 0.0464   
1993 0.1877 0.2642 0.0656 0.9969 0.1407 0.3494 0.0921 0.0921   
1994 0.228 0.3507 0.0599 1.0933 0.1394 0.2623 0.092 0.1236   
1995 0.2061 0.2934 0.0495 1.0503 0.0536 0.2399 0.0703 0.0505   
1996 0.279 0.4369 0.0863 0.1352 0.0938 0.3094 0.1351 0.0857   
1997 0.3558 0.5899 0.0951 0.4658 0.1003 0.2673 0.1577 0.0643   
1998 0.3662 0.6482 0.1037 0.6024 0.942 0.2832 0.1836 0.0456   
1999 0.3858 0.7673 0.1242 0.4575 0.1166 0.3219 0.2471 0.0452   
2000 0.2272 0.5236 0.0875 0.5438 0.1291 0.3854 0.2017 0.0382   
2001 0.3103 0.5248 0.101 0.6911 0.0382 0.3254 0.1708 0.0502   
2002 0.3072 0.5807 0.134 0.7402 0.1347 0.4364 0.2534 0.0448   
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2003 0.3787 0.6179 0.116 0.612 0.1494 0.3862 0.1892 0.0456   
2004 0.3776 0.6089 0.097 0.4311 0.1164 0.257 0.1565 0.0404   
2005 0.4001 0.7029 0.184 0.4967 0.112 0.4598 0.3233 0.0417   
2006 0.285 0.4085 0.1195 0.35 0.0758 0.4191 0.1712 0.0328   
           
           
    IBL       
      Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986           
1987           
1988           
1989           
1990           
1991 1.1418 -0.1541 1 -1.4923 2.614 0.8765 -0.1352 0.6428   
1992 0.2173 -0.598 0.0978 -1.7796 0.2257 0.4495 -0.2685 0.085   
1993 0.207 -0.3844 0.0972 -0.7411 0.2877 0.4698 -0.1805 0.1395   
1994 0.1866 -0.3333 0.1188 -1.0419 0.1542 0.6369 -0.2122 0.1481   
1995 0.4375 -0.7451 0.1515 -0.7238 0.1439 0.3462 -0.2579 0.0927   
1996 0.8304 -0.7855 0.2852 -0.7895 0.2694 0.3434 -0.2579 0.1277   
1997 0.0346 0.0561 0.1546 0.537 0.1345 0.3032 0.2501 0.0808   
1998 0.0386 0.0571 0.1515 0.5295 0.1909 0.2983 0.2246 0.0849   
1999 0.3321 0.4584 0.1348 0.6683 0.1854 0.4059 0.1859 0.0786   
2000 0.3367 0.5181 0.1181 0.7309 0.1522 0.3509 0.1817 0.0819   
2001 0.3376 0.5138 0.0966 0.8479 0.1145 0.2861 0.147 0.0426   
2002 0.3045 0.409 0.1566 0.8479 0.1017 0.5142 0.2103 0.0497   
2003 0.3246 0.4614 0.1206 0.7129 0.0918 0.3714 0.1713 0.0478   
2004 0.3507 0.4804 0.1148 0.8269 0.096 0.3273 0.1572 0.3114   
2005 0.3365 0.5027 0.1982 0.8194 0.0866 0.589 0.2961 0.0408   
2006 0.4711 0.6739 0.1494 0.5956 0.0623 0.3171 0.2137 0.0305   
           
           
    IBTC       
     Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986           
1987           
1988           
1989 0.1539 0.3675 0.0704 1.7942 0.0282 0.4545 0.1685 0.0469   
1990 0.1568 0.233 0.0777 1.074 0.0249 0.4928 0.1144 0.057   
1991 0.1924 0.327 0.1257 1.1811 0.0574 0.6489 0.2133 0.0876   
1992 0.0954 0.5228 0.1326 4.4611 0.082 1.3908 0.7289 0.1322   
1993 0.0678 0.1771 0.1438 2.3043 0.0459 2.129 0.3756 0.2112   
1994 0.2756 0.7717 0.1961 1.9143 0.0549 0.7111 0.5487 0.2892   
1995 0.1459 2.2611 0.2577 1.1408 0.0526 1.7661 1.7662 0.2201   
1996 0.3514 1.1021 0.2647 1.6996 0.0647 0.7534 0.8303 0.231   
1997 0.4574 1.9633 0.3779 1.76 0.0833 0.8262 1.5592 0.1643   
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1998 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   
1999 0.3812 1.1366 0.2215 1.5998 0.0689 0.5809 0.6603 0.2399   
2000 0.3667 1.1243 0.5684 1.7021 0.0477 1.5497 1.9268 0.0875   
2001 0.4989 1.0706 0.272 0.6111 0.0333 0.5452 0.589 0.0869   
2002 0.4962 1.1459 0.1913 1.0011 0.0295 0.3855 0.4418 0.073   
2003 0.401 1.1737 0.2456 1.737 0.0297 0.6123 0.7188 0.0704   
2004 0.3579 0.9122 0.2156 1.4234 0.0241 0.6024 0.5495 0.0637   
2005 0.3954 1.2557 0.4129 1.8115 0.358 0.3127 1.3113 0.0872   
2006 0.5247 1.0186 0.2845 0.3042 0.0247 0.5421 0.5522 0.0489   
           
           
    
OCEANIC   
BANK     
  
      Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986           
1987           
1988           
1989           
1990           
1991           
1992           
1993           
1994           
1995           
1996 0.0282 0.3614 -0.035 0.396 0.0299 -1.2464 -0.4503 -0.014   
1997 0.3397 0.3955 -0.1828 0.5691 0.0718 -0.5381 0.2127 0.0812   
1998 0.2778 0.3881 0.0125 0.7296 0.0725 0.0444 0.0174 0.1207   
1999 0.2405 0.3641 0.0632 0.8716 0.0945 0.2625 0.0956 0.0323   
2000 0.1759 0.2502 0.0697 1.0571 0.0609 0.3962 0.0991 0.0638   
2001 0.2343 0.3237 0.1103 0.8948 0.129 0.4705 0.1523 0.0765   
2002 0.2115 0.2816 0.1044 0.8568 0.0862 0.4937 0.139 0.0585   
2003 0.2093 0.2754 0.1088 0.8891 0.1196 0.52 0.1433 0.0505   
2004 0.2857 0.36 0.1192 0.7455 0.1057 0.4172 0.1502 0.0396   
2005 0.3807 0.5378 0.1146 0.5121 0.0516 0.301 0.1619 0.0278   
2006 0.3353 0.5194 0.1541 0.2175 0.0215 0.1846 0.0958 0.0249   
           
           
    UBA       
     Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986           
1987 0.3179 0.3773 0.0505 0.5933 0.0818 0.1585 0.06 0.0187   
1988 0.2844 0.3419 0.0465 0.6505 0.0788 0.1633 0.0558 0.0417   
1989 0.3307 0.373 0.0452 0.5427 0.0781 0.1366 0.0509 0.0109   
1990 0.2207 0.2584 0.0415 0.6338 0.0907 0.1884 0.0486 0.0103   
1991 0.192 0.2048 0.0382 0.5291 0.1138 0.1987 0.0406 0.0013   
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1992 0.1961 0.2103 0.2709 0.597 0.1109 0.138 0.029 8E-05   
1993 0.2362 0.2914 0.0321 0.5438 0.1115 0.1361 0.0396 0.016   
1994 0.1778 0.2352 0.0649 0.6573 0.1413 0.3652 0.0859 0.0008   
1995 0.1407 0.1876 0.0817 0.8606 0.0943 0.5805 0.1088 0.0111   
1996 0.0815 0.1145 0.0824 0.9108 0.1169 1.011 0.1158 0.0239   
1997 0.0846 0.1238 0.9155 0.914 0.1178 1.0809 0.1338 0.0156   
1998 0.1474 0.2225 0.0683 0.8703 0.1076 0.4632 0.103 0.0003   
1999 0.1085 0.1482 0.051 0.8273 0.0899 0.4618 0.0684 0.0177   
2000 0.0799 0.1162 0.0565 1.0715 0.1251 0.7068 0.0822 0.0317   
2001 0.1693 0.2331 0.046 1.018 0.0966 0.2714 0.0633 0.0008   
2002 0.2071 0.3121 0.0492 1.013 0.1009 0.2374 0.0741 0.0113   
2003 0.2496 0.3523 0.0684 0.8643 0.0948 0.2744 0.0966 0.0239   
2004 0.2818 0.3873 0.0864 0.8577 0.0885 0.3068 0.1188 0.0268   
2005 0.2815 0.3417 0.0711 0.8198 0.0786 0.2525 0.0863 0.0251   
2006 0.1374 0.1544 0.0559 0.2442 0.0252 0.4072 0.0629 0.1069   
           
           
    UBN       
     Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986 _ _ _ _ _      
1987 0.326 0.4304 0.7568 0.274 0.092 0.1864 0.0854 0.0145   
1988 0.3517 0.457 0.7696 0.4226 0.104 0.1849 0.0847 0.1773   
1989 0.298 0.4116 0.7241 0.7214 0.114 0.2239 0.0923 0.019   
1990 0.2867 0.4154 0.6903 0.7094 0.14 0.246 0.1022 0.0138   
1991 0.1318 0.1782 0.7398 0.7791 0.1373 0.3847 0.0685 0.001   
1992 0.158 0.2401 0.0414 1.0914 0.1085 0.2621 0.0629 0.0004   
1993 0.1318 0.2097 0.0452 0.1408 0.1037 0.3432 0.0719 0.0192   
1994 0.1641 0.2852 0.0305 0.2139 0.1199 0.1855 0.0529 0.014   
1995 0.1472 0.2181 0.0226 0.1386 0.0922 0.1541 0.0336 0.0109   
1996 0.2086 0.2935 0.0306 0.1821 0.1243 0.1466 0.043 0.0157   
1997 0.2721 0.367 0.0383 0.0936 0.1091 0.1022 0.0516 0.0188   
1998 0.2386 0.3147 0.0552 0.0691 0.1154 0.2314 0.0728 0.0212   
1999 0.2071 0.2788 0.0806 0.9326 0.1237 0.3893 0.1085 0.0292   
2000 1.8138 0.2336 0.0699 0.7364 0.1741 0.3858 0.9012 0.1741   
2001 0.1662 0.209 0.0637 0.6301 0.1189 0.3833 0.0801 0.0296   
2002 0.1652 0.2225 0.1101 0.8145 0.0885 0.6666 0.1482 0.0272   
2003 0.1655 0.2432 0.0993 0.7854 0.0745 0.5999 0.1458 0.0308   
2004 0.213 0.3242 0.0978 0.8418 0.0787 0.4593 0.1489 0.0278   
2005 0.1975 0.3924 0.0546 0.1085 0.0825 0.4972 0.1951 0.03   
2006 0.2605 0.4896 0.0442 0.0831 0.0704 0.7094 0.3473 0.0238   
           
    
 
 
     
  
           
 237 
WEMA BANK 
     Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986           
1987 0.3841 0.418 0.0812 0.5716 0.2143 0.2071 0.0865 0.0006   
1988 0.2618 0.2837 0.0774 0.7271 0.2874 0.2934 0.085 0.0149   
1989 0.2231 0.2414 0.0754 0.7351 0.4797 0.3383 0.0815 0.1057   
1990 0.253 0.2743 0.0778 0.7057 0.4133 0.307 0.0841 0.1108   
1991 0.2249 0.2431 0.0752 0.6516 0.1283 0.3333 0.081 0.1189   
1992 0.3706 0.4045 0.0837 0.5956 0.1314 0.2253 0.0909 0.069   
1993 0.3229 0.3574 0.0964 0.3654 0.122 0.2992 0.1069 0.1397   
1994 0.1702 0.2323 0.079 1.0118 0.1046 0.4637 0.1077 0.3669   
1995 0.1487 0.2386 0.0626 1.2063 0.0835 0.4214 0.1004 0.2034   
1996 0.2728 0.3762 0.0765 0.7789 0.1178 0.2803 0.1054 0.0857   
1997 0.3522 0.5079 0.0941 0.6854 0.1101 0.2669 0.1356 0.0557   
1998 0.4326 0.5892 0.0833 0.6018 0.1005 0.1926 0.1134 0.0469   
1999 0.4809 0.6387 0.0963 0.5155 0.1377 0.2003 0.1279 0.0567   
2000 0.3187 0.4123 0.1017 0.5061 0.1652 0.3191 0.1315 0.0417   
2001 0.3812 0.4994 0.0669 0.7449 0.0993 0.1754 0.0876 0.0541   
2002 0.3876 0.5215 0.0854 0.6857 0.1276 0.2204 0.1149 0.1342   
2003 0.3833 0.5372 0.1176 0.7167 0.1212 0.3069 0.1648 0.0972   
2004 0.2815 0.4151 0.0811 0.1453 0.0591 0.288 0.1196 0.1177   
2005 0.3807 0.5378 0.1146 0.2335 0.0303 0.301 0.1619 0.0278   
2006 0.3353 0.5194 0.1541 0.1114 0.018 0.4596 0.2372 0.0249   
           
           
    ZENITH BANK       
Year BL/BA BL/BD CAP=SF/TA LAD=LA/BD EOM=OE/TA SHF/BL SHF/BD ROA   
1986           
1987           
1988           
1989           
1990           
1991 0.1094 0.1491 0.0802 0.7088 0.0477 0.7391 0.1107 0.1622   
1992 0.0692 0.1247 0.087 0.087 0.053 1.2642 0.1586 0.2096   
1993 0.197 0.4509 0.0864 0.0864 0.0675 0.4383 0.1978 0.2403   
1994 0.2143 0.3259 0.0817 0.0819 0.0646 0.3926 0.1246 0.2139   
1995 0.1281 0.296 0.0807 0.0808 0.0706 0.6319 0.1863 0.1602   
1996 0.1938 0.629 0.0684 0.0684 0.0608 0.353 0.2221 0.1382   
1997 0.2695 0.6048 0.0964 0.0964 0.0578 0.3576 0.2164 0.1454   
1998 0.2883 0.5281 0.1081 0.1081 0.0824 0.3751 0.1981 0.173   
1999 0.2905 0.5103 0.1503 0.1503 0.0627 0.5171 0.2639 0.0449   
2000 0.2165 0.4769 0.0126 0.0126 0.0812 0.043 0.0205 0.0457   
2001 0.2233 0.4246 0.1117 0.1117 0.0672 0.5162 0.2191 0.0465   
2002 0.2233 0.4122 0.1005 0.1005 0.0589 0.4503 0.1856 0.0432   
2003 0.2478 0.453 0.1124 0.1124 0.0892 0.4535 0.2054 0.0483   
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2004 0.2815 0.4151 0.0811 0.0811 0.0714 0.288 0.1196 0.0331   
2005 0.3807 0.5378 0.1146 0.5471 0.0551 0.31 0.1619 0.0278   
2006 0.3353 0.5194 0.1541 0.5921 0.0514 0.4597 0.2388 0.0249   
 
Where:  BL  = Bank Loans 
              BA  = Bank Assets 
              BD  = Bank Deposits 
             CAP = Capital Adequacy Ratios 
             SHF  = Shareholders Funds 
             TA    = Total Assets 
             LA    = Liquid Assets 
             LAD  = Liquidity  
             O/E   = Operating Expenses 
             ROA  = Return on Assets 
             EOM  = Efficiency of Management 
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     APPENDIX III 
MARKET CONCENTRATION OF KEY VARIABLES IN THE NIGERIAN BANKING 
INDUSTRY 
   1986 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 5995 11.28 311 11.22 4413 11.16 1869 11.35 
         
TOTAL 5995 11.28 311 11.22 4413 11.16 1869 11.35 
INDUSTRY 53124 100 1432 100 27320 100 5308 100 
         
   1987 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 6777 12.27 373 24.37 5010 17.8 2047 11.47 
UBA 5657 10.24 286 18.63 4767 16.94 1799 10.07 
UBN 5748 10.4 349 22.74 4074 14.47 1872 10.49 
         
WEMA 366 0.66 30 1.89 336 1.19 140 0.78 
         
TOTAL 18544 33.58 1006 65.75 14184 50.4 5857 32.87 
INDUSTRY 55210 100 1530.3 100 28140 100 17851 100 
         
         
   1988 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 7072 11.93 435 22.46 5646 19.43 2253 11.24 
UBN 6336 10.69 413 21.38 4877 16.78 2229 11.11 
UBA 7061 11.92 328 16.98 5873 20.2 2008 10.01 
AFRIBANK 2714 4.58 210 10.88 1734 5.96 1052 5.24 
WEMA 366 0.61 30 1.5 588978 2.02 140 0.7 
         
TOTAL 23545 40 1413 73.14 18715 64.39 7680 38 
INDUSTRY 59226.2 100 1932.4 100 29065.1 100 2051.5 100 
          
         
   1989  N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 8492 12.96 534 19.83 5785 21.28 2403 10.78 
UBA 9205 14.05 417 15.45 8159 30.01 3044 13.66 
UBN 7986 12.18 534 19.80 5783 21.27 2380 10.68 
AFRIBANK 2360 3.60 277 10.25 1656 6.09 1065 4.78 
WEMA 890 1.36 67 2.48 823 3.02 199 0.88 
FIB 132 0.2 14 0.48 46 0.16 20 0.89 
IBTC 214 0.33 15 0.55 89 0.32 33 0.04 
FIDELITY 328 0.5 9 0.29 213 0.77 23 0.09 
         
TOTAL 29604 45.18 1862 60 22550 82 9163 41 
INDUSTRY 65523.7 100 2692.3 100 27181.3 100 22276.3 100 
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   1990  N’ million     
BANK TA  MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 8482 10.22 300 8.08 6585 16.98 1651 6.40 
UBN 9242 11.13 653 17.56 6380 16.45 2650 10.28 
UBA 11351 13.68 472 12.72 9694 25.00 2505 9.72 
AFRIBANK 3387 4.08 288 7.75 2478 6.39 1074 4.16 
WEMA 1006 1.21 78 2.1 928 2.39 255 0.98 
ACCESS 197 0.23 15 0.4 153 0.39 4 0.02 
FIB 371 0.45 28 0.72 315 0.81 48 0.18 
FIDELITY 351 0.42 24 0.62 231 0.59 25 0.09 
IBTC 441 0.53 34 0.91 297 0.77 69 0.27 
         
TOTAL 34823 42 1890 51 27058 70 8 32 
INDUSTRY 82957.9 100 3712.7 100 38775.7 100 25782.8 100 
         
         
   1991  N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 11319 9.63 457 10.63 8287 15.81 1635 4.96 
UBN 13166 11.20 668 15.53 9740 1858 1737 0.05 
UBA 12684 10.79 484 11.26 11894 22.69 2435 7.4 
AFRIBANK 4494 3082 311 7.23 3257 6.21 1400 4.25 
WEMA 1402 1.19 106 2.44 1297 2.47 315 0.96 
ACCESS 219 0.18 18 0.42 82 0.16 25 0.07 
FIDELITY 622 0.52 40 0.93 476 0.90 68 0.2 
ZENITH 419 0.36 34 0.77 308 0.58 46 0.13 
FIB 234 0.19 34 0.77 166 0.32 51 0.15 
IBTC 487 0.41 61 1.42 287 0.54 93 0.28 
         
TOTAL 44446 38 2209 52 35264 67.38 7801 24 
INDUSTRY 117511.9 100 4300.8 100 52408.7 100 32912.4 100 
         
         
   1992 N’ million     
BANK TA  MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 16686 9.18 955 11.71 11965 15.73 2379 5.84 
UBN 23870 13.13 989 12.12 15712 20.65 3773 9.26 
UBA 18610 3.51 505 6.18 17356 22.81 3650 8.96 
AFRIBANK 6386 10.24 391 4.78 4757 6.25 1968 4.83 
WEMA 1705 0.94 143 1.74 1512 2.05 632 1.55 
ACCESS 543 0.3 26 0.3 271 3.56 69 0.17 
FIDELITY 699 0.38 76 0.93 453 0.59 57 0.13 
ZENITH 773 0.42 67 0.82 429 0.56 53 0.13 
GTB 1125 0.62 66 0.79 848 1.11 105 0.26 
DIAMOND 228 0.12 50 0.61 80 0.11 36 0.08 
         
TOTAL 71621 40 32266 41 52849 70 12718 32 
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INDUSTRY 181736.1 100 8157.2 100 76073.5 100 40731.6 100 
         
         
   1993  N’ million     
BANK TA  MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 23552 9.4 1494 20 16439 14.62 3073 6.9 
UBN 32008 12.77 993 13.31 20115 17.89 4219 9.46 
UBA 22975 9.18 739 9.91 18628 16.57 5429 12.18 
AFRIBANK 12770 5.09 893 11.97 10977 2.53 2024 4.54 
WEMA 3146 1.25 304 4.06 2842 2.53 1016 2.28 
ACCESS 960 0.38 57 0.76 365 0.32 123 0.28 
FIDELITY 872 0.35 95 1.27 579 0.51 100 0.22 
ZENITH 1481 0.59 128        1.7 647 0.58 292 0.65 
GTB 2323 0.92 152 2.04 1650 1.48 436 0.97 
DIAMOND 1305 0.52 96 1.27 672 0.59 14 0.003 
         
TOTAL 101391.3 40.4 4948 66.33 73 63.54 16854.5 37.8 
INDUSTRY 250600.4 100 7460.8 100 112407.4 100 44568.6 100 
         
         
   1994 N’ million     
BANK TA  MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 36552 11.28 2219 24.26 25022 17.57 6164 6.87 
UBN 43274 13.36 1318 14.14 24914 11.50 7105 7.92 
UBA 24282 7.49 1577 17.23 18354 12.88 4318 17.55 
AFRIBANK 16413 5.07 1041 11.38 18087 12.70 2658 2.96 
WEMA 6006 1.85 475 5.18 4399 3.01 1022 1.1 
ACCESS 1371 0.42 76 0.82 624 0.44 245 0.27 
IBTC 3591 1.11 704 7.69 1283 0.9 990 0.02 
ZENITH 3064 0.95 251 2.74 2015 1.41 657 0.73 
GTB 4863 1.5 291 3.18 3161 0.02 1109 1.24 
DIAMOND 2887 0.89 208 2.26 2158 0.02 329 0.37 
         
TOTAL 142303.3 44 8157 89 100014.3 70.23 24593.8 39.03 
INDUSTRY 324002.1 100 9148 100 142399.2 100 89756 100 
         
         
   1995 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 63872 13.78 3225 24 43464 23.32 12666 9.03 
UBN 76432 16.48 1734 12.53 51607 27.69 11255 8.03 
UBA 44200 9.53 3611 26.10 33162 17.79 6220 4.44 
AFRIBANK 26041 5.62 2269 0.16 2125 1.14 6143 4.38 
WEMA 10020 2.16 628 0.04 6243 3.35 1490 1.061 
ACCESS 2351 0.51 97 0.69 852 0.45 241 0.17 
FIB 1126 0.24 133 0.96 752 0.4 532 0.38 
ZENITH 520 1.1 412 2.97 2205 1.18 653 0.4 
GTB 10943 2.35 542 3.91 7689 4.13 2256 1.16 
DIAMOND 7040 1.51 131 2.89 4576 2.45 1022 0.73 
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TOTAL 199894 43 13147 95 152233.7 81.68 42657.8 30.4 
INDUSTRY 463671.4 100 13833.7 100 186373.6 100 140225.4 100 
         
         
   1996 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 77269 14.41 14568 26.22 58214 25.84 17108 10.85 
UBN 80055 14.93 2449 14.05 56914 25.26 16704 10.60 
UBA 52016 9.70 4287 24.60 37019 16.43 4240 2.69 
AFRIBANK 2676 4.99 2407 13.81 18446 8.19 9450 5.99 
WEMA 10734 2.00 821 4.71 7785 3.45 2929 1.86 
ACCESS 1176 0.02 151 0.86 667 0.29 328 0.2 
IBTC 5713 1.06 1512 8.67 1822 0.81 2007 1.23 
ZENITH 9781 1.82 731 4.19 3013 1.34 1895 1.2 
GTB 11790 2.20 1018 5.84 7532 3.34 3290 2.09 
DIAMOND 10163 1.89 825 4.73 6491 2.88 1734 1.1 
         
TOTAL 285457.3 53.25 16705 95 197904.3 87 59682.3 37.87 
INDUSTRY 536057.9 100 17425.3 100 225298.7 100 157568.8 100 
         
         
   1997 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 141052 24.14   64455 23.88 22764 9.79 
UBN 85850 14.69 3289 14.07 63654 23.59 23364 10.03 
UBA 57782 9.89 5296 22.65 39521 14.65 4894 2.1 
AFRIBANK 34366 5.88 2879 12.31 26342 9.76 12700 0.54 
WEMA 13442 2.3 1264 5.41 9321 3.45 4735 2.03 
ACCESS 1777 0.3 184 0.79 1195 0.44 719 0.31 
IBTC 5260 0.9 1988 8.51 1275 0.47 2406 1.03 
ZENITH 16017 2.74 1544 6.61 7139 2.65 4317 1.86 
GTB 16170 2.77 1539 6,58 9753 3.61 5754 2.47 
DIAMOND 13273 2.27 1134 4,85 9544 3.54 3636 1.56 
         
TOTAL 384986 65.87 19110 81 232196.3 86 85285.7 36.67 
INDUSTRY 584375 100 23374.9 100 269847.2 100 232506.5 100 
         
         
   1998 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 102418 14.74 10462 20.41 70697 22.49 28430 10.83 
UBN 109586 15.78 6053 11.81 83093 26.44 26148 9.96 
UBA 73751 10.62 5036 9.82 48858 15.54 10872 4.14 
AFRIBANK 5595 0.81 70 0.13 4006 1.27 1555 0.59 
WEMA 17269 2.49 1439 2.81 12680 4.03 7471 2.85 
ACCESS 1714 0.25 1714 3.34 952 0.3 685 0.26 
IBL 12575 1.81 1906 3.72 8486 2.7 6386 2.43 
ZENITH 21736 3.13 2351 4.58 11867 3.78 6267 2.39 
GTB 19133 2.75 1984 3.87 10808 3.44 7006 2.67 
DIAMOND 17358 2.5 1680 3.28 11676 3.71 5212 1.99 
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TOTAL 3811296 54.8 32690.5 63.77 263121.9 83.37 100028 38.1 
INDUSTRY 694615.1 100 51258.7 100 314303.5 100 262529.9 100 
         
         
   1999 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 137869 12.88 12510 17.66 89868 18.87 34235 10.12 
UBN 138342 12.93 11159 15.75 102775 21.58 28662 8.48 
UBA 99978 9.34 5011 7.01 73207 15.37 10850 3.21 
AFRIBANK 41400 3.87 1726 2.44 33877 7.11 14400 4.26 
WEMA 17925 1.68 173 0.24 13497 2.83 8621 2.55 
ACCESS 4878 0.46 4878 6.88 2733 0.57 1260 0.37 
IBL 9770 0.93 2208 3.12 3345 0.7 3801 1.12 
ZENITH 34024 3.18 5113 7.22 19375 4.07 9887 2.92 
GTB 20626 1.93 2563 3.62 10369 2.18 7957 2.35 
DIAMOND 26633 2.49 2238 3.16 19049 3.99 6406 1.89 
         
TOTAL 531648.2 49.68 47574 67 368094.3 77.27 126082 37.28 
INDUSTRY 1070020 100 70841.8 100 476350.9 100 338160.4 100 
         
         
   2000 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 194744 12.80 16016 15.67 138003 19.95 38360 11.11 
UBN 188326 12.38 13175 12.89 146190 21.13 34147 9.89 
UBA 119987 7.89 6782 6.63 82518 11.93 9595 2.79 
IBL 23503 1.55 2776 2.71 15272 2.21 7913 2.29 
WEMA 22752 1.49 2314 2.26 17585 2.54 7251 2.1 
GTB 35597 2.34 3117 3.05 15446 2.23 8087 2.34 
AFRIBANK 63250 4.16 2040 1.99 54881 7.93 12867 3.73 
DIAMOND 30473 2 2865 2.8 22464 3.21 8689 2.51 
ACCESS 8435 0.55 842 0.82 4401 0.64 3127 0.9 
ZENITH 40757 2.68 514 0.5 25035 3.62 11939 3.46 
         
TOTAL 727824.5 47.8 50442 49.3 521793 75.42 141972.3 41 
INDUSTRY 1521158 100 102235.6 100 691794.3 100 345327.8 100 
         
         
   2001 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 224007 10.34 18932 10.98 155598 16.42 50170 18.97 
UBN 238311 10.99 15191 8.81 189605 20.01 39631 6.71 
UBA 181248 8.46 8427 4.89 133135 14.05 31041 5.29 
OCEANIC 32320 1.49 3564 2.07 23388 2.47 7574 4.45 
WEMA 38813 1.79 2596 1.51 29631 3.13 14799 1.01 
GTB 40869 1.88 4124 2.39 24139 2.55 12667 1.98 
AFRIBANK 71839 3.31 2823 1.64 58287 6.15 21122 1.69 
DIAMOND 47372 2.19 4086 2.37 32398 3.42 15798 2.82 
ACCESS 8001 0.37 917 53 4832 0.51 2795 2.11 
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ZENITH 60190 2.78 6725 3.9 30688 3.24 13029 0.37 
         
TOTAL 944920 43.59 67384.2 39 681701.3 71.97 208030 1.74 
INDUSTRY 2167260 100 172415.6 100 947182.9 100 748144.2 27.88 
         
         
   2002 N’ million     
BANK TA  MSP  TCR MSP  TD MSP  LA MSP 
FBN 224007 10.34 20202 10.98 178603 16.42 66384 7.85 
UBN 238311 10.99 30302 8.81 204347 20.01 45486 5.38 
UBA 181248 8.46 9782 4.89 131866 14.05 41150 4.87 
OCEANIC 53294 1.97 5565 2.38 40028 3.22 11272 1.33 
WEMA 44101 1.63 3768 1.61 32775 2.64 17093 2.02 
GTB 59292 2.19 7950 3.4 31373 2.52 18217 2.15 
AFRIBANK 73088 2.7 4332 1.85 56955 4.58 31138 3.68 
DIAMOND 53199 1.97 5320 2.28 33556 2.7 16255 1.92 
ACCESS 11343 0.42 1944 0.83 6475 0.52 4980 0.58 
ZENITH 92563 3.42 9306 3.98 50134 4.03 20665 2.44 
         
TOTAL 1151347 43 98471 42.11 766112.3 61 372640 32 
INDUSTRY 2705749 100 233789.7 100 1243404 100 845682.8 100 
         
         
   2003 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 409083 13.42 27800 9.54 264245 19.76 60439 5.8 
UBN 329583 10.81 32730 11.24 224347 16.77 54560 5.2 
UBA 200995 6.59 13767 4.73 142427 10.65 50178 4.8 
ZENITH 112535 3.69 12652 4.34 61574 4.6 27895 2.68 
GTB 83311 2.73 9661 3.32 51068 3.82 31556 3.03 
ACCESS 22582 0.74 2365 0.81 9309 0.69 71350 0.68 
WEMA 61323 2.01 7215 2.48 43762 3.27 23508 2.26 
AFRIBANK 83144 2.73 6546 2.25 61195 4.57 33845 3.25 
IBL 71412 2.34 8611 2.96 50245 3.76 23187 2.26 
DIAMOND 59287 1.95 4993 1.71 42147 3.15 15932 1.53 
         
TOTAL 1433255 47 126340 43.3 950319 71 328235.3 31.5 
INDUSTRY 3047856 100 291252 100 1337296.2 100 1041663 100 
         
         
   2004 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
UBN 367788 9.80 35985 12.36 241585 14.54 78338 6.05 
FBN 384211 10.24 42311 14.52 255491 15.38 83500 6.45 
UBA 208806 5.56 18059 6.20 151929 9.14 58855 4.55 
GTB 119698 3.19 31999 10.98 74222 4.47 45198 3.49 
ZENITH 193321 5.15 15674 5.38 131095 7.89 54420 4.20 
DIAMOND 69062 1.84 6520 2.24 43391 2.61 19500 1.51 
WEMA 71424 1.91 8040 2.76 55072 3.31 36607 2.83 
AFRIBANK 70578 1.88 5317 1.83 57989 3.49 26482 2.05 
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IBL 87006 2.32 9988 3.43 63508 3.82 30514 2.36 
         
ACCESS 31342       0.83 2702       0.93 22724 1.37 12341 0.95 
TOTAL 1603245 42.7 176584.6 60.6 1097005.6 60 445755.6 34.43 
INDUSTRY 1753278 100 291151.2 100 1661482 100 1294449.5 100 
         
           
   2005 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 470839 10.43 49805 8.42 332196 16.31 123739 6.65 
ZENITH 329717 7.30 37790 6.39 233413 11.46 125531 6.75 
UBN 398271 8.82 39129 6.61 200511 9.85 78684 4.23 
IBL 164348 3.64 32576 5.51 110014 5.4 55316 2.97 
UBA 248928 5.51 177020 2.99 205110 10.07 70086 3.77 
GTB 167898 3.72 30895 5.22 95564 4.69 67179 3.61 
OCEANIC 329717 7.3 37790 6.39 233413 11.46 125531 6.75 
DIAMOND 125675 2.78 20710 3.5 75166 3.69 41805 2.25 
 ACCESS 66918 1.48 14072 2.38 32608 1.61 17942 0.96 
AFRIBANK 95754 2.12 21387 3.61 61601 3.03 30543 1.64 
         
 TOTAL 2398065 53.11 301856.3 51 1579596 77 736346 39.6 
TOTAL 
INDUSTRY 4515118 100 591738.7 100 2036089.9 100 1859555 100 
         
         
   2006 N’ million     
BANK TA MSP TCR MSP TD MSP LA MSP 
FBN 538145 8.41 58996 6.19 391169 11.36 190004 8.12 
ZENITH 608505 9.51 93801 9.84 392864 11.41 204057 8.73 
UBN 517564 8.09 95685 10.04 275457 8 134864 5.77 
IBL 360903 5.64 53911 5.66 252281 7.33 170035 7.27 
UBA 851241 3.30 47621 4.99 757407 22 116960 5.00 
GTB 305081 4.77 36446 3.82 212834 6.18 86958 3.72 
OCEANIC 608505 9.51 37670 3.95 392864 11.41 204057 8.73 
DIAMOND 223048 3.48 3497 3.67 144570 4.2 81306 3.58 
 ACCESS 174554 2.73 28844 3.03 11.879 3.22 60941 2.61 
AFRIBANK 131270 2.05 27059 2.84 94816 2.75 48224 2.66 
         
 TOTAL 4318816 67 515003.3 54 3025141 87 1297406 55.47 
TOTAL 
INDUSTRY 6400783 100 953001.2 100 3442000 100 2338718.8 100 
 
SOURCE:  COMPILED FROM APPENDIX 1 
Where TA: Total Assets    LA: Loans and Advances 
             MSP: Market Share Power 
            TCR: Total Capital Reserves/Shareholders fund 
            TD: Total Deposits 
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APPENDIX IV: AGGREGATE CONCENTRATION RATIO IN THE BANKING 
INDUSTRY 
(USING % METHOD) 
  
YEAR TA (MSP) TCP (MSP) TD (MSP) L&A(MSP) 
SAMPLED 
BANKS Banks 
1986 11.28 11.22 11.16 11.35 1  29 
1987 33.58 65.75 50.4 32.8 5  34 
1988 40 73.14 64.39 38 5  42 
1989 45.18 69 82 41 8  47 
1990 42 51 70 32 9  58 
1991 38 52 67.38 24 10  65 
1992 40 41 70 32 10  65 
1993 40.4 66.33 63.54 37.8 10  66 
1994 44 89 70.23 27.39 10  65 
1995 43 95 81.68 30.4 10  64 
1996 53.25 95 87 37.87 10  64 
1997 65.87 81 86 36.67 10  54 
1998 54.8 63.77 83.37 38.1 10  54 
1999 49.68 67 77.27 37.28 10  54 
2000 47.8 49.3 75.42 41 10  54 
2001 43.59 39 71.97 27.88 10  90 
2002 43 42.11 61 32 10  90 
2003 47 43.3 71 31.5 10  89 
2004 42.7 60.6 66 34.43 10  89 
2005 53.11 51 77 39.6 10  89 
2006 67 54 87 55.47 10  25 
        
 SOURCE: COMPUTED FROM APPENDIX 111    
        
 WHERE: MSP= Market Share Percentage   
  TA= Total Assets    
  TCR= Total Capital & Reserves/Shareholders fund.   
  TD= Total Deposits    
  LA Loans & Advances    
  Banks= Commercial Banks    
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APPENDIX V:  CONCENTRATION RATIO IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY (USING %) 
  
       
YEAR 
TA 
(MSP) 
TCR 
(MSP) 
TD 
(MSP) 
L&A 
(MSP) 
BIG 4 
(MSP) BANKS 
1986 11.28 11.22 11.16 11.35 1 29 
1987 32.91 65.74 49.21 32.03 4 34 
1988 39.73 71.7 62.37 32.6 4 42 
1989 42.79 65.33 72.56 39.9 4 47 
1990 39.11 46.11 64.82 30.56 4 58 
1991 35.11 44.65 63.27 16.66 4 65 
1992 36.06 34.79 65.44 28.89 4 65 
1993 36.44 55.19 58.84 33.08 4 66 
1994 37.2 67.28 60.65 22.56 4 65 
1995 42.14 66.54 72.93 23.11 4 64 
1996 44.03 78.68 75.72 29.83 4 64 
1997 54.6 54.44 71.88 22.48 4 64 
1998 44.27 46.62 68.25 27.32 4 54 
1999 39.02 42.86 62.63 26.07 4 54 
2000 37.23 37.18 60.94 27.52 4 54 
2001 33.1 26.32 56.57 18.97 4 90 
2002 30.95 27.63 45.97 21.78 4 90 
2003 34.51 29.85 51.78 19.11 4 89 
2004 30.75 38.46 46.95 21.54 4 89 
2005 32.06 24.41 47.69 21.4 4 89 
2006 39.31 31.06 52.77 27.62 4 25 
       
  SOURCE: COMPUTED FROM APPENDIX 111  
       
  WHERE: MSP= Market Share Percentage 
   TA= Total Assets  
   TCR= 
 
Total Capital & 
Reserves/Shareholders fund  
   TD= Total Deposits  
   LA Loans & Advances  
   Banks= Commercial Banks  
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APPENDIX VI: THE FOUR BIG BANKS IN NIGERIA (1986-2006) 
      
YEAR FBN UBA UBN AFRIBANK ZENITH 
1986 * * * *  
1987 * * * *  
1988 * * * *  
1989 * * * *  
1990 * * * *  
1991 * * * *  
1992 * * * *  
1993 * * * *  
1994 * * * *  
1995 * * * *  
1996 * * * *  
1997 * * * *  
1998 * * *  * 
1999 * * * *  
2000 * * * *  
2001 * * * *  
2002 * * * *  
2003 * * * *  
2004 * * *  * 
2005 * * *  * 
2006 * * *  * 
      
 SOURCE:  
COMPILED FROM 
APPENDIX V  
      
Where:  FBN: First Bank of Nigeria   
 UBA: United Bank for Africa   
 UBN: Union Bank of Nigeria   
 Afri :  AfriBank of Nigeria   
 Zenith:  Zenith Bank of Nigeria  
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APPENDIX VII 
 BANKING INDUSTRY: FOUR FIRM CON.RATIO USING  
 FIVE YEARS INTERVAL (1986-2006)      USING PERCENTAGE METHOD    
       
 YEAR                                                                                   TA(MSP) TCR(MSP) 
TD 
(MSP) 
LA 
(MSP) Av No. of Banks 
 1987-1991 38 58.7 62.46 31.35 8.13 
 1992-1996 39.17 60.5 66.71 27.49 6.17 
 1997-2001 41.64 41.84 64.05 24.47 6.32 
 2002-2006 33.52 30.28 49.03 22.29 5.24 
       
 SOURCE: COMPILED FROM APPENDIX V   
       
 Where:  TA: Total Assets    
  TCR: Total Capital & Reserves/Shareholders fund   
  TD: Total Deposits    
  LA: Loans & Advances   
 
  
MSP: Market Share Percentage 
 
 
APPENDIX VIII 
   
 BANKING INDUSTRY:  TEN FIRM CON. RATIO USING FIVE YEARS  
 AVERAGE INTERVAL (1986-2006) USING PERCENTAGE METHOD 
       
 YEAR                              TA(MSP) TCR (MSP) 
TD 
(MSP) 
LA 
(MSP) Av No. of Banks 
 1987-1991 32 62.18 66.83 33.58 15 
 1992-1996 44.13 77.26 74.49 33.09 15 
 1997-2001 53.35 60.01 78.81 36.18 16 
 2002-2006 50.56 50.2 72.4 38.6 13 
       
 SOURCE: COMPILED FROM APPENDIX V   
       
 Where:  TA: Total Assets    
  TCR: Total Capital & Reserves/Shareholders fund   
  TD: Total Deposits    
  LA: Loans & Advances   
  MSP: Market Share Percentage   
  CON: Concentration    
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